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Report on Corrections 
 
Parts before Chapter 1: Examiners provided no specific instructions. I changed the 
tone and wording to match subsequent changes in the dissertation.  
I have also modified the introductions and conclusions of every chapter that contain 
corrections. 
 
Chapter 1: The author needs to clarify the relationship between belief and 
make-belief. He attributes the view that belief and make-belief are inconsistent 
to a number of authors (Currie, Walton), but it is implausible that they hold 
this view. The author also seems to accept the view, but he provides little ar-
gument for it, nor does he address arguments (presented by Nichols and oth-
ers) that it is possible to simultaneously imagine that p and believe that p. 
 
Me: I removed the incorrect views on Currie and Walton, and indicated that Nichols 
and Stich’s view will be addressed in Chapter 2 since it indeed provides a somewhat 
plausible defence that leads to a deeper understanding of the so-called problems of 
make-believe theories proposed by Friend.  
 
The author needs to reconsider the argument against Lamarque and Olsen on 
the top of page 33. (It is hard to see why the rejection of assertions in fictional 
works presents a difficulty for making sense of learning from fiction.) 
 
Me: I have cancelled this point. 
 
The author needs to reconsider his claim that Walton would exclude In Cold 
Blood and Schindler’s Ark from the category of fiction. This is inconsistent 
with standard interpretations of Walton and, hence, should be dropped or de-
fended in much greater detail. 
 
Me: I have cancelled this view, and adopted the mainstream view that Walton’s ac-
count is too inclusive since it includes nonfiction made with intentional fabrications 
In Cold Blood as a work of fiction. 
 
Chapter 2: The author needs to clarify the Currie/Ravenscroft claim that imag-
ination ‘mimics’ belief in virtue of sharing an inferential pattern. The material 
on p. 53 seems to show a misunderstanding of the view (the inferential pattern 
for imagining is meant to be ‘within’ imagination as it were), and the later ar-
guments against C&R seem to infer from the fact that there are inferential dif-
ferences that there are not similarities. 
 
Me: I cancelled my criticisms of Currie and Ravenscroft, and added the account of 
Nichols and Stich to explain how pretence/make-believe imagination resembles be-
lief. As a result, I changed my initial rejection of imagination-based theories, now 
believing that they have not explained the functional role of make-believe when 
comprehending works of fiction. Nichols’s examples of pretence all have their spe-
cific functional roles, so, comparatively, it is unclear about what the functional role 
of make-believe imagination in fiction is. It does not mean that make-believe theo-
ries are to be rejected. I only maintain that they are not sufficiently substantiated. I 
then made the point that my account will explain as much in a later part of my pro-
2 
ject, even though it has the cost of undermining the relation between fiction and 
make-believe. 
 
Chapter 3: This chapter is the most problematic section of the dissertation and 
requires a thorough reworking. The reworking might either sketch Friend’s 
view and note that Friend is not strictly speaking offering a definition of fiction 
but then argue that this is too pessimistic for the author will produce a worka-
ble definition later. Or it might defend the claims made against Walton and 
Friend The author needs to reconsider his interpretation of both Walton and 
Friend. The claim that Walton cannot recognize impressionist paintings as 
paintings (p. 83) is implausible. If this is true, the author needs to do much 
more to establish it. (And it would be worthy of a paper on its own.) There are 
three major issues with the interpretation of Friend: (1) the author criticizes 
Friend for presenting an unsuccessful definition of fiction, but Friend does not 
appear to offer a definition of fiction, (2) it is entirely unclear why Friend can-
not accept the existence of cross-media genres (whether or not Walton allows 
for them). It is worth remembering that Friend’s account of genre is not pre-
cisely the same as Walton’s account of categories since she is not focused on 
‘perceptual categories’; (3) the author runs together the standard features with 
the intentional-historical features in Friend’s definition. 
 
Me: I cancelled my criticisms against Walton, and thus rendered the part on Walton 
purely descriptive. For (1), I maintain that, even as a signpost for further research, 
Friend is not addressing the problem addressed by make-believe theories, and added 
an argument followed from my revision in Chapter 2 that there is no good reason to 
abandon the clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction proposed by imagina-
tion-based theories to buy into her approach. I pointed out that the foundation of 
Friend’s genre theory is the failure of make-believe in her eyes. However, my re-
vised version of chapter 2 shows that her criticisms can indeed be addressed by 
make-believe theories, given some deep understanding of the similarity between 
imagination and belief. I cancelled (2) and (3). 
 
Chapter 4: The ingenious argument against Deutsch’s account of fiction needs 
to be fleshed out in more detail. In particular, the assumptions that are re-
quired to make the argument should be made more explicit and a consideration 
of potential replies by Deutsch should be included. 
 
Me: I cancelled my application of Russell’s Paradox when discussing P2. I added 
how Deutsch may respond to my argument against his P1 and have added other 
problematic cases, in which P1 and P2 together lead to at least one very undesirable 
consequence if Deutsch’s account is to be accepted.  
 
Chapter 5: No change needed.  
 
Me: No changes made.  
 
Chapter 6&7: The discussion of interior properties is a bit quick. Is it obvious 
that characterization, for example, is an interior/intrinsic property of a fiction? 
The nature of a fictional character often depends on things that are true in oth-
er fictions (e.g., consider the nature of a vampire). There are similar concerns 
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about style of writing (which may depend on an author’s corpus). The examin-
ers would like to see these issues discussed. 
 
Me: I added the relevant discussion on how the focus on interior properties in my 
preliminary idea of fiction is not affected by the discussions of characterisation and 
writing style by maintaining that (1) the interior properties are an always important 
focus but not the only focus; and (2) the interior properties of a work of fiction are 
still necessary when discussing characterisation and writing style of a particular 
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The question of what exactly constitutes a work of fiction has been contested for 
decades, with no clear conclusion. While there are several factions of philosophers, 
each with their preferred definitions, none are widely accepted definitions. Most, 
when used, often include some works of nonfiction as works of fiction, or exclude 
some works that are clearly works of fiction. In this thesis, I will use an interdisci-
plinary methodology to provide a new definition of fiction that avoids these pitfalls. 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I show that it is implausible to take propositional imagination 
as a necessary component of a definition of fiction without any further clarification 
of the role of make-believe imagination in fiction and that a plausible definition of 
fiction should not include the role of the audience. 
 
In Chapter 3, I evaluate Stacie Friend’s genre approach, as probably the most popu-
lar non-make-believe approach.  
 
In Chapter 4, I cover Harry Deutsch’s often-ignored approach, discuss its problems, 
and outline its contributions. 
 
In Chapter 5, I reject Matravers’s scepticism by showing that there is a meaningful 




In Chapter 6, I construct my own definition of fiction by interpreting the findings 
from in Chapter 5 along with the concepts of interior properties, phenomenal con-
cept, and end value. I then address the issue of assertions in fiction, why it is such a 
problem for many existing definitions, and how it can be overcome by my defini-
tion. 
 
In Chapter 7, I discuss miscellaneous issues that arise in defining fiction, address 
them using my definition, and how my account complements an iconic theory in a 
related debate. 
 
In Chapter 8, I conclude the work with an overview of what I have argued, my defi-
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 The definition of fiction has been a hotly contested question in the world of 
philosophy since the early 1990s. In my thesis, I will contribute to this discussion by 
first demonstrating that the most widely accepted theories of fiction are not suffi-
ciently well-argued for, then showing that fiction is distinct from nonfiction in a 
meaningful way, then providing a new definition of fiction free from any of the de-
fects found in the currently available theories.  
 I have arranged my project to start with an overview of the dominant theo-
ries of fiction, beginning with those that contain imagination as a necessary com-
ponent. After demonstrating that they are implausible, I will introduce an alterna-
tive: a genre approach to explaining the idea of fiction, which still contains imagi-
nation as a component, albeit an optional one. Although this approach may not be 
a fully worked-out definition of fiction, I will still argue that the plausibility of 
adopting such approach is questionable. Having evaluated those theories contain-
ing imagination, I will address and evaluate Deutsch’s poetic license theory. 
 After showing that the dominant theories of fiction are implausible, I will 
then address the sceptical argument, which argues that a definition of fiction is 
unnecessary because there is no meaningful distinction between fiction and non-
fiction. I will show how this scepticism is founded on a misunderstanding of certain 




 Having now cleared the field, I will introduce my own definition of fiction, 
and demonstrate its plausibility in the face of issues that cannot be satisfactorily 




In Chapters 1 and 2, I show that it is not sufficiently plausible to take propo-
sitional imagination as a necessary condition of fiction without further clarifying 
the functional role of imagination when one is either creating or comprehending a 
work of fiction and that a plausible definition of fiction should not presume any 
role of the audience. 
In Chapter 3, I question the plausibility of Friend’s genre approach, even 
without taking it as a fully worked out theory of fiction, like those make-believe 
theories.  
In Chapter 4, I cover Deutsch’s often-ignored approach. Although it is im-
plausible as a definition of fiction, it does show that fiction can be defined without 
imagination and in a way that does not require the role audience. 
In Chapter 5, I reject Matravers’s scepticism by showing that there is a 
meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction, particularly in the normative 
aspect, using the findings from social science experiments.  
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In Chapter 6, I construct my own definition of fiction by interpreting the 
findings mentioned in chapter 5 along with the concepts of interior properties, 
phenomenal concepts, and end value. I then address the issue of assertions in fic-
tion, showing why it is such a problem for many existing definitions of fiction, and 
how my definition can accommodate it. 
In Chapter 7, I discuss miscellaneous issues that arise in defining fiction, in-
cluding those that challenge general definitions of fiction as well as my own, such 
as the question of whether myths are fiction. I finish by using my definition to re-
solve these issues. 
 
The Significance of This Project 
 
My project differs from all other research on the topic in several key ways. 
First, I produce a new definition of fiction that does not explain fiction in terms of 
imagination and is thus free of the problems associated with the dominant, imagi-
nation-based approach. While Deutsch’s account is also non-imagination-based, it 
leads to undesirable results, as I will demonstrate. 
Second, my project uses a unique methodology that involves making use of 
both social science findings and philosophical theories. This demonstrates the in-
terdisciplinary significance of research about fiction, and how the strengths of so-
cial science research (regulated data gathering and objective verification of find-
ings, particularly when it comes to intuition tests) and philosophy (conceptual 
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analysis, evaluation of arguments, and well-structured argumentation) can com-
plement each other and enhance both fields. 
Finally, my project makes use of valuable philosophical ideas that have yet 
to be used for defining fiction. While most philosophers in this debate work with a 
similar set of ideas, such as imagination and intention, I show how other ideas, in-
cluding phenomenal concept, interior properties, and end value, are also very use-
ful.  
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Chapter 1  
Imagination-Based Theories of Fiction 
 
I will begin by addressing the dominant theories of fiction, which I call “im-
agination-based theories”. These types of theories take imagination to be a neces-
sary condition of any work of representation to be works of fiction, and they usual-
ly emphasise on authorial intention. In this chapter, I will discuss the implausibility 
of imagination-based theories and show that despite the implausibility of these 
theories generally, the emphasis on authorial intention is plausible. 
There are two types of imagination-based theories: the first is the bottom 
up approach, in which fiction is defined in terms of fictive utterances. This includes 
theories by Gregory Currie and David Davies. The second is the top down ap-
proach, in which fiction is defined as a whole. This includes those theories that 
treat all utterances in a work of fiction as fictive utterances, including assertions 
and factual statements, such as that of Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen. 
It is important to address these two types of theories separately, because 
rejecting one does not necessarily entail rejecting the other. By the end of this 
chapter, I will show that the bottom up approach faces a significant difficulty in the 
relationship between utterances in fiction and a work of fiction as a whole. I will 
also show that the top down approach is implausible, but the method of defining a 
work of fiction as a whole is useful and preferable. 
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I will begin this chapter by presenting the iconic imagination-based theory 
of Currie to familiarise readers with the typical facets of an imagination-based the-
ory and to clearly define the terms of use. 
 
Getting a Sense of the Field and Terminology with Currie’s Approach 
 
I’ll begin by addressing Currie’s (1990) definition of fiction. This is a particu-
larly suitable theory to start with, as it is one of the earliest theories to introduce 
imagination1 and the intention of the author as necessary components of a defini-
tion of fiction. While there have been many attempts to improve on his theory, 
those two necessary conditions have remained unchanged throughout subsequent 
imagination-based theories. Finally, Currie’s approach faces an issue common to all 
imagination-based theories: the difficulty to place the role of assertions in fiction. 
Imagination-based theories are built on a comparison of fiction and nonfic-
tion to make-belief and belief. In these theories, imagination is make-believe. Ac-
cording to Currie (1990), the attitude of make-believe is different from the attitude 
of belief. This difference defines the difference between fiction and nonfiction, 
“What distinguishes the reading of fiction from the reading of nonfiction is 
not the activity of the imagination but the attitude we adopt towards the 
                                                 
1
 While imagination plays a central role in this dominant approach, I will not here define or evaluate 
definitions of imagination because I will address this in the next chapter, and because some of the 
theories in this debate do not involve a definition of imagination at all. Therefore, as I evaluate im-
agination-based theories in this chapter, I will do so with the presumption that what the author of 
the theory says about imagination is plausible. I will instead focus on whether imagination-based 
theories themselves are plausible. 
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content of what we read: make-belief in the one case, belief in the other” 
(p. 21). 
 
Although this quote does not define what make-believe or imagination is, it 
makes some basic but important points. First, Currie relates fiction to imagination 
or make-believe; and relates non-fiction to belief. Second, Currie states that make-
believe imagination is an attitude distinct from belief. Currie and other philoso-
phers like Shaun Nichols did produce some expositions of the similarities and dif-
ferences between imagination and belief, but I shall discuss them in chapter 2 
since this chapter, chapter 1, is more like of a critical literature review of several 
dominant theories of fiction. 
Before going further into Currie’s definition, it is important to clarify several 
issues of terminology. In the above quote, “make-believe” and “imagination” are 
used interchangeably. Currie (1990) thinks “make-believe” is a more specific term 
compared to “imagination” because it does not include visualisation and only in-
cludes certain particular attitude towards propositions in fiction (p. 21), though he 
also recognises this interchangeability in terms: 
“What the author of fiction does intend is that the reader take a certain at-
titude toward the propositions uttered in the course of his performance. 
This is the attitude we often describe, rather vaguely, in terms of ‘imagina-
tive involvement’ or (better) ‘make-believe’. We are intended by the author 
to make believe that the story as uttered is true” (p. 18). 
 
The wording of Currie’s theory is not controversial in the debate on the def-
inition of fiction. Thus, I will accept the interchangeability amongst “propositions”, 
“statements”, and “verbal utterances” in this debate. Nevertheless, I will only use 
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the term “utterance” in my project, because I will only discuss the different types 
of utterances in the context of the words found in works of fiction. Therefore, I on-
ly focus on utterances and am not interested in any particular theory of proposi-
tions or statements.   
The second terminology issue is that of the word “author”. I recognise the 
complexity and subtlety of the debate about authorship, as delineated by Paisley 
Livingston (2005) in his book Art and Intention. Thus, by this “author”, I only mean 
the person who produces a work of fiction, nonfiction, or a work of representation. 
I do not to take any stance in the debate on authorship. 
Finally, when I use the phrase “apprehending a work” in this project, I am 
referring to the process of a person having a first-hand experience of a work of 
representation. Apprehension, in the way used in this project, includes reading, 
listening, watching, and any other sense in which a work of representation can be 
experienced. 
 
The Bottom up Approach: Discussing Currie’s Account and Its Problems 
 
Currie (1990) begins his account of fiction by clarifying the aim of his defini-
tion: he is attempting to define what makes a work of representation a work of fic-
tion (p. 2). His first premise is that one cannot differentiate fiction from nonfiction 
solely by the difference in their respective texts, which includes both the syntactic 
and semantic properties of any language. He claims that there is no linguistic or 
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semantic feature (such as containing an untrue utterance) that is necessarily 
shared by all works of fiction, but cannot be found in any nonfiction. 
Consequently, fiction must not be defined by text alone. Currie’s (1990) so-
lution is that fiction must be defined by the context of its creation, which includes 
the author’s intention. For him, fiction is set of utterances produced with a fictive 
intention by an act of communication (p. 11). 
I shall grant Currie’s first premise in the entire project for the sake of evalu-
ating this argument; however, it is important to note that his second premise is not 
developed from it. Like many of the make-believe theorists after him, Currie (1990) 
applies the theories of utterance meaning by H.P. Grice because he treats fiction as 
an act of communication:2 
“The author who produces a work of fiction is engaged in a communicative 
act, an act that involves having a certain kind of intention: the intention 
that the audience shall make believe the content of the story that is told” 
(p. 24). 
 
 Therefore, the idea of fictive intent is produced by treating the creation of 
fiction as an act of communication, and by the application of the Gricean theory of 
communication.  
 
                                                 
2
 Gricean theory, as presented by Currie, states that the purpose of linguistic communication is de-
fined by the intention of the utterer, the audience’s recognition of the intention in question, and 
the inferences that can be drawn about the speaker’s intention from the utterance, including the 
speaker’s behaviour. Currie (1990) outlines it thus: “For communicative purposes it is important, 
therefore, not only that I intend you to believe what I say; it is also important that you recognize 
this intention. And usually it will be easy for you to infer that this is my intention because that is the 
only reasonable hypothesis that makes sense of my behaviour” (p. 25).  
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The Idea of a Work 
 
It is important here to clarify that Currie does not consider a set of utter-
ances to be a collection of texts, but rather as a work of fiction. The definition of 
what constitutes a work is important when coming up with a definition of fiction; 
however, the definition of work is a largely unsettled debate. Thus, a plausible def-
inition of a work of fiction should presume no definition of work and must be con-
sistent with any definition that can reasonably be used for work. Even more im-
portantly, a plausible definition of a work of fiction is not a definition of a fictional 
text.3 
Currie’s Fictive Utterance Theory 
 
 Currie (1990) argues that fiction must be differentiated from nonfiction by 
the intention with which its author makes a set of utterances, as well as the use of 
imagination: 
“(D0) U’s statement of S is fictive if and only if (iff) U utters S intending that 
the audience will  
1) Recognize that S means P; 
2) Recognize that S is intended by U to mean P; 
3) Recognize that U intends them (the audience) to make-believe that 
P;  
4) Make-believe that P. 
                                                 
3
 For a further delineation of the distinction between work and text, see Chapter 7. 
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And further intending that 
5) (2) will be a reason for (3); 
6) (3) will be a reason for (4)” (p. 31). 
 
(Although Currie uses the term “statement” in the quote, I treat it as an ut-
terance to avoid complications in defining a statement.) I agree with the emphasis 
on authorial intention, but I disagree with Currie’s way of using it, which involves 
the presupposition that the author intends to have the work of fiction experienced 
by at least one audience member. I also disagree with his emphasis on imagination. 
 
Fiction Created for No One: Without an Audience, The Author’s Intention for an 
Audience is Irrelevant 
 
One of the main problems with Currie’s theory is that it cannot stand in sit-
uations where fiction is created without the author intending for at least one other 
person to experience it. Currie (1990) addresses this problem and tries to over-
come it by saying that an author can write a fiction and intend for no one else to 
read it. To accomplish this, he must burn the text that he creates immediately after 
it is finished. In this case, he does not intend to communicate with anyone, and so 
there is no audience. 
Currie understands this case as though the author has no particular audi-
ence in mind when writing the narrative (pp. 31-4). To include this possible case in 
his theory, he supplements his theory with the following points: 
21 
“(D2) U’s statement of S is fiction iff there is a φ and there is an X such that 
U utters S intending that anyone who has X would 
1) Recognize that S has φ; 
2) Recognize that S is intended by U to have φ; 
3) Recognize that U intends them (the possessors of X) to make-
believe that P, for some proposition P” (p. 33). 
 
However, this account fails to address Currie’s own aforementioned hypo-
thetical case of burning fiction. First, this account takes the form of a subjunctive 
conditional, i.e. if X & Y, it would be Z. Yet, this case rules out one of the constitu-
ent propositions of the conjunction in the antecedent; namely, it denies that U ut-
ters S with the intention of having certain people recognise U’s intention for utter-
ing S. While to evaluate the truth value of a subjunctive conditional is to evaluate 
whether the consequence will be true (obtain) in the possible worlds in which the 
antecedent is obtained4, the burning fiction case does not happen in those worlds 
in which the author intends the work to have an audience. Thus, this account is not 
applicable to this case; Currie’s own analysis cannot explain why a private fiction is 
a fiction.  
 
The Case of Mental Fiction 
 
                                                 
4
 For more on subjunctive conditionals, see Bennett (2003). 
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If Currie’s burning fiction thought experiment is modified, it shows that fic-
tion can exist only in a person’s mind and removes the need for an audience. I call 
this type of fiction “mental fiction”. I will now provide a thought experiment for 
this point by modifying Currie’s burning writing thought experiment. Suppose that 
a person is typing a narrative on a computer that is programmed to automatically 
delete every word that he types. If we regard an author as the audience of his own 
work, then according to Currie’s theory, I consider him to be reading his own writ-
ing, because he controls and recognises what he is typing. This is because he knows 
the content of the fiction and recognises that the content is to be imagined as true. 
Therefore, what he types can still be regarded as fiction according to Currie’s ac-
count, although it is immediately deleted — the author is the audience. 
Nevertheless, this person does not intend anyone to read his fiction. If the 
author is the audience in this case, then no one can make a work of fiction and in-
tend it to have no audience, because it is very difficult to cease to be the audience 
of one’s own work. Instead of making this point himself, Currie tries to work 
around the case with subjunctive conditionals. Therefore, it is unclear whether he 
accepts that the author in the case of mental fiction is the audience or not.  
Indeed, with the case of mental fiction, I argue that what the author ex-
pects a member of an audience besides himself to do should not be a necessary 
condition of a plausible definition of fiction, and therefore the role of the author as 
audience and the role of other people as the audience should be kept separate.  
If the creation of fiction can be completed in the mind of the author with-
out writing down, filming, drawing, or speaking anything, then the role of the audi-
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ence should not be included in a definition of fiction. As shown in the case of the 
typist in my thought experiment, if an author can be the audience of his work, then 
including the role of the author’s intention for the audience is redundant, because 
the author’s intention and the actions he takes to create the fiction are sufficient 
to render his work of representation a work of fiction. If the audience of a work 
includes the author, then in the case of mental fiction, the role of the audience will 
become another role of the author. In other words, it will be the author intending 
for him to do something. Thus, the case of mental fiction reduces the role of the 
audience as described in Currie’s theory to another action of the author, thus, the 
idea of having an audience is not necessary. This means that the author alone is 
sufficient as an audience, and an audience is unnecessary for a work. 
To separate the role of the author as audience and the role of other people 
as audience, we must consider the authority of the author and the agency he has 
created and changed his work. If the audience of others cannot enjoy the same au-
thority as what the author as the audience has, then Currie’s theory cannot explain 
why mental fiction is fiction.  
 
Currie on Declarative Utterances in Fiction 
 
So far, Currie has provided an account for the fictive utterances that are not 
about actual historical facts. He has explained what is essential for the production 
and apprehension of imaginative utterances in fictions. But what are his explana-
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tions of the true utterances in fiction? Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a fiction 
could exist that does not contain even one true utterance. Even those fictions with 
completely made-up worlds have simple truths, such as the existence of the Sun or 
gravity. Therefore, Currie stresses that, 
“a work is fiction iff (a) it is the product of a fictive intent and (b) if the work 
is true, then it is at most accidentally true” (p. 46). 
 
 Condition (a), namely the product of a fictive intent, is defined by D0 and 
D2. Similarly, with an example of a reliable newspaper running a story that con-
tains many utterances that are intended to be true, Currie distinguishes accidental 
truth from intentional truth by considering whether the content of a narrative 
would change. In Currie’s (1990) words, one needs to consider whether the narra-
tive “display[s] counterfactual dependence on the facts”:  
1) “If different events had occurred, the paper’s report [narrative content] 
would have been correspondingly different.  
2) Were those events, in otherwise changed circumstances, to have oc-
curred as they did, the paper [narrative] would have reported them” (p. 
47).  
 
Currie claims that an intentionally true utterance should satisfy both of 
these counterfactual conditions. These subjunctive conditionals are true when ap-
plied to these utterances (p. 47). Therefore, the true utterances in a fiction must 
fail to satisfy at least one of the counterfactual conditions to qualify themselves as 
accidentally true utterances.  
In my view, Currie’s conditions for accidental truth exclude works that seem 
intuitively to be works of fiction.  A historical fiction, like Leo Tolstoy’s War and 
25 
Peace, satisfies both of these conditions. This is because Tolstoy did attempt histor-
ical accuracy in a good part of his work of fiction. If the facts changed as he was 
writing it, he would change the corresponding factual part of his book. For in-
stance, if the facts about Napoleon’s invasion had been different, some of the ut-
terances in War and Peace would have been different. If the facts did not change 
as he was creating his work, he would keep writing about them as he had. There-
fore, a good part of his fiction is intentionally true. Therefore, while some parts of 
War and Peace satisfy the condition of fictive intent; many other parts fail to satis-
fy the condition of accidental truth, because they are intentionally true. Therefore, 
War and Peace could not be considered to be fiction, according to Currie’s ac-
count. 
 
Friend’s First Challenge to Currie’s Account  
 
Currie could reply that War and Peace is an atypical work of fiction, and his 
definition of fiction focuses more on typical fictions, which contain mostly fabricat-
ed parts.  
Unfortunately, even if it is plausible to dismiss the issue of War and Peace, 
Currie’s definition of fiction still has a fundamental problem with fictions contain-
ing utterances the author believes to be true. For these sentences, the author and 
audience probably (not always) ought not to imagine them as true since they be-
lieve them as true. If this is the case, then factual fictions like War and Peace or 
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Romance of the Three Kingdoms are not odd cases to be dismissed, but are instead 
two paradigmatic cases of a fundamental flaw in Currie’s account.  
Friend (2012) makes this argument as well: 
“First, many works of fiction contain non-accidentally true statements. Eliz-
abeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton opens with this sentence: ‘There are some 
fields near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as “Green Heys 
Fields”, through which runs a public footpath to a little village about two 
miles distant’ (1987, p. 1). This statement is not only true, it was intended 
to be true and any informed reader of Gaskell will believe it. It meets all the 
standard requirements on sincere assertion. Denying that it is an assertion 
because it occurs within a work of fiction would just be begging the ques-
tion (p. 184).  
 
 Her first example focuses on intentionally true sentences. It shows that 
some fictional utterances are not imagined to be true or accidentally true. The au-
thor of the fiction in question believes and expects them to be true; and he also 
expects the readers to believe that they are true. Therefore, Friend thinks that 
these utterances should not be considered to be imaginary. For Currie to respond 
to Friend’s case, he would have to either give up his bottom up stance and go for a 
top down imagination-based definition of fiction, or work out the relationship be-
tween fictive utterances and fiction. 
 Currie (1990) did foresee this possibility, and attempted to avoid it by defin-
ing the relationship between fictive utterances and fiction: 
“A work of fiction is a patchwork of truth and falsity, reliability and unrelia-
bility [accidentally and non-accidentally true utterances]. We can say that a 
work as a whole is fiction if it contains statements that satisfy the condi-
tions of fictionality I have presented, conditions we can sum up briefly by 
saying that a utterance is fiction if and only if it is the product of an act of 
fiction-making (as defined in Section 1.8) and is no more than accidentally 
true” (p. 49). 
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 This quote contains two points that are difficult to understand. First, Currie 
thinks that a work is a fiction if it contains fictive utterances. Does this mean that 
two sentences of fictive utterances are sufficient to render a piece of writing fic-
tional? I do not think so. I do not think that Currie thinks so either, because this 
point would be much too inclusive to be plausible. Second, why does he mention 
that a sentence alone can be fiction? Does he want to claim that a work of fiction is 
indeed a complex that consists of many one sentence fictions? I do not know. Even 
if this is the case, this point still does not answer why the complex of one sentence 
fictions is regarded as fiction despite also containing many one sentence nonfic-
tions.  
In any case, Currie (1990) does not think that factual utterances in fiction 
do any harm to his definition. Right after the aforementioned quote, he moves on 
to dismiss the question of the required proportion of fictive utterances to render a 
work fictional as a bad question: 
“Is a work fictional if even one of its statements is fictional in this sense? 
Must the greater proportion of the whole be fiction? These are bad ques-
tions. One might as well ask how many grains of sand make a heap. If we 
wanted to, we could define a numerical degree of fictionality, but it would 
be artificial and unilluminating. What is illuminating is a precise account of 
the fictionality of statements. For in some perhaps irremediably vague way, 
the fictionality of works is going to depend upon the fictionality of the 
statements they contain. As long as we are clear about what water mole-
cules are, it hardly matters for purposes of definition that most things we 
call “water” actually contain much else besides (p. 49)”.  
 
He thinks that defining a numerical degree of fictionality is not necessary 
for an account of fiction, though he maintains that such an account of proportions 
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can be provided. He goes further to postulate that his fictive utterance account is 
necessary and sufficient to define fiction using an analogy between his definition 
and a water molecule. The chemical formula of a water molecule is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for defining water. Therefore, Currie implies that his ac-
count has provided all the necessary and sufficient conditions for defining fiction. 
According to this analogy, those intentionally true assertions in fiction are only ac-
cidental impurities in the fiction, like having a minor amount of salt in water.  
I reject this defence. While the presence of some other substances in water 
does not disqualify a solution from being water, some do. For example, tea is a so-
lution formed by water and the material infused into it by tea leaves. However, a 
cup of tea is not a cup of water with impurities. There are many differences be-
tween the two. For instance, their cost is typically radically different, their health 
benefits are different, and their cultural value is different as well. Thus, even if Cur-
rie’s analogy of fiction and water works, it does not show that assertions in fiction 
can be treated as impurities and then ignored. Thus, it is not a plausible defence 
against Friend’s criticism.   
 Worse, if Currie’s analogy between water and fiction does work, then the 
proportion of fictive utterances in a work of fiction becomes a genuine issue. This 
analogy actually falsifies his claim that the proportion problem should be ignored. 
For example, I find it hard to call a container of chemically saturated potassium 
sulphate solution “water” even though water is the solvent in it. But it may be pos-
sible to label a container of water that has a little bit of potassium sulphate in it as 
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water. This thought experiment demonstrates the intuition that impurity is con-
nected to proportionality. 
Therefore, Currie must either give up on his dismissal of the idea of the 
proportion of fictive utterances or give up on his analogy between his definition of 
fiction and the molecular definition of water. If he chooses the former option, then 
he has to answer the question of proportion. I see no way he could do it. If he 
chooses the latter option, then he has no argument to defend his theory and thus 
cannot include factual utterances in fiction. 
 
Friend’s Second Challenge  
 
Even if Currie’s analogy between his definition of fiction and the molecular 
definition of water works, it cannot defend his account from a further fundamental 
challenge by Friend.  Friend (2012) argues instead that many works of fiction con-
tain many utterances that fail to satisfy Currie’s definition, and there is at least one 
work of nonfiction that contains a significant amount of utterances that do satisfy 
Currie’s definition. Thus, instead of pinpointing the means of categorising works as 
fiction or nonfiction, Currie’s account is simultaneously too inclusive and too exclu-
sive; it includes some works of nonfiction as fiction, and it fails to include some 
works of fiction as fiction.  
Friend argues against Currie’s proposal of using fictive utterances to differ-
entiate fiction from nonfiction. She begins her argument with a case of nonfiction 
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that satisfies Currie’s definition. According to Friend (2012), Truman Capote’s In 
Cold Blood (2009) satisfies the Currie’s criteria, because the fabricated parts of this 
work can only be true accidentally, and so satisfy Currie’s conditions for true fictive 
utterances. These fabricated parts include certain imagined events, as well as mi-
nor changes to actual sequences of events. Yet, Capote’s book is considered to be 
journalism, not fiction (pp. 184-6). Currie should have excluded this work, but he 
cannot. 
Approaching the issue from the opposite perspective, Friend (2012) pro-
vides another example of fiction that is composed mainly of facts, which Currie 
should include, but is unable to do so using his own definition: 
At the same time, many works of fiction take the truth to constitute a con-
straint on the ordering of events. The point of the seven novels in Gore Vi-
dal’s ‘Narratives of Empire’ series (1967–2000) is to introduce readers to 
American history according to Vidal’s interpretation. Although the mem-
bers of two fictional families show up in every novel—though barely at all in 
Lincoln (1984)—they are there primarily to provide perspectives on the real 
events that drive the plots forward (p. 184). 
 
 The books in The Narratives of Empire series contain many genuinely true 
assertions. They are not accidentally true, and they are not fictive utterances; but 
the works are still considered to be fictional. Therefore, it is hard to still claim that 
a work of fiction is a narrative primarily composed of fictive utterances. 
While Currie could attempt to fall back on proportionality, there are many 
different ratios of facts to fiction in Capote’s and Vidal’s books. Indeed, the differ-
ence between the proportions of facts to fiction must be significant and standard-
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ised to prevent the idea of proportionality from becoming arbitrary. This clearly 
demonstrates that proportionality cannot save Currie from Friend’s criticisms. 
Finally, while Currie may attempt to step back from defining fictional works 
to simply defining fictional utterances,  Although Currie and other imagination-
based theorists can resolve this undesirable situation by working out the relation-
ship between the fictive utterance and fiction, such an account has not yet been 
provided. 
 
Davies’s Attempt to Defend Bottom up Approach 
 
Friend does not confine her criticisms strictly to Currie’s theories; her criti-
cisms are applicable to the bottom up approach in general. Davies (1996) tries to 
save the bottom up approach by replacing Currie’s point on accidental truth with 
an idea he calls the fidelity constraint in an attempt to differentiate fiction from 
nonfiction and indirectly answer Friend’s challenges, particularly regarding the re-
lationship between utterances and fiction.  
Davies does not attempt to work out the relationship between fictive utter-
ances and fiction. Rather, he focuses on the factual utterances in fiction. He argues 
that fiction is a combination of fictive utterances and abnormal factual utterances, 
saying that a work of fiction must fail to satisfy the fidelity constraint, which is the 
“correspondence with the manner in which events actually transpired was taken, 
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by the utterer, to be a constraint that the ordering of events in [the text] must sat-
isfy” [(p. 52); cited in Friend (2012), p. 184].  
According to Davies (2001), the accurate description of the actual sequence 
of events is just a means to an end. The author may describe the events in their 
actual chronological order, but he must not do so for the sake of conveying the 
knowledge of that chronological order of the relevant events [(p. 266); cited in 
Friend (2012), p. 184].  
Davies’s approach is implausible. There is no reason why an author cannot 
write a work that aims both to be historically accurate and entertaining, educa-
tional, etc. Schindler’s Ark is a fine example. While it aims for historical accuracy, it 
does not aim for historical accuracy alone. Thomas Keneally aimed to present a se-
quence of events in his book, and therefore satisfies Davies’s fidelity constraint; 
thus, Davies’s theory has the same problem as Currie’s — if he follows his own def-
inition, there are works of representation that he should include as works of fiction 
but cannot. 
Davies also faces Currie’s problem of including nonfiction as fiction. Capote 
is not aiming to present an exact chronology of events in In Cold Blood, since he 
knew that there were many fabricated parts and false descriptions. Therefore, it 
fails to meet the fidelity constraint, and thus should be regarded as fiction by Da-
vies. Just like Currie, Davies’s approach is simultaneously too exclusive and too in-
clusive.  
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Thus, either bottom up theorists must work out the relationship between 
utterances in fiction and works of fiction, or the entire approach must be rejected. 
In light of Friend’s challenges to the approach, it becomes clear that bottom up 
theories fail to produce any plausible explanation of this relationship. Thus, we can 
reject the bottom up approaches. 
 
A Top Down Imagination-Based Approach: Lamarque and Olsen’s Account 
 
 Having shown that the bottom up approach is implausible, I will now turn 
to the top down approach, in which a work of fiction is defined as a whole, rather 
than by singling out any type of utterance. While I agree with the method of defin-
ing a work of fiction as a whole rather than in terms of some of its utterances, I do 
not agree with how this approach is used by other theorists in conjunction with the 
concept of imagination. I will begin with an introduction to this type of theory by 
discussing the foundational top down theory of Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen 
(1994), and whether it can stand up to Friend’s criticisms and thus save imagina-
tion-based theories. 
 While some may categorise Lamarque and Olsen’s theory as bottom up be-
cause they mention the idea of fictive utterances, I take their approach as top 
down. Their definition of fictive utterances includes any utterance in a work of fic-
tion, including those that are intended to be true.  
I begin my evaluation of their theory by introducing their account: 
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“So far, then, there are the main features of fictive statement: 
1. A Gricean intention that an audience make-believe (or imagine  or pre-
tend) that it is being told (or questions or advised or warned) about par-
ticular people, objects, incidents, or events, regardless of whether there 
are (or are believed to be) such people, objects incidents, or events; 
2. The reliance, at least in part, of the successful fulfilment of the intention 
in (1) on mutual knowledge of the practice of story-telling; 
3. A disengagement from certain standard speech act commitments, 
blocking inferences from a fictive statement back to the speaker or 
writer, in particular inferences about beliefs” (pp. 45-6).  
 
To clarify before I begin my discussion of their theory, it is important to 
note that in the second criterion, Lamarque and Olsen (1994) follow the definition 
of practice proposed by Nöel Carroll (1988) (p. 33).5  Also, I take the third criterion 
as stating that the production of a fictive utterance is distinct from any non-fictive 
speech act, like an assertion, or an imperative statement.  
I begin by my overview with Lamarque and Olsen’s first criterion. As noted 
before, accidental truth is an implausible way to account for true sentences in fic-
tion, since many true sentences in fiction are intentionally true. Lamarque and Ol-
sen (1994) provide certain hints for solving Friend’s challenges (because their theo-
ry is top down, they can deal with both challenges simultaneously):  
“What sets the fictive storyteller apart are the conditions governing the 
way the descriptions are presented, the purposes they seek to fulfil, the re-
sponses they elicit, and so one; in other words the practice within which 
they play their part. So we are back to fictive statement (p. 41)”. 
 
                                                 
5
 I shall set aside whether Carroll’s idea of practice can be applied to define fiction. This is because I 
want to establish whether this account is of any help regarding Friend’s challenges. Also, evaluating 
the applicability of the notion of practice is not the purpose of this paper. 
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First, Lamarque and Olsen do not specify what type of utterances can be 
fictive in this quote; neither do they do so in the above description of their ac-
count. Therefore, their account leaves room for intentionally true sentences to be 
fictive utterances. In comparison, Currie’s constraint on accidentally true utteranc-
es makes such a move impossible with his theory. 
Also, Lamarque and Olsen focus on the purpose or use of the utterance, ra-
ther than its truth value. This leaves a possibility for their theory to regard inten-
tionally true sentences as fictive utterances because they serve a different purpose 
when they appear in a fiction. This point can also be drawn from their third criteri-
on. 
 
Evaluating Lamarque and Olsen’s Account 
 
If one takes Lamarque and Olsen’s theory to be true, then Friend’s criti-
cisms should not even be raised. While Friend says that there are intentionally true 
utterances in fiction that are expressions of the author’s belief (assertions6), and 
therefore cannot be imaginative utterances, Lamarque and Olsen say that there 
are no such assertions in fiction, and that all utterances in a work of fiction are in-
tended to elicit imagination, and belief does not enter into it. 
                                                 
6
 I take assertions as expressions of belief for now. I will discuss this further in Chapter 2. 
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Lamarque and Olsen need to stand by this denial of assertions to avoid fall-
ing into the same traps as Currie and Davies and being unable to account for inten-
tionally true utterances. However, they present no argument allowing them to 
plausibly deny that intentionally true utterances are assertions, and no explanation 
as to why these utterances are there for imagination and not as assertions. 
 Second, if Lamarque and Olsen deny the existence of assertions in fiction 
altogether, then their theory fails to explain certain difficult cases.  Authors who 
write historically accurate works intend to include assertions about the events of 
the time period in the book. Tolstoy in particular did extensive research on the 
Russian court and attempted to present certain information about the historical 
events that occurred in the Russian court accurately. Thus, these intentionally true 
utterances are assertions just like those found in history textbooks.  
If Lamarque and Olsen insist on denying that these utterances are asser-
tions, they will have to resort to an error theory. They will have to claim that alt-
hough the author and audience think that certain utterances in fiction are asser-
tions; these utterances are indeed not assertions. It is very difficult to agree with 
this theory though. If the author has the authority to decide that his work is a fic-
tion (an authority that Lamarque and Olsen themselves grant), it is very hard to 
accept that he does not have the authority to decide that the speech-act of pro-
ducing certain utterances in his work is producing assertions. 
In response, Lamarque and Olsen might support their error theory by claim-
ing that no sentence can be taken as assertion when it is in a fiction, because ut-
terances in a fiction are made for different purpose than those in nonfiction. This 
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reasoning is implausible too. One can learn a great deal of history from Schindler’s 
Ark; and Keneally wanted his audience to do so. These two facts do not affect the 
work’s status as an award winning work of fiction. Tolstoy also told a great deal of 
history in War and Peace. Therefore, simply having assertions cannot render a 
work of representation to be a work of nonfiction, and assertions do not cease to 
be assertions simply by being placed in a fiction. Thus, it is implausible to exclude 
assertions from fiction using an error theory. 
Finally, it is difficult to deny the existence of assertions in fiction because 
fictional works can be criticised for having factually incorrect descriptions or for 
ignorance on the part of the author. Authors cannot deny these criticisms as irrele-
vant by saying that there are no assertions in fiction. Just imagine: if Tolstoy were 
to write a story about the life of an Indian guru and claimed that it was based on a 
true story, but did not do any research, then the story would likely be very inaccu-
rate due to his ignorance. It would be implausible for him to reject the criticism by 
claiming that his work was fictional, and therefore had no requirement to reflect 
reality. 
Because of these difficulties, Lamarque and Olsen’s account must be reject-
ed. In particular, I deny their third criterion, which says that utterances in fiction 
cannot be connected to the author’s beliefs. I also deny that the first condition can 
be applied to all utterances in fiction. Therefore, it fails to be a plausible approach.  
Thus, I share Friend’s intuition that the intentionally true utterances in her 
example are genuine assertions, so I also agree with her that not all utterances in 
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fiction are made in order to invite the audience to make believe something. I agree 
with her that many utterances in fiction are produced to be believed.  
After reviewing the implausibility of Lamarque and Olsen’s account, we can 
see that one must not take all utterances in a fiction as fictive utterances. A plausi-
ble account of fiction must acknowledge that there are assertions in fiction and 
provide an account of their role. This goes back to an important question — why 
does the presence of assertions in a work not make it necessarily a work of nonfic-
tion? This is an issue that must be addressed with immense subtlety, so I will re-
turn to it after presenting my own definition of fiction, which I will use to address 
the issue. 
 
Walton’s Make-Believe Theory 
 
So far, I have yet to find any imagination-based theory that can stand up to 
Friend’s criticisms. But what if we go back even further than Currie, to the theory 
of representational works that his theory was founded on, that of Kendall Walton? 
I will provide a brief overview of this theory, and then demonstrate its weaknesses 
as a theory of fiction. 
In Mimesis as Make-Believe, Walton (1990) states that make-believe is a 
type of imagination: 
“Any work with the function of serving as a prop in games of make-believe, 
however minor or peripheral or instrumental this function might be, quali-
fies as “fiction”; only what lacks this function entirely will be called nonfic-
tion” (p. 72).  
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This theory has served as the foundation for Currie’s theory, and thus for 
imagination-based theories after him. According to Walton, a work of fiction is a 
prop in a game of make-believe, and make-believe is a type of imagination. Walton 
(1990) says “games of make-believe are one species of imaginative activity; specifi-
cally, they are exercises of the imagination involving props” (p. 12).  
He also specifically connects fiction and imagination, as can be seen in the 
above quote. He says that make-believe is imagination with props; and fiction is a 
prop in the process of apprehension. The type of imagination involved in appre-
hending fiction is propositional imagination, defined by Walton (1990) thus: “imag-
ining (propositional imagining), like (propositional) believing or desiring, is doing 
something with a proposition one has in mind” (p. 20).  
The person doing this imagining takes utterances in fiction as true, but only 
in the context of apprehending a fiction: 
“‘Let’s say that stumps are bears’, Eric proposes. Gregory agrees, and a 
game of make-believe is begun, one in which stumps—all stumps, not just 
one or a specified few—‘count as’ bears. Part of what they imagine is that 
there is bear at a certain spot—the spot actually occupied by the stump. 
‘Hey, there’s a bear over there!’ Gregory yells to Eric. Susan, who is not in 
on the game but overhears, is alarmed. So Eric reassures her that it is only 
‘in the game’ that there is a bear at the place indicated. The proposition 
that there is a bear there is fictional in the game”. (p. 37) 
 
According to this analogy, make-believing a proposition in a work of fiction 
as a true proposition entails that the belief that the proposition in question is true 
is confined to a specific fictional context. Or to be put in another way, if one make-
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believes that p solely because of what he reads in a work of fiction, it is likely that 
one ought not to believe that p in factual context. If a person accepts an utterance 
in fiction as being true beyond the context of the fiction, he is making a mistake. As 
pointed out by David Velleman and Nishi Shah (2005), belief is a type of acceptance 
of a proposition, though not all instances of acceptance are cases of belief (pp. 
498-9). If a person does not accept an utterance as a true proposition, he does not 
believe it. Thus, according to Walton’s theory, audience do not believe that those 
utterances are actually true solely because they appear in a work of fiction. This 
carries over into any imagination-based theory that does not specifically provide 
another definition of imagination, including that of Lamarque and Olsen (though 
not Currie, as he published his own definition of imagination with Ian Ravenscroft 
(2002), an issue which I will discuss in chapter 2.) 
Finally, Walton’s make-believe theory differs from other definitions of im-
agination, as it states that a work of fiction is intended to prescribe what the audi-
ence imagines:  
“If p is fictional, then should one be forced to choose between imagining p 
and imagination not-p, one is to do the former [“this construal will not do 
for the special cases in which p and not-p are both fictional” quoted from 
bookmark no. 28 inserted right after this sentence]. When I speak of pre-
scription to imagine in what follows [i.e. what follows in the later parts of 
his book, my note], I will take them to be so qualified” (p. 40).  
 
The Implausibility of Walton’s Definition 
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Walton’s theory of fiction is a convenient foundation for imagination-based 
theories, as it provides a concise definition of imagination and defines the type of 
imagination used in defining fiction as propositional imagination.  
Nevertheless, Friend (2012) rightly notices that Walton does not try to de-
fine fiction in the ordinary sense. Instead, he is focused on providing a definition 
for representational arts in general (i.e. works of fiction, documentaries, memoirs, 
plays etc.), not just fiction (p. 182). In Walton’s (1990) own words, “we could use 
‘representation’ and ‘work of fiction’ interchangeably” (p. 72). Therefore, Walton is 
not in fact defining fiction; he is defining representation.  
Even so, I shall evaluate Walton’s theory as a theory of fiction because it 
has been taken as a foundation of imagination-based theories since Currie (1990) 
applied this idea in defining fiction specifically, saying, “it was the work of Kendall 
Walton that first suggested to me an explanatory connection between fiction and 
make-believe” (p. 18). Since then, imagination-based theorists have used Walton’s 
idea that imagination is a necessary condition for defining fiction. 
Unfortunately, Walton’s theory is not plausible. There are at least two sub-
stantial problems. First, Walton says that an audience is necessary for defining fic-
tion, as can be seen in his analogy between games of make-believe and fictions, in 
which the audience of fiction is analogous to the participants of games of make-
believe. Yet, I have already rejected this necessary condition in an earlier part of 
this chapter with the case of mental fiction and Currie’s own failure in addressing 
his own case of burning fiction.  
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Nevertheless, one may claim that an author may set up a game of make-
believe for his own entertainment. The author in this case is also the audience of 
this work of fiction. As shown in the case of the typist in my thought experiment, if 
an author can be the audience of his work, then including the role of the author’s 
intention for the audience to do certain things is redundant, because the author’s 
intention and the actions he takes to create the fiction are sufficient to render his 
work of representation a work of fiction.  
Second, while Walton’s theory of fiction has the advantage of including fic-
tion made for telling facts like Schindler’s Ark as a work of fiction, because it states 
that fiction is any work that has the function to serve as a prop in a game of make-
believe, the very same characteristic becomes a disadvantage, namely being too 
inclusive, when categorising nonfiction made with intentional fabrications, like In 
Cold Blood. Unless there is an argument that In Cold Blood cannot have the func-
tion of being a prop in a game of make-believe, Walton’s theory is too inclusive 
since it includes non-fiction made with intentional fabrications as works of fiction. 
Indeed, it is likely that In Cold Blood is a prop in a game of make-believe, in which 
the audience are prescribed to imagine crime scenes, historical events, and the 
psychology of those involved in them. If so, this book has the function of being the 
prop in a game of make-believe, and is thus a work of fiction according to Walton’s 





In this chapter, I have addressed the dominant theories for defining fiction, imagi-
nation-based theories. I began by exploring and evaluating the paradigmatic bot-
tom up imagination-based theory of Currie, and demonstrating that it, as well as 
the theories developed from it, are simultaneously too inclusive and too exclusive. 
In doing so, I provided both my own criticisms, and demonstrated how bottom up 
theories fail to stand up to Friend’s criticisms.   
 
From there, I went on to evaluate the top down approach of Lamarque and Olsen, 
demonstrating that it is also unable to stand up to the criticisms of Friend, and is 
also both too inclusive and exclusive. 
 
Finally, I went back beyond Currie to the foundation on which his theory is based, 
Walton’s theory of fiction. I demonstrated how Walton’s theory is in fact not a 
theory of fiction, but a theory of representational arts, and is also implausible. 
 
While all the theories thus far have been shown to be implausible, the top down 
one has one good aspect: it demonstrates that it is possible to define the relation-
ship between utterances in fiction and a work of fiction as a whole as opposed to 
the relationship between a work of fiction and the fictive utterances in it. However, 














Imagination-Based Accounts and Imagination: How Well do Different Ideas of 
Imagination in Fiction Defend Imagination-Based Theories 
 
Having now discussed Friend’s criticisms on imagination-based theories, 
particularly that (1) they are both too inclusive and too exclusive, and (2) they show 
that imagination-based theories cannot account for assertions in fiction, I will now 
argue that assertions in fiction form a significant problem for imagination-based 
accounts, and that these accounts cannot deal with the problem by redefining 
imagination. I will demonstrate this second point by reviewing Currie and 
Ravenscroft’s definition of imagination, as well as Kathleen Stock’s expositions on 
imagination. 
 
Clarifying the Problem: Assertions in Fiction as Expressions of Belief in Works of 
Fiction 
 
  Both Friend and Derek Matravers are sceptical about imagination-based 
definitions of fiction, in part because of the problem of assertions in fiction. They 
use different language [Friend (2012) uses the term “assertion” (p. 182), Matravers 
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(2014) uses the idea of “belief” (pp. 100-1)], but it is clear that they are discussing 
the same problem [see MacFarlane (2011)]7. 
Matravers (2014) states his criticism thus: 
“The consensus view [imagination-based accounts, my note] defines a 
fictional proposition as something a reader is mandated to imagine, where 
imagination is contrasted with belief. It then has the problem of moving 
from the definition of fictional proposition to the definition of fictional 
works, as such works contain many propositions we are mandated to 
believe” (pp. 100-1).8 
 
 Like Friend, he focuses on the move from fictive utterances to works of 
fiction; and his criticisms also state that the role of assertions in fiction must be 
clarified. 
 Proponents of imagination-based accounts have two options: (1) they 
accept that there are assertions in fiction and produce an account of the 
                                                 
7
 MacFarlane (2011) says, an “assertion is sometimes said to be the overt expression of belief” (p. 
80). Although he agrees that making an assertion is an expression of belief, he does not think that 
assertions are the only speech-acts to make such expressions. For instance, event invitations can 
express a speaker’s beliefs. Nevertheless, according to MacFarlane, it is not controversial to claim 
that making an assertion is an act of expressing belief (pp. 80). Thus, in my view, Friend and 
Matravers are making the same point, because of their claim that imagination-based theories of 
fiction fail to include how fiction contains verbal expressions of the genuine beliefs of authors. This 
failure is what I mean when mentioning the problem of assertions in fiction from now on. 
8
To complement my argument against imagination-based theories, I will mention some material by 
Matravers (2014) in Fiction and Narrative. In his book, he mentions the problem of assertions in 
fiction (pp. 100-1) and rejects the two remedial definitions of imagination by Currie and Ravenscroft, 
and Stock, which I will discuss later in this chapter (pp. 21-44). These two points are two of his three 
reasons for his scepticism against the meaningfulness of the fiction/nonfiction distinction. 
Matravers’s third point is to show that there is no difference in the reading experience of reading 
nonfiction and fiction. I leave this point aside for another chapter for several reasons. First, it is not 
directed against imagination-based accounts in particular. Second, although I will comment on the 
material by Matravers in this chapter, I do not dedicate this chapter to his scepticism; I will cover 
that in Chapter 5. Even though I am making two points that are similar to the points made by 
Matravers, there are still the differences in our reasoning. 
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relationship between assertions in works of fiction and works of fiction; or (2) they 
can deny that there are any genuine assertions in works of fiction. 
 Friend (2012) says “denying that [an utterance] is an assertion because it 
occurs within a work of fiction would just be begging the question” (p. 184). I agree 
with her, and I have provided my argument for this point in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, the option (1) is the only remaining option for imagination-based 
theorists. 
 
Carroll’s Relationship between Assertions and Fiction 
 
 Nöel Carroll attempts to provide an explanation of the relationship between 
assertions and fiction. Carroll (2016) says that imagination-based theorists like 
Currie and Davies may claim that “suppositional imagining is the default 
propositional attitude when it comes to fiction” (p. 367). He further states that 
“fiction is defined in terms of an authorial intention to imagine p, unless there is a 
defeasible reason to suspect that belief is intended” (p. 367) and, “suppositional 
imagining is the default propositional attitude when it comes to fiction” (p. 367). 
 Although Carroll uses the term “suppositional imagining”, it is reasonable to 
understand his idea as propositional imagining. This is because he is referring to 
propositions when he talks about labelling the idea of imagination in imagination-
based accounts. More importantly, he retains the core idea of imagination that I 
mention in the last chapter — make-believe. Carroll (2016) says, 
48 
“To believe x is to hold it in the mind as asserted. To believe that the earth is 
round is to hold in mind as asserted the proposition content “that the earth 
is round”. To suppositionally imagine, on the other hand, is to entertain a 
certain propositional content as asserted—to hold it before the mind as 
unasserted” (p. 364). 
 
 Although imagination-based theorists may not agree that propositional 
imagination is just entertaining a proposition, Carroll’s understanding of 
imagination shares the core of imagination-based theories — defining fiction in 
terms of make-believe. 
This approach can resolve Friend’s (2012) example of assertions in fiction:  
“Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton opens with this sentence: ‘There are some fields 
near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as “Green Heys Fields”, through 
which runs a public footpath to a little village about two miles distant’ (1987, p. 1)” 
(p. 184). 
According to Carroll’s account, the audience imagines the sentence in 
question without believing it because they take the attitude of imagination towards 
the sentence by default. According to Walton’s standard definition of imagination, 
they would merely accept the sentence as true in the context of the novel. 
However, Carroll can account for the role of assertions in fiction by arguing that 
readers’ extra knowledge about Manchester and the surrounding areas makes it 
possible for them to believe that the sentence quoted by Friend in the last 
paragraph is an expression of the author’s beliefs about the real world. Thus, 
Carroll’s account supports the imagination-based theorists’ argument that the 
audience may believe utterances in a fiction because they believe that the author 
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wants them to do so. If this were to be the case, then imagination-based theorists 
would be free from the problem of assertions in fiction. 
 
The Failure of Carroll’s Defence 
 
Unfortunately, Carroll’s account only works for those works of fiction that 
are not made for telling facts. It is made for assertions in fiction that are used for 
setting the scene or providing background information for the plots of a work. 
However, there are works of fiction that are made for telling facts — they contain 
many assertions that are made to express beliefs about the actual world. In cases 
like these, Carroll cannot plausibly claim that the audience needs a reason to 
change from imagining that the content is true to believing that the content is true, 
because fictions made for telling facts are there to be believed, at least a good part 
of their content is. These works are the opposite of those Carroll talks about; they 
are meant to be primarily believed, unless there is a reason for the audience to 
think that they contain fabrications. 
Keneally’s (2007) Schindler’s Ark is a prime example. The author declares his 
intention for the work to tell facts publicly, writing in the introduction that he 
intends for the audience to believe the content of the work to be true, except when 
it comes to the dialogue and inner feelings of the historical figures in it, which he 
declares are made up (p. 4). Therefore, when reading this book, the audience 
needs a reason to imagine certain plots as true, but they do not need any further 
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reason to believe that its contents are true. Thus, the audience of the book does 
not take an attitude of imagination towards the content by default, and so an 
important part of Carroll’s account fails. 
 
The Importance of the Context of Assertions in Fiction 
  
 I have now shown that Carroll’s account can work for fiction with assertions 
that are not made for telling facts, but cannot work for fiction with assertions that 
are made for telling facts.9 The failure of his account highlights a fundamental flaw 
in imagination-based theories: that imagination is not a necessary component of a 
definition of fiction. 
 Carroll emphasises that fictions are created to be imagined as true, not 
believed to be true, and that fiction should be connected with imagination barring 
a good reason for doing otherwise — imagination should be the default attitude. 
However, this account cannot work with fictions that are created for telling facts. 
The default attitude of the audience towards these works is belief, not imagination. 
Thus, the connection between fiction and imagination as the core of imagination-
based theories fails, which is a significant problem for these theories. To resolve it, 
                                                 
9
Although I may be the first one to distinguish fictions that contain some assertions from fictions 
that are made for telling facts, I am not the only one who recognises the existence of this type of 
fiction. Friend (2012) also provides Gore Vidal’s Narratives of Empire series to be her examples of 
fictions made for telling facts (p. 184), though she does not distinguish the severity of this case from 
the case of the opening sentence in Mary Barton. 
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they would have to substitute another idea for imagination, which would make it 
impossible for them to still be imagination-based theories. 
 
Carroll’s Possible Response 
 
Carroll could counter argue that audiences ought to take the default 
imagination approach towards a work before they know the author’s intentions. 
This can work for accounts in which the author’s intentions are unclear, or are 
simply irrelevant to the truth value of the assertions. However, it still does not work 
for works like Schindler’s Ark. 
In addition to their emphasis on imagination, many imagination-based 
accounts stress the importance of authorial intention in determining the fictional 
status of a work. I agree with this part of their theories. Following from this point, if 
the author’s intention is well-documented, then the editors and audience cannot 
decide whether a work is fictional or not without considering them. Thus, as long 
as one agrees that author’s intention matters, it is implausible for anyone to decide 
whether Schindler’s Ark is a work of fiction without consulting the author’s 
intention. 
Having done that, audience ought to believe that most of the assertions in 
this work are true. In this way, they will have to go into an attitude of belief by 
default rather than imagination by default. Thus, Carroll’s possible defence is 
52 
implausible, and does not even work in terms of the emphasis on authorial 
intention found in many imagination-based theories. 
In one final defence, Carroll and imagination-based theorists could claim 
that their definitions do not apply to fictions made for telling facts, that these are a 
special type of fiction that should be considered separately. But I do not agree that 
fictions made for telling facts should be excluded because they are relatively 
uncommon, as the degree of commonality with which such works are published 
could change at any time. Besides, such works need to be considered differently 
only because of a failure of imagination-based accounts. There is no plausible 
reason for imagination-based theorists to blame their failure on a particular type of 
fiction, because even if they exclude fictions made for telling facts, there are still 
serious problems with their theories. 
 
The Seemingly Fundamental Flaws of Imagination-Based Accounts 
 
 In addition to Imagination-based accounts have several other problems in 
addition to the issue of fiction made for telling facts, imagination-based accounts 
struggle with fictions made without the intention of having any audience; in light of 
these two issues, the core component of the author intending the audience to 
imagine a work as true clearly does not work. 
 This leaves imagination-based theorists with the sole option of creating a 
definition of imagination that is useful for defining fiction. Indeed, both Currie and 
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Kathleen Stock, being imagination-based theorists, have produced their own 
expositions of imagination in fiction. I will begin with the one by Currie and 
Ravenscroft, and then move on to the one by Stock.  
 
How can Imagination-Based Theorists Weaken Friend’s Argument? 
 
Friend’s argument states that: (1) make-believe theories fail to explain the 
role of assertions in fiction (as I delineated in Chapter 1, see also Friend (2012), p. 
184); and (2) make-believe theories mistakenly include fabricated parts of works of 
nonfiction as fictive utterances. She (2012) uses the fabricated parts of In Cold 
Blood as her example (pp. 184-6). 
Make-believe theorists could defend their theories by arguing that Friend is 
mistaken about what make-believe imagination in fiction is. As a possible defence 
of the make-believe view, Friend mistakenly thinks that one does not make-believe 
a proposition that one believes in as true, like an assertion. However, one can, 
because make-believe imagination and belief may share the same content and 
even the same cognitive mechanism, so one can make-believe and believe that a 
proposition is true. Afterwards, make-believe theorists may argue that one make-
believes that the assertions in fiction are true because the author and readers of 
work of fiction process these assertions according to a cognitive mechanism that is 
different from that for belief. These assertions in fiction are there to be make-
believed because they are used within the representational contents that are 
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processed by the cognitive mechanism of make-believe. Therefore, in the cases of 
fiction made for telling facts, Friend just shows that fiction prescribes the audience 
to imagine a lot of propositions that they already believe as true propositions. 
Therefore, she has only shown that the content of fiction and nonfiction may 
overlap significantly, nothing more. 
 
Currie and Ravenscroft’s Definition of Imagination 
 
The core of my possible defence for the make-believe view is to show that it 
is plausible to accept that a person may imagine or make-believe (whichever is 
more exclusive) some propositions that are already part of her belief as true 
propositions. A dominant method of making this point is to show that make-believe 
imagination and belief are very similar. Currie, being a make-believe theorist, 
seemed to see the benefit of arguing for the similarity between make-believe 
imagination and belief, at least for his own theory of fiction. Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002) define the type of imagination used in defining fiction as “recreative 
imagination,” by which they mean the mental “capacity of perspective shifting” (pp. 
1-2, 10, 13-14). 
Using Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) terminology, a person has a shift in 
perspective if and only if he places himself in a situation other than his own, i.e. 
one that differs from what is currently happening to him in the actual world. They 
clarify this idea in discussing how it helps with creativity: 
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“It is probably true of human beings that their capacity for creative 
imagining depends in good measure on their capacity for perspective-
shifting; if we can place ourselves, in imagination, in situations other than 
our own, current situation, our capacity to engage with what is merely 
possible—and hence to make the possible actual—is greatly enhanced” (p. 
9). 
 
Therefore, if Currie insists that imagination in fiction is recreative 
imagination, he thinks that it is necessary for the audience and/or author of a 
fiction to place themselves in a situation other than their own.10 Additionally, this 
type of perspective shifting is also a case of belief-like imagination — during a shift 
in perspective; a person shifts from a state of not-believing that p to a state of 
believing that p, without actually believing that p11. Currie and Ravenscroft’s 
definition of recreative imagination in the following quote: 
“So what is the recreative imagination? Here is our central hypothesis. 
Imagination projection involves the capacity to have, and in good measure 
to control the having of, states that are not perceptions or beliefs or 
decisions or experiences of movements of one’s body, but which are in 
various way’s like those states—like them in ways that enable the states 
possessed through imagination to mimic and, relative to certain purpose, to 
substitute for perceptions, beliefs decisions and experiences of movements. 
These are what we are calling states of recreative imagination” (p. 11). 
 
 There is an important point to be drawn from this quote: recreative 
imagination is not belief, perception, or a decision, despite the similarity of 
recreative imagination and belief. In this point, they agree with Walton’s account 
                                                 
10
It may be strange that they apply their idea of perspective shifting to define imagination in 
defining fiction. Nevertheless, I do not see any need to quibble over whether imagination in 
imagination-based accounts means perspective shifting. First, they provide a definition of what their 
idea of perspective shifting or recreative imagination means. In the context of my current project, I 
only need to evaluate whether this idea of imagination rescues imagination-based accounts from 
Friend’s challenges. 
11
P is any given proposition or sentence. 
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that the audience does not genuinely accept utterances as true. However, they 
differ from his account in that they do not believe in context-specific acceptance — 
instead, they say that audiences are in a state that mimics genuine acceptance. 
Thus, instead of accepting an utterance as a true proposition in a context specific 
way, author and audience propositionally imagine that p if they place themselves in 
the situation of someone who believes that p, you can try the belief out without 
actually believing that p12. 
 Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) state that imagination that mimics belief (i.e. 
belief-like imagination) shares the “inferential pattern” with actual beliefs (pp. 12-
3). While they have not specified what they mean by an “inferential pattern”, in 
their discussion of what happens in fiction, they maintain that inferences related to 
imagination and inferences related to actual belief operate in the same way. They 
demonstrate the similarity between the two with their understanding of Ramsey’s 
test, which they cite: 
“given an overall state of belief G, you should accept the conditional ‘If P 
then Q’ if you should accept Q in the overall state G*P” (p. 12 - 13). 
 
                                                 
12
As a side note, I take this definition of recreative imagination as a refinement of Currie’s account. 
Currie published this work with Ravenscroft in 2002, which was over decade after publishing his 
definition of fiction in 1990. As mentioned in the last chapter, Currie (1990) declares that the idea of 
make-believe is from Walton when making his original definition (pp. 18-9). Because of the different 
interpretation of the idea of imagination in his own definition of fiction, I take this move as a change 
in how he interprets his own definition. He seems to be trying to improve his definition by 
interpreting what imagination means in his definition. Having addressed Currie and Ravenscroft’s 
definition, I will evaluate its plausibility as a definition of propositional imagination in the definition 
of fiction. I am not concerned about whether their definition of imagination is a plausible one on its 
own. My project is on definition of fiction, not on definition of imagination. Even if this definition of 
imagination is flawed, I can still use this idea for defining fiction if it works. Similarly, even if this 
definition is a plausible one, I cannot apply it to define imagination in definitions of fiction if the 
application leads to implausible result. 
57 
 This test is an evaluation of indicative conditionals (i.e. if p, q). According to 
Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) reading of Ramsey’s test, when a person evaluates 
an indicative conditional, he imagines the antecedent as true, and then decides 
whether to accept the consequent as true: 
“How do I apply the Ramsey test? If I could add P to my beliefs and settle 
into a new overall state of belief, I could then just see whether Q seemed 
reasonable or not. But I can't add to the stock of my beliefs at will. Anyway, I 
do not wish to take on beliefs irrespective of their truth values just to 
evaluate conditionals. The idea is that instead of adding P as a belief I can 
add it ‘in imagination’, and since imagination preserves the inferential 
patterns of (p.13) belief, I can then see whether a new imagining, Q, 
emerges as reasonable in light of this. If it does, I have reason to think that 
adding P to the stock of my beliefs would lead me to add Q as well, and so I 
can add the conditional ‘if P then Q’ to my beliefs (pp. 12-3)”. 
 
 Therefore, they think that belief-like imagination is to make-believe the 
antecedent of an indicative conditional13. In particular, they motivate the idea that 
there is belief-like imagining by appealing to the Ramsey Test. Currie and 
Ravenscroft take the proposition p in the antecedent of an indicative conditional (if 
p, q) to be an instance of belief-like imagination, i.e. supposing a proposition as 
true and then considering what to believe as a result14. 
 This technique of supposition and consideration as derived from Currie and 
Ravenscroft’s understanding of Ramsey’s test can be applied to perspective shifting, 
                                                 
13
An indicative conditional is “if p, it is the case that q”, not “if p, it would be the case that q”. The 
latter one is called subjunctive conditional; and is not relevant to the Ramsey’s test. Jonathan 
Bennett (2003) has produced an introduction to this distinction. The emphasis on indicative 
condition shows in the wording of the Ramsey’s test. 
14
I do not dispute whether belief-like imagination follows this inferential pattern, as it is irrelevant 
to defining the idea of imagination in fiction. I am only concerned about whether this definition of 
belief-like imagination is a plausible way to define imagination in definitions of fiction. 
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in which a person imagines what it is like to be in a perspective beyond his own one, 
and see what he thinks or feels. The cognitive process of perspective shifting may 
include both supposition (the if-clause or antecedent) and consideration (the main 
clause or the consequent), so the cognitive process of perspective shifting becomes 
a two-step process. The first step is belief-like imagination, because Currie and 
Ravenscroft, as mentioned in the last paragraph, take the antecedent to be an 
instance of belief-like imagination. 
 Nevertheless, make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension and 
creation seems to include more than the belief-like imagination in the process of 
perspective shifting. Not only do the readers and authors make-believe that they 
are in another perspective or that something that is not actually true is true within 
the story, make-believe in fiction seems to include also what can be inferred from 
accepting certain belief-like imagination, at least intuitively. Indeed, Currie and 
Ravenscroft (2002) do stress that imagination in some cases mimics the inferential 
pattern of belief. Therefore, to further clarify the idea of make-believe imagination 
in fiction, there is a need to explore how make-believe imagination mimics belief. 
Also, given that make-believe only mimics belief instead of being reduced to belief, 
it is important to delineate the difference between make-believe and belief after 
delineating the similarities between them. 
 
Digging Deeper into the Similarities between Belief and Make-Believe 
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 More can be said about the similarity and difference regarding the 
comparison between make-believe and belief. Nichols (2004) produced a very clear 
explication of how imagination mimics belief through his account of pretence 
(Stephen Stich shares the same account since he co-authored a paper on this 
subject with Nichols, see Nichols and Stich (2000)). Nichols (2004) says “the single 
code hypothesis provides a unified explanation for a wide range of similarities 
between imagination and belief” (p. 129). While this theory explains pretence, 
Nichols also means it to explain the role of imagination in fiction, “the single-code 
hypothesis provides a surprisingly powerful account of one aspect of the 
imagination” (p. 129). The core claim of the single-code hypothesis is that the 
content of pretence and the content of belief are often processed in the same way, 
“a [cognitive] mechanism that takes pretence representations as input will process 
those representations much as it would process isomorphic belief representations” 
(p. 131). 
 Therefore, the meaningful similarity between imagination and belief lies in 
how a cognitive mechanism processes belief and pretence representation in the 
same way, at least in many cases. Nichols and Stich (2000) further explain this by 
detailing how the content of imagination/pretence is actually processed, saying: 
“Like the Belief Box and the Desire Box, the Possible World Box contains 
representation tokens. However, the functional role of these tokens, their 
pattern of interaction with other components of the mind, is quite different 
from the functional role of either beliefs or desires. Their job is not to 
represent the world as it is or as we'd like it to be, but rather to represent 
what the world would be like given some set of assumptions that we may 
neither believe to be true nor want to be true. The PWB is a work space in 
which our cognitive system builds and temporarily stores representations of 
one or another possible world. We are inclined to think that the mind uses 
the PWB for a variety of tasks including mindreading, strategy testing, and 
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empathy. Although we think that the PWB is implicated in all these 
capacities, we suspect that the original evolutionary function of the PWB 
was rather to facilitate reasoning about hypothetical situations (see Currie, 
1995b for a contrasting view)” (p. 122). 
 
“One important part of the story, on our theory, is that the inference 
mechanism, the very same one that is used in the formation of real beliefs, 
can work on representations in the PWB in much the same way that it can 
work on representations in the Belief Box” (p. 122). 
 
 These two quotes show that make-believe imagination and belief operate in 
a similar way at least when it comes to inference, especially in terms of how they 
interact with other components of mind, though with different functional roles. 
While belief is about the events in the actual world, make-believe imagination is 
about the events in the certain possible world. If they share the same mechanism, 
they should be able to have the same content. Nichols (2004) confirms this point by 
further noting that belief and make-believe imagination often have the same 
representational content (p. 129). 
 
Make-Believe Imagination and the Debate about Defining Fiction 
 
 As a result, make-believe theorists may respond to Friend by arguing that 
make-believe imagination and belief are very similar cognitive mechanisms, which 
process two very similar sets of representational content in two very similar ways. 
Therefore, Friend’s criticism regarding fiction made for telling facts only confirms 
this point. As such, make-believe theories accommodate the utterances in works 
like Schindler’s Ark, War and Peace, or Vidal’s Empire series. In the perspective of 
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make-believe theorists, these works or their assertions are there to be make-
believed or imagined as true propositions. 
Although I have been mentioning the similarity between belief and make-
believe for the sake of argument, these two cognitive mechanisms are not the 
same. Propositions that are make-believed as true are processed in a way similar to 
how they are processed when they are believed, but for a different purpose or 
functional role. This is because Nichols and Stich (2000) use the functional role of 
the cognitive mechanism to distinguish pretence/imagination from belief, “the 
functional role of these tokens, their pattern of interaction with other components 
of the mind, is quite different from the functional role of either beliefs or desires” 
(p. 122). Thus, make-believe theorists may respond to Friend by arguing that she 
pays too little attention to how to differentiate imagination in fiction from belief, 
namely the difference in their functional roles. Although make-believe theorists 
may not be able to pinpoint the exact difference in the functional roles of 
assertions in fiction and assertions, it is not a fatal error for them. It is nothing 
more than an area that needs to be explored in order to render their theories 
sufficiently convincing and plausible, even though this exploration may be a 
challenging one. 
 Although I have shown that Friend is not necessarily right about what she 
says regarding assertions in fiction and their problems for make-believe theories, I 
think this result only shows that there is a clash of intuition between make-believe 
theorists and Friend. Friend may claim that all she needs is the difference between 
believing and imagining is a sufficiently strong foundation for her argument. For the 
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sake of argument, I have shown that make-believe theorists may claim that 
assertions in fiction are also instances of make-believe because they are processed 
by the mechanism of make-believe in the context of creating and comprehending a 
work of fiction. Nevertheless, Friend and her followers may not agree that 
assertions in fiction should be understood in this way. She may argue that simply 
claiming that assertions in fiction have a different functional role from assertions in 
nonfiction is insufficient to explain the role of assertions in fiction, especially there 
is no clear idea of what the functional role of make-believe imagination is in the 
context of fiction creation and comprehension. Therefore, the debate between 
Friend and make-believe theorists still continues, especially in the area of 
assertions in fiction. All I want to show by delineating the ideas of make-believe is 
that the debate between Friend and make-believe theorists is far from settled. 
 If make-believe theorists want to win this debate against Friend by 
deploying my hypothetical argument, they have to resolve a key issue: if make-
believe theories are to be accepted: what is the functional role of imagination in 
fiction? In both cases of strategic thinking and mind-reading (functional roles of 
certain types of imagination mentioned by Nichols and Stich), there are clear 
functional roles of imagination as a powerful tool for fulfilling these two goals. 
Therefore, what is the one functional role or the set of functional roles of 
imagination in fiction? It seems that make-believe theorists leave this question 
unanswered. Certainly, this is no fatal attack to make-believe theories. However, if 
this line of defence is going to be effective, a plausible theory of fiction, especially a 
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make-believe one, should explain the functional role of make-believe imagination 
in the tasks of comprehending and creating works of fiction. 
 So far, in my hypothetical defence for make-believe theories, I have been 
leaving out Friend’s another criticism: nonfiction made with intentional fabrications. 
I do so just for developing the hypothetical defence in a linear way, instead of 
developing two arguments at once. Further, the line of argument for fiction made 
for telling facts can be applied to this case, just in a twisted way. Make-believe 
theorists may accept that nonfiction made with intentional fabrications includes 
fictive utterances (make-believe theorists have to accept that nonfiction made with 
intentional fabrications includes fictive utterance, since the authors of these works 
certainly do not believe that these utterances are true), while maintaining that 
these fictive utterances serve different functional roles from those fictive 
utterances in fiction. Fictive utterances in fiction serve the functional role of 
contributing to the overall make-believe induced by reading fiction, while fictive 
utterances in nonfiction serve the functional role of inviting the audience to form 
certain beliefs about the thematic, psychological, or other aspects certain historical 
events. Therefore, make-believe theorists can explain the fictive utterances in In 
Cold Blood away by claiming that these utterances are there to lure the audience to 
form certain beliefs about the psychology of certain historical figures or about how 
certain historical events happened. 
As can be seen from applying the idea about the similarity between make-
believe imagination and belief, although make-believe theorists have not yet 
provided an answer regarding the functional role of make-believe when creating 
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and comprehending a work of fiction as a whole, they may successfully respond to 
Friend’s criticism by appealing to the similarities and differences between make-
believe and belief. Therefore, instead of being rejected, as Friend argues, make-
believe theories are just incomplete or not plausible enough. The result of the 
debate between Friend and make-believe theorists is neither settled nor conclusive. 
 
Kathleen Stock’s Exposition of Imagination 
 
While the expositions of imagination by Currie and Ravenscroft and Nichols 
and Stich defend make-believe theories to a great extent, they still cannot fully 
remedy make-believe theories. Kathleen Stock’s definition of fictive utterances can 
be taken as an alternative defence for imagination-based theories, in which she 
substitutes her own exposition of imagination for make-believe imagination. I shall 
evaluate her alternative non-make-believe imagination-based approach. 
Stock’s (2011) goal in producing her exposition of imagination is to provide 
imagination-based accounts with a way to include fact telling expressions or 
expressions of belief in the content of fiction. She argues that for an utterance to 
be fictive, it is necessary and sufficient that it is “intended to produce imagining” (p. 
145). Although she does not claim to produce a definition of a work of fiction, her 






Stock (2011) argues for her account by delineating the idea of imagination 
in fiction, which she calls propositional imagination, with three conditions, starting 
with her first condition: 
“Necessarily, a thinker T who imagines that p thinks of p as being the case 
This is just a consequence of a point made earlier: that, like belief, 
propositional imagining involves thinking of a state of affairs as 
antecedently established rather than as something to be done” (p. 151). 
 
 This necessary condition does not mean that imagining that p means 
believing or thinking that it is the case that p in the actual world. Rather, it only 
states a similarity between imagining and belief. While the subject thinks that p is 
the case in both cognitive mechanisms, imagining that p often (not always) means 
thinking that p is true only in certain non-actual contexts. To make this point in her 
exposition of imagination, Stock (2011) states that, when a person imagines that p, 
she is indeed connecting the content of her thought that p to certain other 
propositions that she does not believe to be true. This point is to be delineated in 
                                                 
15
I did not discuss Stock’s definition of fictive utterances in the last chapter for several reasons. First, 
it does not define what a work of fiction is. Therefore, it is not exactly a definition of fiction. Second, 
I find it more suitable to discuss Stock’s theory after mentioning Friend’s arguments in the last 
chapter. While Friend makes her argument against imagination-based definitions by assertions in 
fiction, Stock’s theory attempts to include assertions in fiction as fictive utterances. Thus, her 
argument is a direct response to Friend’s arguments against other imagination-based theories. Third, 
this account defends imagination-based theories against their criticisms by defining imagination, so 
it fits the theme of the later part of this chapter, which is to defend imagination-based theories by 
re-defining imagination. 
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her two further conditions of her exposition of imagination. She calls them 
“connect 1” and “connect 2”: 
“CONNECT 1: Necessarily, a thinker T who imagines that p is disposed to 
connect her thought that p is the case with other propositional thoughts 
about what is the case” (p. 151). 
“CONNECT 2: Necessarily, where a thinker T imagines that p at time t, either 
T does not believe that p or T is disposed to connect her thought that p is 
the case to some further proposition(s) about what is the case, whose 
content is not replicated by any belief of hers at t” (p. 153). 
  
 Connect 2 is connect 1 with a time constraint, meaning that it is possible for 
a person to imagine p to be true at one time, then believe it to be true at another 
time. 
  Stock (2011) also wants to use connect 2 to differentiate belief from 
imagination. She says when one imagines that p, either he does not believe that p 
or p is connected to other propositions that he does not believe as true (p. 153). 
Because of this refinement, I shall leave connect 1 aside and only take connect 2 to 
be Stock’s official view on propositional imagination. 
 
Connection and Disposition 
 
 There are two ideas that need to be explained in connect 2, namely 
connection and disposition. Stock (2011) explains connection thus: 
“By ‘connect’ I mean attempt to conjoin, or otherwise treat as premises in 
the same argument, to think of as true with respect to the same world. 
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(This is obviously supposed to be different from merely having several 
thoughts consecutively.) Propositional imagining is never only the act of 
engaging with a single proposition (p. 151)”. 
 
 There are four important considerations here. The most straightforward 
way for a sentence to connect to another sentence is to be a premise in an 
argument with that sentence. Nevertheless, fiction is not a collection of arguments. 
Thus, I propose to understand the idea of a premise in a more inclusive way. For p 
connecting to q, instead to saying p, therefore, q, I propose to treat it as p, so q. In 
this way, imagination in fiction may include facts that serve as a reason for 
fabricated events that occur later in the same work. 
 Also, being connected can also be understood as being true in the same 
world. For the term “world”, while Stock does not clarify whether she means the 
actual world, possible worlds, or some combination of the two, I take it to mean 
the content of the same work of representation.16 
 Additionally, the idea of conjoining is puzzling, because conjoining is simply 
a synonym of connecting. While it is unclear what Stock means, I take conjoining to 
mean considering a sentence together with many other sentences in the content of 
the same work of representation. 
                                                 
16
I find it particularly implausible that Stock is talking about possible worlds. First, the content of a 
fiction is not a possible world, or time travel stories could not exit. An example of time travel story is 
Back to the Future. I will provide more details about the issues related to time traveling in chapter 4. 
Second, the content of a fiction is hardly about any one possible world, because there is not enough 
detail to pick just one possible world. For example, there is no specification about how many bow 
ties Hercule Poirot has in Murder on the Orient Express. Therefore, both a world in which Poirot has 
10 bow ties and a world in which he has 12 bow ties will fit into the story. Nevertheless, Stock states 
literally “the same world” in the quote, so I find it more sensible to regard it as being in the content 
of the same work of fiction. 
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 Finally, it is important to note that Stock joins these three explanations of 
“connect” by the word “or”. This means that any one of these three is sufficient to 
count as “connection”. 
 Stock (2011) defines the idea of disposition as a potential to behave in a 
certain way: 
“Note that CONNECT 1 cites a disposition to make such connections; it does 
not say that it must be actualized. Its commitments are therefore pretty 
weak. 
That imagining is potentially connected to other propositional thoughts in 
this way is a commonplace” (p. 152). 
 
The explanation of disposition mentioned in connect 1 also applies to the 
idea of disposition mentioned in connect 2, because connect 2 is a development of 
connect 1. The idea of disposition mentioned in connects 1 and connect 2 means 
the potential to connect.  An imagined proposition has the potential to connect to 
other propositions in one or any combination of the three ways delineated before, 
though it does not necessarily do so.17 
This allows her to define fictive utterances thus: 
“So, putting NIP and CONNECT 2 together: on the assumption that the 
reader of a fictional work is supposed to be disposed to conjoin together all 
or most of the utterances contained therein, even a work significantly 
constituted of utterances intended to be believed may also prescribe 
imagining overall, as long as it contains some utterances which are not 
intended to be believed” (p. 154). 
                                                 
17
In the following discussion, I shall mention some examples of sentences that actually connect 
when I comment on Stock’s exposition, to avoid any disagreement on intuitions about whether a 
sentence actually has any unrealised potential to connect. 
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“Let NIP be the claim that necessarily, a fictive utterance prescribes 
imagining” (p. 146). 
 
In summary, connect 2 is her answer to how imagination-based accounts 
include assertions in fiction.  It is important to note that the wording of connect 2 
and NIP do not suggest a jointly sufficient condition, so these claims are not a 
definition of imagination in a strict sense. However, these expositions of 
imagination may be able to resolve the connection between fictive utterances and 
fiction. 
 
Evaluating Stock’s Account 
 
 I argue that although Stock’s exposition of imagination is more plausible 
than that of Walton or Currie and Ravenscroft, it still cannot save imagination-
based theories. To begin with, it is too inclusive. 
 In the case of fictions created for telling facts, Stock’s account can solve 
some problems that others cannot, including why works like Schindler’s Ark should 
be considered to be fiction. She does so by pointing out that works like Schindler’s 
Ark satisfy her criteria for NIP and connect 2: a person can both believe and 
imagine a sentence to be true, as long as it is connected to a sentence that he does 
not believe to be true. This allows imagination-based accounts to include factual 
utterances in fiction as fictive utterances, and to say that factual utterances in 
fictions created for telling facts are instances of imagination. This would allow 
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imagination-based theories to include works of fiction created for telling facts, like 
Schindler’s Ark, as fictions. But this inclusivity goes too far. While it allows fictions 
created for telling facts to be categorised as fiction, it does not exclude works of 
nonfiction like In Cold Blood. 
 Stock says that a written work is a work of fiction, so long as it includes 
some utterances that are not intended to be believed. This is certainly the case 
with In Cold Blood, as Capote knowingly inserted some untrue utterances into it. 
According to Stock’s account, this work must still be considered fictional. 
To resolve this issue, Stock may extend the application of the idea of thinker 
in connect 2 to audience to exclude In Cold Blood. In her account, if the author 
emphasises that his work is telling facts and is written after extensive research for 
its factual accuracy, then it is not a work of fiction. The emphasis on research and 
factual accuracy shows that the author intends to convince his audience to deny 
that his work satisfies NIP and connect 2, so the work in question is nonfiction. In 
Cold Blood is a case of this. 
Stock (2011) does actually make a similar attempt. She argues that In Cold 
Blood is nonfiction because of its emphasis on research and because Capote claims 
to be telling facts. In fact, this book was advertised as being written after extensive 
research and the majority of sentences in it are expressions of belief. For the same 
reason, Stock claims that Vidal’s Lincoln is a work of nonfiction because of Vidal’s 
motive to tell facts in it (pp. 158-9). 
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If Stock categorises In Cold Blood as nonfiction because the author wants his 
audience to believe the content of his book as telling facts, then she must 
categorise Schindler’s Ark as nonfiction for the same reason, because the author of 
Schindler’s Ark believed that his book was telling facts, and like Capote, he wanted 
the audience to believe the same thing. Therefore, Stock’s account fails to 
categorise Schindler’s Ark as fiction while categorising In Cold Blood as nonfiction, 
with an alternative interpretation. Her exposition still cannot help imagination-
based accounts to differentiate fiction created for telling facts from nonfiction 
made with fabricated parts. 
Even if what Stock says about In Cold Blood and Lincoln is accepted, the 
consequence is still undesirable for her. Schindler’s Ark satisfies both of her 
aforementioned rationales for being a work of nonfiction, but it won the Booker 
Prize for fiction in 1982, confirming that it is not only a work of fiction, but widely 
recognised as such. Applying this idea to imagination-based theories, authors 
intend their audience to carry out imagining when reading their work in the way 
specified in connect 2. This can exclude In Cold Blood from being fiction, as the 
claim of being a true account is specified in the title of the book, In Cold Blood: A 
True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences. Thus, Capote wants his 
audience to believe, not imagine, that the content of his writing is true.   
Further, trying to expand the “thinker” in connect 2 to “audience” does not 
work. It is implausible to claim that an author of a work of fiction always intends his 
audience to do something to his work, because the case of mental fiction shows 
that the author of a work of fiction may intend no one to read his work, as I 
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showed in the last chapter. If Stock’s exposition defends imagination-based 
accounts by regarding all utterances in fiction as fictive, In Cold Blood shows that 
Stock’s idea of imagination is still too inclusive. Alternatively, if connect 2 and NIP 
serve as an exposition on the relationship between utterances in fiction and works 
of fiction, Stock’s account still does not show the difference in the relationship 
between utterances and works in the case of fiction made for telling facts and the 
same relationship in the case of nonfiction with many intentionally fabricated parts. 
 
What about the Difference between Fiction and Lies? 
 
A single case like In Cold Blood may not be sufficient to reject Stock’s idea of 
imagination as a plausible defence for imagination-based theories. However, if 
imagination-based accounts fail to distinguish many lies from fiction even with 
Stock’s account of fictive utterances, they have a significant problem. 
I have argued that the one (sometimes only) party that does the imagining 
in imagination-based accounts is the author of a work of fiction, as one may 
produce a work of fiction with the intention of not having it read or apprehended. 
Thus, applying connect 2, Stock’s idea of fictive utterances includes all utterances 
imagined by any author. This will include many lies. 
Consider the case of perjury. A witness or suspect in a court case may give a 
false account of what they were doing when a crime was happening by saying 
something that they do not believe to be true. Consequently, their other 
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expressions of belief are connected to these make-believe expressions, because 
they are part of the same narrative, and may even have a causal relationship. Using 
Stock’s account, all these utterances in all these lies must be fictive. This problem 
can be blocked by the idea of the author intending to have an audience imagine, 
because lies of this sort are made to be believed, not imagined. However, given my 
rejection of the idea of intending the audience to imagine, Stock’s fictive utterance 
account cannot even differentiate lies from fiction; much less defend imagination-
based accounts18.  
 
Insights into the Components of a Plausible Definition of Fiction 
 
Though Currie and Ravenscroft’s and Stock’s accounts have failed in their 
defence of imagination-based theories, they have highlighted some important 
components and considerations for a plausible definition of fiction, namely that a 
plausible definition of fiction must be able to differentiate works like Schindler’s Ark 
from works like In Cold Blood. This is because there are many works of fiction that 
contain facts, including War and Peace, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and even 
the TV show Rome. Works like these form a category, namely works of fiction made 
                                                 
18
Although Stock’s account ultimately fails as a defence, it has a few important merits. Stock tries to 
defend imagination-based theories by undermining the sharp contrast between imagination and 
belief; and she achieves this by refusing to identify make-believe as imagination in fiction. Instead, 
she explains her idea of imagination by the connection between different utterances. As a result, 
the content of imagination can be an utterance that the author of a work of fiction believes to be 
true, though it is connected to some make-believe content when being imagined as true in fiction. 
Nevertheless, this contrast alone still fails to distinguish fictions made for telling facts from 
nonfiction with intentional fabrications, so it fails to rescue imagination-based accounts. 
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for telling facts. Thus, works of fiction made for telling facts are not just some rare 
cases or exceptions. 
 Second, it is very implausible mix these types of works up with works like In 
Cold Blood, because the fabricated parts in In Cold Blood are controversial; and the 
fabricated parts in those works are not. Indeed, some dramatizations of history in 
some works of fiction are even considered praiseworthy, as shown by Schindler’s 
Ark winning the Booker Prize. 
Further, it is also unacceptable for journalists to claim that they were 
writing fiction when it comes to light that they have fabricated pieces of reporting. 
For example, Stephen Glass knowingly wrote factually inaccurate pieces for The 
New Republic. He could not free himself from the scandal by claiming that he was 
writing works of fiction. 
Unfortunately, imagination-based theories, even with Stock’s expositions, 
still fail to distinguish nonfiction made with fabricated parts from fiction made for 
telling facts. This is a substantial issue, as this is not only an issue for aesthetics and 
philosophy of language, but also for media ethics (like the case of Stephen Glass). 
Therefore, a plausible theory of fiction must be able to differentiate fiction made 





 In this chapter, I have developed my argument from Chapter 1, namely, that 
a plausible account of fiction cannot include the idea of the author’s intention for 
the audience to do something with a work, and that imagination-based accounts 
fail to include expressions of belief (assertions) in fiction. As a result, these 
accounts exclude some works of fiction from being fiction and include some works 
of nonfiction as fiction. 
 I began this chapter by showing that assertions in fiction form a problem 
that imagination-based theories cannot resolve, because they define imagination 
as make-belief. There are at least two types of assertions to consider: those for 
setting the scene, and those that are for telling facts. 
The author of a work of fiction that is made to be believed may not believe 
that its content is true, while the author of a work of fiction that is made for telling 
facts believes that the content of his work is true, at least in terms of the sequence 
of events. I have shown that imagination-based theorists can defend themselves 
against assertions made for setting the scene because of an argument from Carroll, 
but not against assertions made for telling facts in a work of fiction made for telling 
facts. 
In light of this, I then considered different explanations of imagination as a 
possible defence for imagination-based theories, beginning with Currie and 
Ravenscroft’s account of belief-like recreative imagination, then supplementing it 
with that of Nichols and Stich. These theories explain how make-believe theories 
include fiction made for telling facts as fiction and exclude nonfiction made with 
intentional fabrications from being nonfiction, and so defend make-believe theories 
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against criticisms from Friend. Nichols and Stich’s approach indeed leads to another 
question: what is the functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction? Unlike 
imagination or pretence in mind reading or strategic thinking, there is not one 
specific role of make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension. Make-believe 
theories have yet to provide an answer. This is not a fatal attack, but it shows that 
make-believe theories are incomplete or are not convincing enough. I then 
considered Stock’s exposition of imagination. This account explains imagination as 
either make-belief or a connection to make-belief. It has the advantage of being 
able to include utterances that authors of fiction believe to be true as fictive 
utterances, and thus can include scene-setting assertions in fiction. 
However, it still fails to defend imagination-based approaches. It either 
includes works of fiction made for telling facts (e.g. Schindler’s Ark) but fails to 
exclude works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts (e.g. In Cold 
Blood), or it excludes works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts 
from being works of fiction, but also excludes works of fiction made for telling facts. 
This is a significant problem, because there are many works of fiction made 
for telling facts and some works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated 
parts. Additionally, the failure to distinguish works of fiction made for telling facts 
from works of nonfiction with intentionally fabricated details leads to a problem in 
media ethics, because the former type of works is not blameworthy but the latter 
very much so. 
To conclude, Chapters 1 and 2 together show that, at best, make-believe 
theories of fiction are incomplete, because they fail to answer the functional role of 
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make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension and creation, which is the key 
for addressing Friend’s seemingly fatal criticisms. In the later part of my project, I 
will produce my own interpretation of the purpose of creating a work of fiction 
which explains the functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction 
comprehension and creation. My explanation, however, will weaken the direct 
relation between fiction and make-believe imagination. I shall not move on to my 
own proposal now, since I first need to address some theories that are alternative 





Imagination as a Non-Necessary Condition: Friend on Fiction as a Genre 
  
 Having shown the inadequacies of those accounts, I shall set them aside for 
now and evaluate some alternative definitions. These theories either include imag-
ination as a non-necessary component for defining fiction, or reject the idea of im-
agination in defining fiction altogether. I will now go through both options, begin-
ning with Friend’s approach of imagination as a non-necessary component in this 
chapter, before moving on to the second option with Deutsch’s theory in the next 
chapter. 
This chapter is dedicated to Friend’s approach for several reasons. First, it is 
a highly regarded theory of fiction among many philosophers who are looking for a 
non-imagination-based theory. Second, its components are not radically different 
from imagination-based theories, and it still includes imagination as a component, 




I shall begin by delineating and evaluating Friend’s account or expositions 
of fiction, together with Walton’s idea of categories of art, of which it is an applica-
tion. I will then go on to show that Friend’s account may have said nothing about 
what constitutes a work of fiction, so her account misses the point of the debate. 
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Instead, her account only mentions how to identify works of fiction taking some 
stereotypical properties of them as standard features. In a more charitable read-
ing, Friend’s definition is at best incomplete, because she presumes that there are 
no properties that render a work of representation fictional. Even If the more char-
itable reading is accepted, then there must be something external to the work re-
sponsible for its categorisation, such as a genre. However, she has not argued for 
this point. Thus, I will not regard her account as a plausible account of fiction, and I 
will also set it aside after this chapter.  
Given the complexities of evaluating Friend’s theory of fiction, I will sepa-
rate this chapter into three parts. The first part is a purely descriptive delineation 
of Friend’s definition of fiction. The second part is to delineate the philosophical 
foundation of Friend’s theory, including the characteristics of Walton’s theory of 
categories of art and how it affects the plausibility of Friend’s definition, as well as 
the evaluation of how useful Walton’s theory of categories of art is for defining fic-
tion in general. The third part is an evaluation of Friend’s theory. 
 
Part 1 
Friend’s Definition of Fiction 
Friend (2012) believes that the failure of imagination-based definitions of 
fiction shows that imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for defining fic-
tion. She calls her alternative approach the genre approach:  
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“At the same time, my proposal that fiction and nonfiction be construed as 
genres does justice to the intuitive links between fiction on the one hand, 
and imagining, story-telling and making things up on the other—the links 
that motivate the fictive utterance theory [my note: imagination-based ac-
counts in my wording]. I claim, however, that rather than constituting nec-
essary and sufficient conditions, these links indicate standard features of 
the genre of fiction; as such, they count towards classification, but only in 
combination with other criteria. To understand this claim we must put it in 
the context of an account of genre” (p. 187). 
 
In this quote, Friend thinks that imagination-based theorists make a mis-
take in taking imagination to be a necessary component for defining fiction. She 
also thinks that imagination is only a standard feature of fiction, saying,  
“What other theorists propose as defining properties of fictionality—such 
as containing utterances whose contents we are to imagine—I see as 
standard features of works in the fiction genre” (p.188).  
 
 In her account, the conditions in the definitions of Currie, Davies, and La-
marque and Olsen become the standard features of fiction as a genre. I will explore 
the idea of standard features shortly, meanwhile, I will I take it as being certain 
common features among works of fiction. In Friend’s account, imagination-based 
definitions are right in many (but not all) cases because they specify the features 
that are commonly found in fiction, though these standard features do not neces-
sarily render a work of representation to be a work of fiction.   
In Friend’s (2012) genre theory of fiction there are three types of features 
that determine whether a work is a work of ficion or a work of nonfiction: standard 
features, contra-standard features, and variable features (a notion which she bor-
rows from Walton): 
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“Classification as fiction or nonfiction, like classification in other genres or 
categories of art, influences the way we experience, understand and evalu-
ate a work by specifying a contrast class against which the work’s proper-
ties stand out as being standard, contra-standard or variable” (p. 188). 
“A feature of a work is standard if possession of that feature places or tends 
to place the work in a particular category: flatness is standard for painting; 
an obvious-but-innocent suspect is standard for whodunits. A feature is 
contra-standard if possession of that feature excludes or tends to exclude 
the work from a category. Heavy drumbeats are contra-standard for 
minuets; stream-of consciousness narration is contra-standard for science 
textbooks. Variable features are those that can differ between works in a 
category without bearing on classification. Colour and composition are var-
iable for painting; the degree of detail in describing characters is variable 
for the novel” (p. 188). 
 
These features are considered in the context of the work’s categorisation. 
Standard features of a genre tend to place a work that possesses them in that gen-
re. Contra-standard features of a genre tend to exclude a work possessing them 
from the genre. Variable features are those that vary among the works in the same 
genre and have no effect on the classification of the genre of a work (p. 188).  
Friend (2012) does not specify the standard, contra-standard, and variable 
features of works of fiction exhaustively, because she believes that the standard 
features of works of fiction change with different periods of time (p. 193). This will, 
in turn, affect what the contra-standard features are, as well as the variable fea-
tures. Nevertheless, she specifies some of the standard features of fiction, and in-
cludes imagination as one of them:  
“If we take a text to be fiction, for example, we will expect it to engage us 
imaginatively through narrative; to deploy certain literary devices; to in-
clude invented elements, such as descriptions of what has never happened 
and names that fail to refer; to make claims that are not assertions by the 
author; and so on” (p. 189). 
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 If the standard features do not necessarily categorise a work as fiction, then 
how does that work? Friend (2012) delineates her mechanism in this quote: 
“We can safely say that a work that lacks any standard features of a catego-
ry, whether manifest or non-manifest, will be excluded from that category. 
Furthermore, a work that has many standard features of a category (and 
few contra-standard features) is likely to belong in that category, and a 
work that has few standard features of a category (and many contra-
standard features) is unlikely to belong” (p. 193). 
 
 I call this mechanism Friend’s mechanism. Friend’s mechanism says that 
having standard features makes a work of representation more likely to be classi-
fied as fiction. However, she does not explain how her definition works in non-
paradigmatic cases, like that of Schindler’s Ark. In my understanding, her account 
regards works like these as borderline cases. This is not a shortcoming, because 
this novel and works similar to it contain many standard and contra-standard fea-
tures of fiction.  
 Further, Friend (2012) argues that her definition of fiction is significant in 
that it explains why readers react differently to fiction and nonfiction, stating that 
this happens because a genre is also a category that guides the reader’s interpreta-
tion and understanding of a work (pp. 195, 199-200). She mentions some findings 
from an experiment by Deborah Hendersen and Herb Clark that show that readers 
remember more details of a narrative and can recite more parts of a work if a book 
is labelled as fiction. Friend explains this result as the guidance for understanding 
embedded in the categorisation of fiction, saying that readers recall more of the 
narratives and of the texts of a work of fiction because they expect the work to be 
more enjoyable to read. In contrast, readers of works of nonfiction expect to learn 
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certain facts when reading the works. Therefore, they cease to focus on the de-
tailed parts of the narrative and the text and start focusing on learning (p. 200).   
 
Part 2 
Friend’s Genres and Walton’s Categories of Art 
 
 The idea of genre in Friend’s (2012) account is developed from Walton’s 
idea of categories of art. She says “genres are essentially what Kendall Walton 
(1970) calls ‘categories of art’” (p. 187). By which, she means “ways of classifying 
representations that guide appreciation, so that knowledge of the classification 
plays a role in a work’s correct interpretation and evaluation” (p. 195).  
According to Walton (1970), the standard features, contra-standard fea-
tures, and variable features all play a significant role in evaluating and categorising 
works of art. While standard features are normally those that do not contribute to 
the evaluation of the artistic merit, like the properties of having paint or being cre-
ated on canvas, they still play a significant role in evaluating the artistic merit of a 
work when considered together with the variables (pp. 343-9).   
 Walton (1970) provides an example of music. The standard features are the 
material and mechanics used to build the piano. These features lead to another 
standard feature, which is that the sound of a piano cannot sound as continuous or 
linear as string instruments. However, the sound of a piano can still vary, according 
to a pianist’s technique and style, or the requirements written on a score, or the 
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use of tools such as a pedal, all of which are variables. Walton’s point is that the 
standard features are the constraints on the range of possibility of a category of 
art, while the various possibilities within these constraints are the variables (pp. 
349-50). 
 According to Walton (1970), standard features are not only the physical 
constraints of a category of art, but also some conventions, like the two-
dimensionality of many paintings. Contra-standard features, therefore, include a 
refusal to use the material specified in that category and the breaking of certain 
conventions in a particular category.  
However, just because something is contra-standard in one case does not 
mean it necessarily will be in other cases. For instance, Walton mentions a painting 
with a three-dimensional object glued on it, which is contra-standard to the two-
dimensionality of paintings. But when there are many similar paintings, it causes 
ambiguity — is a work contra-standard, or the beginning of a new genre (pp. 351-
3)? This example shows the possibility that one can transform an existing category 
of art, or make up a new category of art, or both.  
 
Walton’s Four Criteria for Admitting a Work into a Category of Art 
 
 Walton (1970) provides four criteria for admitting a work into a given cate-
gory of art. None are sufficient on their own, the first two are necessary, and the 
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third and fourth are not (p. 357, p. 361). Thus, criteria 1, 2, and 3 or 4 are necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions for a work to be admitted into a category.  
 The first criterion states that a work normally has many standard features 
of a given category, though this criterion alone is not sufficient for categorisation, 
because the very same work may be taken as and evaluated in different categories 
in different societies (p. 357). For example, it is certainly disastrous to interpret 
Guo Xi’s Early Spring (107219) as abstract painting like those by Jackson Pollock, be-
cause to do so is to ignore all the embedded expression of Chinese philosophy and 
the painting’s literati origins. This evaluation and categorisation certainly lose a 
great deal of the artistic merit of this masterpiece. 
 The case of Early Spring shows that artistic merit plays a role in the 
categorisation of works. Walton (1970) sees the point, so his second criterion of 
categorisation is to categorise work in a category that maximises its artistic merit 
(p. 357). In terms of application, the second criterion should be considered with 
the assumption that the work possesses many standard features in more than one 
category. 
 As stated before, the first two criteria are insufficient. Walton (1970) thinks 
that it is unacceptable to accept a work that is agreed to be mediocre in a certain 
category of art as a masterpiece in a made up category or categories that are away 
from the context of the production of the work, no matter how many standard fea-
                                                 
19
 This date can only be taken as a reference, as many dates of ancient Chinese paintings, particu-
larly those before Ming dynasty, cannot be taken with complete certainty due to poor documenta-
tion. 
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tures the work possesses and how good the work will appear to be in those cate-
gories (pp. 259-60).  
The case of Early Spring supports Walton’s emphasis on the relationship be-
tween the context of production and the categorisation of an artwork. First, this 
painting supports the need for an additional criterion by showing the inadequacies 
of the first two criteria. It calls for the consideration of the context of the produc-
tion of an artwork. This piece possesses many standard features and may be a 
great abstract painting if taken as one, so it still satisfies the first two criteria to-
gether. Second, this example supports Walton’s emphasis on the context of pro-
duction as an additional criterion. Connoisseurs may not be able to appreciate the 
merit of the painting without knowing the brush technique and the Chinese ideol-
ogy embedded in the work, which is part of the context of how this work was pro-
duced, including the society of the artist that produced it.  
 Therefore, Walton (1970) provides two additional conditions for the con-
text of the work. Neither is sufficient on their own, but a work only needs one of 
them to be admitted into a category of art, providing that it satisfies the criteria 1 
and 2.  
The third condition is the author’s opinion on which category of art his 
work belongs in, presuming that he knows the category well enough to judge. This 
criterion can prevent the association of a random category of art to any object for 
the sake of assigning a lot of artistic merit to it, so this criterion strengthens Wal-
ton’s account by excluding such undesirable situations.  
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The fourth criterion is that the category of art in question is well-
established in the society or community in which the artist produces the work. This 
criterion is provided because an artist may be inventing a new category by making 
the artwork in question (for example, Schoenberg’s invention of the atonal twelve-
tone system). Thus, if an artist successfully makes a work that invents a new cate-
gory of art, there will be a new and well-established category associated with the 
work in his society or community (pp. 357-61). Duchamp’s Fountain is a case of 
making up a new category successfully, because its new category becomes well-
established by being accepted as a genuine category in his art community.  
The third and fourth criteria do exclude Early Spring from being an abstract 
painting. This painting fails to satisfy criterion three because Guo Xi certainly knew 
nothing about abstract painting. This painting also fails to satisfy the fourth criteri-
on because his contemporary society, the Northern Song dynasty in China, had no 
well-established category of abstract painting when this work was produced. Thus, 
the disjunction formed by these two criteria successfully rejects Early Spring as an 
abstract painting.  
 
Exploring Friend’s Theory with Walton’s Account 
 
Before evaluating Friend’s exposition of fiction, I will extrapolate certain 
subtleties of her account, in order to clarify my target of evaluation. Friend claims 
that her account has no necessary and sufficient conditions. I will now review her 
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account with a focus on such conditions and show that it is plausible to have at 
least one necessary condition and at least one sufficient condition for her account. 
I will then restate an interpretation of Friend’s account including this sufficient 





I will first consider whether Friend’s account contains any necessary condi-
tion. Her application of Walton’s account mainly focuses on his first criterion, the 
standard, contra-standard, and variable features. Although Walton did not spell 
out all of these features for each category, he demanded that a work within a par-
ticular category of art must possess many of the standard features of that catego-
ry. Does Friend inherit this point? If so, there is a necessary condition: if a work of 
representation is a work of fiction, it possesses many standard features of fiction.  
Friend may have to accept that her emphasis on standard features leads to 
any necessary conditions. Not only whether a work is a work of fiction or not de-
pends on how many standard features it has, it seems to be the case that a work 
must have at least one standard feature to be a work of fiction. I revisit a quote 
from Friend (2012) to confirm this point,  
“We can safely say that a work that lacks any standard features of a catego-
ry, whether manifest or non-manifest, will be excluded from that category. 
A work that has many standard features of a category (and few contra-
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standard features) is likely to belong in that category, and a work that has 
few standard features of a category (and many contra-standard features) is 
unlikely to belong” (p. 193). 
 
According to this quote, having very few standard features does not render 
a work to be a work of nonfiction. Nevertheless, because of the first sentence of 
this quote, Friend’s (2012) definition does require a work of fiction to have at least 
some standard features. Therefore, having at least one standard feature is a neces-




While Friend’s definition has necessary conditions, it may also have suffi-
cient conditions. Having all the standard features of a work of fiction can be a suffi-
cient condition; and having this sufficient condition makes Friend’s account more 
plausible. If Friend insists on not having any sufficient conditions, then she has not 
provided a supplementary theory to explain why having all the standard features 
of a work of fiction does not render a work of representation to be a work of fic-
tion. If the standard features are there to determine whether a work of represen-
tation is a work of fiction, why is it insufficient for a work that possesses all the 
standard features to be a work of fiction? 
If Friend somehow worked out a theory to explain this, then there is an odd 
consequence: no written work or work of representation can be certainly catego-
rised as being a work of fiction. Friend’s theory categorises a work of representa-
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tion as a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction based on how many standard fea-
tures it possesses; and no work possesses more standard features than all of the 
standard features of works of fiction. Consequently, if the work that possesses the 
most standard features is still not necessarily a work of fiction, no work can neces-
sarily be a work of fiction. As a result, according to Friend’s theory, there can only 
be works that are very likely to be works of fiction.  
Nevertheless, many written works or other works of representation are 
surely fiction. Thus, Friend’s consequence that no work of representation is cer-
tainly a work of fiction is strongly counterintuitive. To avoid the aforementioned 
result, it seems that Friend should accept that all of the standard features of a 
work of fiction together are a sufficient condition for categorising a work of repre-
sentation as a work of fiction. She is not a sceptic like Matravers (2014); she is try-
ing to delineate her idea on what fiction is, so it is not a good idea for her to claim 
that no work of representation can certainly be categorised as a work of fiction. As 
a result, for the sake of plausibility, Friend needs to have at least one sufficient 
condition: to have all the standard features of a work of fiction.  
In sum, Friend’s account does have a necessary condition, which is to have 
at least some standard features, and at least one sufficient condition, which is to 
have all the standard features of a work of fiction. If it does not have this sufficient 
condition, it cannot avoid the strongly counterintuitive result that no work of rep-





Evaluating Friend’s Genre Approach 
 
 I begin this part of my evaluation by asking a significant question about 
Friend’s account: does her account actually answer the question that imagination-
based theorists are trying to answer? Is she answering the question of what makes 
a work of representation a work of fiction? Even if her account is not exactly a def-
inition of fiction but only a signpost to the right direction for researching defini-
tions of fiction, these questions are still significant. At most, they need to be re-
phrased as: does Friend’s exposition lead to a plausible direction for researching 
the definition of fiction? Or, has Friend provided enough reasons to argue that the 
property of being a work of fiction cannot be defined? 
 Suppose Friend is right, and it is plausible to define fiction with a cluster of 
standard, contra-standard, and variable features. Then, what factor renders certain 
features to be the standard features of works of fiction in Friend’s account? If 
there is another internal factor that determines the standard features of works of 
fiction, then a plausible theory of fiction must pinpoint that internal property. This 
is because these internal features are what constitutes a work of fiction. Friend 
makes no comment about whether there are such internal features. Thus, I will 
evaluate her theory in two ways: first, with the assumption that there are further 
internal features; and second, with the assumption that there are no further inter-
nal features. 
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I argue that if there are further internal features that constitute what a 
work of fiction is, then Friend is not providing insights for solving the problem of 
what constitutes a work of fiction. Instead, she is only answering how one knows 
whether a work of representation is a work of fiction. What constitutes a work of 
fiction is a metaphysical question, while the one answered by Friend is an episte-
mological one, and indeed not the point of the debate.  
To substantiate my point, I will make use of Hilary Putnam’s account for dif-
ferentiating the features used for identifying a natural kind from the properties 
that define a natural kind. Although fiction is not a natural kind, Putnam’s point still 
applies. When producing his causal theory of reference for natural kinds, Putnam 
(1975) distinguished the properties that define a particular natural kind from what 
he calls stereotypes. Putnam (1975) says “a ‘stereotype’ is a conventional (fre-
quently malicious) idea (which may be wildly inaccurate) of what an X looks like or 
acts like or is” (p. 249). It consists of the information about the reference of a term, 
which a person is required to know if he is considered to have acquired that term. 
While stereotypes are determined by linguistic conventions, Putnam thinks that 
the definition of a natural kind term depends on the physical environment rather 
than linguistic conventions, like the tigers in the actual world being animals and 
water in the actual world being H2O. Therefore, stereotypes are not definitions of 
natural kinds (p. 247-51).  
As examples, Putnam (1975) points out that H2O is what constitutes water 
and what water means (pp. 230-1); and that having stripes is a stereotype about 
tigers (pp. 249-52). Although Putnam’s (1975) point is that the physical environ-
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ment, not linguistic habits or the psychological state of the language users, deter-
mines the meaning of natural kinds (pp. 247-8), his point still applies to my discus-
sion of Friend’s theory, because I am specifically focusing on his distinction be-
tween stereotypes and definitions.  
While fiction is not a natural kind, Putnam’s distinction still applies, since its 
applicability is not confined to his very simple case of water. For example, a stereo-
type of Chinese people is that they normally have yellow skin and speak Mandarin/ 
Putonghua, however, there are Chinese people who have neither one of these 
properties, such as those born in certain remote parts of China or born as de-
scendants of British families in Hong Kong, a used-to-be colony of the British Em-
pire. Further, Putnam (1975) made a remark on his idea of stereotypes that shows 
that his distinction between definitions and stereotypes is applicable to the point 
Friend missed. He says “most stereotypes do in fact capture features possessed by 
paradigmatic member so the class in question” (p. 250). Putnam thinks that stereo-
types capture the features of the paradigm of a natural kind. Similarly, Friend’s 
standard features of works of fiction are a list of features possessed by many para-
digmatic works of fiction. Following this application of Putnam’s idea, Friend’s ac-
count is only delineating the stereotypes of fiction, rather than providing a defini-
tion of what a work of fiction is20.  
If there is no internal property that makes a work of representation a work 
of fiction, then Friend’s project is incomplete. She is not a sceptic; she has not ar-
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 The point about the distinction between the metaphysical question and the epistemological 
question on fiction is from my supervisor Mark Textor, but the application of Putnam’s account is 
my own. 
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gued that a person should give up on finding what makes a work of representation 
a work of fiction. Arguing that the dominant imagination-based approach is wrong 
does not mean that nothing constitutes a work of fiction. She needs to argue that 
there is no property of a work of representation that renders it to be a work of fic-
tion.  
 
A More Fundamental Question for Friend’s Account: Is Genre Approach a Plausi-
ble Move to Begin with? 
 
When comparing Friend’s genre approach to the dominant imagination-
based approach, I notice that Friend’s approach is a more pessimistic one. This is 
because, different versions of imagination-based theories agree that there is a 
clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction. Comparatively, given that there is 
no necessary condition in Friend’s account, it is very difficult to make a certain 
claim that a particular work of representation is not a work of fiction. Therefore, 
the move from imagination-based theories to genre-based theories is actually a 
drastic move that abandons a long-standing and dominant trend of searching for a 
clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction. Abandoning the search for a clear 
distinction between fiction and nonfiction is where the pessimism lies. Given that 
this search of a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction is a longstanding 
trend since Walton and Currie, in my view, it requires some good arguments or at 
least reasons for abandoning this goal.  
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Friend, as presented in chapter 1, seems to have her good reasons for doing 
so. Friend found her genre approach on her interpretation of the inadequacies of 
imagination-based theories. If what she says about make-believe theories is ac-
ceptable, then her genre approach may be well-founded. 
Unfortunately for her, her interpretation of the inadequacies of imagina-
tion-based theories is not the only plausible one. Friend’s strongest point against 
make-believe theories is assertions in fiction since it is a type of utterances that 
constitute to the counter-example of many make-believe definitions. However, 
while make-believe theorists have yet to produce a plausible response, I have 
shown that a plausible response to Friend’s criticism is possible. As seen in the ex-
positions of make-believe imagination by Nichols and Stich, make-believe theories 
may answer Friend’s criticism. They can explain the difference between fiction 
made for telling facts and nonfiction made with intentional fabrication, because, 
applying what Nichols and Stich say about pretence/imagination, these two types 
of work serve different functional roles even though their content is processed 
similarly—both contain a lot of utterances that are to be accepted as true and a lot 
of utterances that are fabricated. The utterances that are assertions in fiction, after 
all, are just certain representational content of the cognitive mechanism of make-
believe imagination.  
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that this potential response has 
not yet been developed to be a complete argument against Friend’s criticisms. 
Nichols assumes that mental states are typed by functional roles, but so far it is 
unclear what the functional role of a work of fiction is. Therefore, Nichols’s work 
96 
can yet to be applied to define fiction without further development of what the 
functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction is.  
Make-believe theories lack an answer regarding what the functional role of 
imagination in a work of fiction is (for example, the function for imagination in 
strategic thinking is to simulate certain counterfactual situations, but there is yet a 
clear answer like this for make-believe imagination in fiction). With this interpreta-
tion, a reasonable way to look at make-believe theories is to find an answer for the 
functional role of imagination in fiction, instead of abandoning the search for this 
answer and thus the search for a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction, 
which is what Friend did. At least, I have not seen any plausible argument from 
Friend that shows that it is impossible or unlikely to obtain an answer for the func-
tional role of imagination in fiction. Therefore, Friend’s account gives up on provid-
ing a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction without providing any con-
vincing reason for doing so. As a result, there is a question for her approach: why 
should philosophers give up on the search for a clear definition of fiction and look 
for a vague one, without any convincing argument for doing so?  
One may think that a vague approach is more philosophically interesting 
because it allows more borderline cases like Vidal’s Empire and In Cold Blood and 
thus has more subtleties. I do not dispute this point. Indeed, I see no fatal flaw 
against Friend’s approach. I only have several remarks to make. First, both Friend 
and I provide our own separate non-imagination-based theory of fiction. Second, 
we take a different approach. The foundations of Friend’s account are the difficul-
ties encountered by imagination-based theories when facing off the issue of asser-
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tions in fiction and her application of Walton’s theory of art. I will not follow such 
approach. As I will show later, I will be building my account on some results of so-
cial science experiments. Thus, unlike Friend’s, my account has nothing to do with 
the failure of imagination-based theories. Fourth, when I delineate my approach of 
defining fiction, I will also delineate my explanation of the issues of assertions in 
fiction. The fifth bit is the best bit. Unlike imagination-based theories, my theory is 
indeed compatible with what Friend has argued for so far, because her target of 
criticism is imagination-based theories; and my idea will not be an imagination-
based one.   
 
An Advantage (Perhaps): Friend’s Account has a Vague Boundary between Fiction 
and Nonfiction 
 
If both fiction and nonfiction are defined as two genres or two sets of gen-
res, then some work like In Cold Blood may share a significant amount of the 
standard features of both works of fiction and works of nonfiction. If this is true, 
then there are works of representation that are works of fiction and works of non-
fiction simultaneously. However, these are mutually exclusive categories. This is a 
criticism made by Michael Martin and Berys Gaut on different occasions [seen in 
Friend (2012) (p. 205)]. I argue that this issue can be worked out in a way that 
shows an advantage of Friend’s account, namely a vague boundary between the 
idea of fiction and the idea of nonfiction. However, I will argue that this advantage 
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is insufficient to differentiate works of fiction that are made for telling facts from 
works of nonfiction that are made with intentional fabrications. Friend (2012) says, 
 
 
“Perhaps, though, the intuition is that once we limit ourselves to represen-
tations or texts, we should say that only one of the categories constitutes a 
genre, with the other as its complement. For example, were I to produce a 
poem that uses the rhyme scheme of a Shakespearean sonnet but had six-
teen lines, one might deny that it is a sonnet without thereby claiming that 
it belongs to some other poetic genre. Similarly, the thought goes, if I say 
that a text is non-fiction I might simply be saying that it is not fiction, or vice 
versa. The difficulty, though, is that it is unclear which of fiction and non-
fiction should be the genre and which the complement. This is because we 
have positive characterizations of both categories, given by standard fea-
tures that cannot be interpreted merely as negations of the features of the 
other category” (p. 205). 
 
In this quote, she entertains the idea that nonfiction is not a genre, but only 
a complement to the genre of fiction, which means that a work of nonfiction is 
simply something that is not a work of fiction. However, she seems to recognise 
that this move is implausible.  
I agree that it is implausible to categorise nonfiction as a complement if fic-
tion is a genre or a set of genres. Philosophers and film scholars define nonfiction 
films as a category of film genre. For example, philosopher Carroll (1997) has pro-
vided another definition of nonfiction film, as has film scholar Carl Plantinga 
(1997). Nonfiction is a category of art and thus a genre, at least in the medium of 
films. Although Friend may deny that nonfiction is not a category of works of rep-
resentation, she has not yet provided an argument for that. Thus, she cannot deny 
that nonfiction is a genre of its own.  
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Alternatively, Friend can claim that there is simply a vague boundary be-
tween fiction and nonfiction, which means that she may not be derailed by works 
like Schindler’s Ark and In Cold Blood, which are often seen as being on the border 
line between fiction and nonfiction. Friend (2012) seems to endorse this view 
when she discusses whether William Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar is a work of 
fiction or a work of nonfiction, though she does not delineate how exactly she 
wants to categorise works like that (pp. 205-6).  
In my view, it is plausible to claim that there is a vague boundary between 
fiction and nonfiction, if Friend’s genre approach is accepted. If Friend admits that 
fiction is a vague concept, with an unclear boundary between itself and nonfiction, 
then she can use this vagueness as an advantage, as it allows her to sidestep a se-
rious problem for imagination-based theories: including works of nonfiction made 
with intentionally fabricated parts, like In Cold Blood, as works of fiction, or exclud-
ing works of fiction made for telling facts, like Schindler’s Ark, from being works of 
fiction. Friend’s approach will regard both of them as borderline cases between 
fiction and nonfiction. 
 
Friend’s Approach and the Difference between In Cold Blood and Schindler’s Ark 
 
Despite this potential advantage, Friend’s definition still has to differentiate 
between works of fiction made for telling facts and works of nonfiction with inten-
tionally fabricated parts. The vagueness in her genre theory alone will not solve 
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this problem. She needs to specify the standard and contra-standard features of 
her theory to differentiate these two categories of work from each other. This is a 
particularly important specification for her to make, as she rejects imagination-
based theories for failing to categorise these two types of work correctly.  
Unlike imagination-based theories, her account is not troubled by failing to 
differentiate between works of fiction made for telling facts and works of nonfic-
tion with intentionally fabricated parts. Her definition can resolve this issue by 
specifying the standard features carefully. Yet, she has not done so for any medium 
of representation; she has only given some examples of works of fiction made for 
telling facts like Vidal’s The Narratives of Empire series and some examples of 
works of nonfiction with intentionally fabricated parts. It would be difficult and 
controversial to specify the standard, contra-standard, and variable features of 




In this chapter, I have addressed and evaluated Friend’s genre theory of fic-
tion. Friend is right about the relationship between imagination and the idea of fic-
tion — imagination is a typical and frequently occurring feature of works of fiction, 
but not a necessary condition. Thus, it is plausible to regard imagination as a 
standard feature of works of fiction. 
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Indeed, the idea of the standard feature is a core of Friend’s genre ap-
proach to explaining the idea of fiction. Thus, I have also addressed Walton’s ac-
count of categories of art since Friend draws her idea of genre from it.  
As for her theory itself, Friend has not sufficiently argued for the plausibility 
of her genre approach, which takes standard features as its core. She does not pro-
vide any explanation of why a work of fiction has certain particular standard fea-
tures, which is important because if there are properties that make a work of rep-
resentation have certain standard features, then there are properties that consti-
tute a work of fiction. In this case, following Putnam’s terminology, the standard 
features in Friend’s account are only stereotypes; they do not define fiction. As a 
result, Friend’s account only delineates the stereotypes of fiction, rather than what 
is a work of fiction and what “fiction” means.  
If there is no internal property that makes a work of representation a work 
of fiction, then Friend’s project is incomplete. She has not argued that there are no 
properties that make a work of representation a work of fiction. Arguing that the 
dominant imagination-based approach is wrong does not mean that nothing con-
stitutes a work of fiction. She needs to argue that there is no internal property that 
renders a work of representation to be a work of fiction.  
Further, given that Friend’s account was founded on her interpretation of 
imagination-based theories of fiction, the foundation of her account will be un-
dermined if her interpretation of the imagination-based theories is undermined. 
My application of Nichols and Stich’s explanation of make-believe imagination in 
chapter 2 produces an alternative interpretation of make-believe theories, which 
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shows that make-believe theories can respond to Friend’s criticism and thus rejects 
her interpretation of the inadequacies of make-believe theories. As a result, I have 
argued that her genre approach is not founded on the most plausible understand-
ing of make-believe theories, which undermines the foundation of the pessimism 
in her genre approach that gives up on the search of a clear distinction between 
fiction and nonfiction.  
Friend’s account leads to the possibility of an odd result — a work that is 
both fiction and nonfiction. However, I accept that this result shows that her defi-
nition is vague, yet still acceptable. Even so, the vagueness of definition alone does 
not differentiate works of fiction made for telling facts from works of nonfiction 
with intentional fabrications. Her account may be able to do so by specifying the 
standard, contra-standard, and variable features of textual fiction, but she has not 
done so. This is another incomplete aspect of her account. 
Thus, Friend’s account is at best incomplete. I will not build on it, or at-
tempt to finish it, because I am not convinced of the genre approach, for the rea-





Harry Deutsch’s Account: Defining Fiction in Terms of Domain 
  
 I have now rejected all imagination-based accounts, as well as Friend’s ac-
count. Before moving on to discuss the scepticism surrounding whether there is a 
meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfiction at all in the next chapter, I 
will address a final definition of fiction: that of Deutsch (2000, 2013). 
 Deutsch’s account is often ignored. In a footnote, Friend (2012) says 
“Deutsch (2000) takes being made up to be both necessary and sufficient for cate-
gorization as a work of fiction, but this position is neither plausible nor popular” (p. 
180).  
 I argue that this account still deserves some attention. First, it is the only 
account with a total breakaway from imagination. Though Friend’s account is not 
imagination-based, it still has imagination as a standard feature. In contrast, 
Deutsch dispenses with imagination altogether, and instead substitutes it with his 
idea of making something up. He defines making something up in two ways: first 
using the principles of poetic license to create the concept of the fictional domain, 
and then using this concept to define fiction. He also constructs another alternative 
interpretation of his definition that emphasises the author’s authority. 
 Deutsch’s account is also important because unlike imagination-based ac-
counts, this does not require or indeed even mention the role of the audience. This 
104 
point matters because I have rejected the point about what the author of a work of 
fiction intends the audience to do in chapter 1. 
 In this chapter, I will argue that although Deutsch’s account has its merits in 
its emphasis on authorial intention and its lack of emphasis on the audience. How-
ever, I also argue that his principles of poetic license are implausible and thus mak-
ing something up, which is the central concept of Deutsch’s definition, is meaning-
less. I also argue that Deutsch’s second definition of making something up does not 




Deutsch’s (2000) definition of fiction is found in the following: 
“I claim that a document or other form of communication is fiction if it is a 
token of a type that was made up out of whole cloth, perhaps with gener-
ous amounts of the fabric woven in as well. By ‘made up out of whole cloth’ 
(‘thin air’ will do as well) I mean specifically that the author of the docu-
ment recorded descriptions that are to be understood  (philosophically) as 
describing elements of the fictional domain. I assume that this domain of 
discourse is a plenitude in the sense given by the principles of poetic li-
cense” (p. 167).  
 
 The most important point to consider here is the idea of “making some-
thing up”. Deutsch (2000) says that making something up is to record “descriptions 
of aspects of the fictional plenitude” (p. 156).  “Descriptions of aspects of fictional 
plenitude” means discourse about the fictional domain. A domain specifies which 
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objects or complex of objects can be designated in it by descriptions or logical for-
mulae.  
 Therefore, Deutsch defines fiction as a set of descriptions about states of 
affairs in the fictional domain. He uses this idea to separate works of fiction from 
works of nonfiction. Deutsch (2000) believes that descriptions of an object in the 
fictional domain always correctly describe the object. In contrast, descriptions in 
works of nonfiction are about objects in the factual domain rather than the fiction-
al domain. Even when they are false, they remain part of the factual domain; they 
do not become fictional. This domain system ensures that fiction cannot be con-
sidered to be lies, and that works of fiction are different from works of nonfiction 
made with intentional fabrications (p. 156).  
 
The Principles of Poetic License 
 
 Deutsch explains the idea of fictional plenitude (and thus domains) with the 
principles of poetic license. He states them thus: 
1. “Let C be any condition on properties. Then there is an object in the fic-
tional plenitude FP that has, in FP, all the properties satisfying C.  
2. Let C be any condition on properties. Then there is a story in which 
some object has all the properties satisfying C.  
3. Let C’ be any condition on propositions. Then there is a story in which 
all of the propositions satisfying C’ are true” (p. 157). 
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I will begin with a brief introduction of these points to clarify a potential 
metaphysical problem, and then discuss the problems with them. It is important to 
note in these principles, Deutsch is not making arguments about fictional objects in 
the actual world. P1 does not assert that there are fictional characters as abstract 
artefacts in the actual world, as it only says objects in fiction are objects in the fic-
tional domain. Deutsch undermines any proposed ontological commitment in his 
account by claiming that he is a casual Meinongian, meaning that he uses a set of 
discourse that resembles Meinongian objects to talk about the content of a work 
of fiction, without committing to Meinongian ontology on nonexistent objects. In 
other words, Deutsch is open to non-Meinongian interpretations of what “object” 
means in P1. 
I assume that his point about being a casual Meinongian is acceptable, to 
evaluate his principles of poetic license. Otherwise, the metaphysical problems of 
the Meinongian approach alone render his principles implausible [for the problem 
of the Meinongian approach, see Sainsbury (2010) and Lewis (1983)]21.  
 
The First Shortcoming of Deutsch’s Account: the Threat of Circularity 
 
                                                 
21
 In the current project, I make this assumption to show that if his account is accepted, there will 
be very undesirable results. I will then reject his account because of its consequences. Because of 
my strategy for rejecting Deutsch’s definition, whether Deutsch can plausibly be a casual Meinongi-
an is more important to the debate about fictional truth than it is to my project. 
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 Deutsch defines fiction as a set of discourse that describes objects and 
events in the fictional domain. There is a risk of circularity in this approach, be-
cause the term being defined — “fictional” — shows up in the definition. Deutsch 
does not define the fictional domain, other than with his explanation of fictional 
plenitude, which is in turn explained by the principles of poetic license. Yet, the 
principles in question include the notion of fictional plenitude in P1. Therefore, if 
the concepts of the fictional domain and fictional plenitude can be used inter-
changeably, he needs to provide another definition for the fictional domain. 
Deutsch provides no explanation of the fictional domain that is independent of the 
principles of poetic license.   
 
The Second Shortcoming of Deutsch’s Account: Russell's paradox and the Refuta-
tion of the Principles of Poetic License 
 
  Even if the circularity in Deutsch’s account can be explained away, I argue 
that the core idea in his account, making something up (as defined by the princi-
ples of poetic license), is implausible. By rejecting these principles, I will reject his 
official interpretation of his idea of making something up. By doing this, I will show 






P1 entails a consequence that is similar to Russell's paradox, so I will reject 
it by applying Russell's paradox. David Papineau (2012) explains Russell's paradox 
thus: the paradox shows that it is inconsistent to assert that there is a set with a 
membership condition of not being a member of the set. Papineau labels this set 
as “the set R” (pp. 3-4, 9-10): 
a. “Assume R is not a number of itself. 
b. But then, since R contains all sets that are not members of them-
selves, it is a member of itself.  
c. So we have contradicted our assumption (a). 
d. So ‘by reduction ad absurdum’ [i.e. reduction to absurdity] we can 
conclude that (a) is false and R Is a member of itself” (p. 11). 
 
Therefore, (a) to (c) argues that R is a member of itself. Papineau (2012) ex-
plicates further: 
a’. “Assume R is a member of itself.  
b’. But then, since R contains only sets that are not members of them-
selves, it is not a member of itself.  
c’. So we have contradicted our assumption (a’). 
d’. So ‘by reductio’ we can conclude that (a’) is false and R is not a member 
of itself” (p. 11).  
 
Papineau (2012) states that both (d) and (d’) are shown, so something is 
very wrong (p. 11).  
I will briefly explain how this argument works. Both (d) and (d’) are derived 
by asserting that there is a set R together with two assumptions (a) and (a’), so 
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they are shown by the arguments a to c and a’ to c’ respectively. Rules of natural 
deduction allow one to put (d) and (d’) together to form a conjunction since they 
are in the same argument; and this conjunction is derived from assuming that 
there is set R. As a result, it is the case that R →((d)&(d’)).The proposition (d)&(d’) 
can also be written as (d)&~(d), as (d) claims that R is a member of itself; and (d’) 
claims that R is not a member of itself. Therefore, Russell's paradox shows that R → 
(d)&~(d).  
There are two ways of rejecting R, given that this conditional is shown to be 
true. First, Russell's paradox shows that R → (d)&~(d), to avoid the contradiction in 
the consequent, R must be rejected. Second, the only way for a truth functional 
conditional to be true while with a false consequent is to have a false antecedent. 
R is the antecedent in this case, so it must be rejected.  
Russell's paradox falsifies the doctrine that there is a set with a member-
ship condition of not being a member of itself. It rejects the assumption that “there 
is a set corresponding to every condition” (see Papineau (2012), p. 13). I will not go 
through the details of the set theory that this paradox is responding to, as I am on-
ly focusing on its applicability to my evaluation of Deutsch’s theory. Thus, I shall 
now explain how this paradox challenges the principles of poetic license. 
 
Reducing P1 and P2 to Russell’s Paradox 
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I argue that P1 adopts the assumption, “there is a set corresponding to eve-
ry condition” in a specific context. Deutsch (2000) defines P1 as “let C be any con-
dition on properties. Then there is an object in the fictional plenitude FP that has, 
in FP, all the properties satisfying C”. There are two important things to note: P1 
claims that there is at least one object in the fictional plenitude having all the 
properties to satisfy any condition C on certain properties; and one object can form 
a set of its own.  
Following from these two premises, I create what I call condition C1: condi-
tion C can be “not being a member of the set that includes all the objects in fic-
tional plenitude”. R1 is a set of objects in fictional plenitude that satisfy the condi-
tion C1. Because of P1, R1 is not an empty set (it must have at least one member 
object). Therefore, the condition of being the member of R1 is to be not a member 
of the set formed by objects in fictional plenitude, while the members of R1 are 
objects in fictional plenitude according to the condition C1. In other words, P1 al-
lows a case of Russell's paradox. Worse, Deutsch cannot refuse to assert that there 
is R1, because P1 allows the set of objects in fictional plenitude that satisfies the 
condition C1. Therefore, P1 should be rejected since it leads to a problem high-
lighted by Russell's paradox. 
Deutsch may respond that fictional domain does not follow the rules of log-
ic as strictly as how the factual domain does. For example, inconsistency in a work 
of fiction is not always a fault, particularly for works where a character in it did 
time travelling back to the past and changed how the story ended such as the mov-
ie Back to the Future. In that movie, the mother in the beginning certainly did not 
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fall in love with the main character (well, she was his mother; and this movie does 
not have an experimental theme). However, during the time travelling, she did. 
Therefore, the statement “Mcfly’s mother fell in love with him and it is not the 
case that Mcfly’s mother fell in love with him” is true in the movie. As a result, 
Deutsch may respond that if the fictional domain does not follow the law of non-
contradiction, it does not need to be restrained by Russell’s paradox either. After 
all, objects in the fictional plenitude are not objects in the actual world or any pos-
sible worlds. 
Even if this potential defence is accepted, P1 in Deutsch’s account is still go-
ing to be problematic. An idea behind Russell’s Paradox is that the assumption, 
“there is a set corresponding to every condition” must be rejected (see Papineau 
(2012), p. 13). Even if Deutsch can argue that Russell’s paradox does not affect his 
P1, it does not mean that P1, as a condition that resembles the idea rejected by 
Russell’s paradox, is plausible. 
 As a further argument of mine against P1, given that there is an object in 
fictional plenitude that has all the properties that satisfy C, then C can be “render-
ing every other object in the fictional domain to be objects in the actual world”. 
Although this condition is ridiculous sounding, P1 still has to allow and satisfy it in 
the fictional domain. Because of this condition C and P1, fiction can only be about 
the objects in the actual world, so in Deutsch’s terminology, fictional domain be-
comes factual domain. There are two ways to put the undesirable consequence for 
Deutsch. In the context of Deutsch’s terminology, Deutsch can no longer use the 
idea of a fictional domain to differentiate fiction from nonfiction, which is the 
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foundation of his project, because of P1. In a context of the discussion of theories 
of fiction, because of this condition C and P1, either there cannot be any object in 
the fictional domain that does not or cannot exist in the actual world, or there are 
certain impossible objects like Pegasus in the actual world because of the content 
of a work of fiction. Either result is absurd. 
There is another version of C that will trouble P1 too, “an object that will 
render any set of descriptions about it a work of nonfiction”. Although it works a 
lot better when considering P1 and P2, I continue to focus on how it affects P1 
meanwhile. Unless there has never been any set of description or story that de-
scribes an object that satisfies C, the object in question is going to change a work of 
fiction to be a work of nonfiction. In Deutsch’s terminology, an object in the fic-
tional domain changes a set of the description of the state of affair in the fictional 
domain to a set of the description of the state of affair in factual domain. In other 
words, P1 allows for a possibility that certain work will necessarily be a work of 
nonfiction in virtue of certain objects included in its content. It seems very counter-
intuitive, because neither Friend nor imagination-based theorists, as two groups of 
leading theorists of fiction, argue for this point. Also, if Deutsch wants to make this 
claim, he is in lack of an argument to do so since there is not one yet. Therefore, P1 
leads to an unsubstantiated, counterintuitive, and apparently absurd claim. 
Deutsch may reply that this is not an issue so long as there is no story describing 
this object in the fictional domain. Unfortunately for him, P2 makes this line of de-
fence impossible, for which Deutsch (2000) says “let C be any condition on proper-
ties. Then there is a story in which some object has all the properties satisfying C” 
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(p. 157). Thus, even if there is an object in the fictional domain renders the set of 
description about it a work of nonfiction, there will be at least a work, which I un-
derstand in the most liberal possible sense as a set of the description of that par-
ticular object, describing that object. Following this, there will be at least a work of 
nonfiction being a work of nonfiction only because of an object that it describes or 
mentions.  
Deutsch may reply to this argument that logic may not apply in the world of 
fiction, just like the potential reply for Russell’s paradox. Suppose he is right, he 
needs to argue for an account of the extent to which fictional world is free from 
the logical rule. In brief, if the rules of logic do not apply in the world of storytell-
ing, then how did Hercule Poirot do his inference in most cases? Also, should one 
still maintain the laws of basic mathematic apply in worlds of fiction? If rules of log-
ic do not apply at all, then it is hard to tell. Both David Lewis (1983) and Sainsbury 
(2010) discussed this subject in great details (pp. 69-90). Both accounts delineated 
the level of complicatedness and importance of this issue. While none of these ar-
guments produces a fatal attack against the P1 and P2, they certainly show that P1 
and P2 are doctrines that lead to very undesirable results.  
 
P3 after the Problems of P1 and P2  
 
I have now rejected conditions P1 and P2, leaving P3 as the only remaining 
component of Deutsch’s definition of the fictional domain. While P3 cannot be re-
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duced to a case of Russell’s paradox, on its own, it is implausible as a definition of 
the fictional domain. 
According to Deutsch (2000), P3 says “let C’ be any condition on proposi-
tions. Then there is a story in which all of the propositions satisfying C’ are true” (p. 
157). It only says that there is at least one story in which all the propositions satis-
fying certain conditions are true; and the conditions can be anything. C3 allows C’ 
to be being factually accurate in all historical events. Descriptions for the factual 
domain also satisfy the condition C’ in question, and then satisfy P3 as a result. 
Therefore, P3 alone is insufficient for differentiating between writing about states 
of affairs in the fictional domains from writing about states of affairs in the nonfic-
tional domain. 
For example, P3 can be interpreted as: if a domain is fictional, there is at 
least one story in which all propositions about its states of affair satisfying C’ are 
true; and C’ can be any condition. In other words, in the fictional domain, there is a 
story in which any proposition satisfies any condition. It seems that the nonfiction-
al domain cannot satisfy this condition. Yet, it may not be that easy. Anything can 
be true according to a lie, which at least partially aims to deceive the audience. It is 
only a matter of whether the lie is believed or not. Especially because a lie aims to 
deceive, there must be something in it that cannot be factually accurate. In this 
case, P3 cannot differentiate between the fictional domain and the factual domain 
because a lie is about the states of the affair in the factual domain — it states what 
actually happens, but deceptively. 
115 
Similarly, P3 cannot deal with cases of hallucinations or delusions. When a 
person is hallucinating or delusional, potentially anything can be accepted as being 
true. Thus, in this domain, there is at least one story in which all propositions satis-
fying certain conditions (which can be anything) are true. The conditions, in this 
case, include stories that are necessarily or metaphysically untrue, like stories of 
time travel. Anything can be true in the domain of that person’s thought, which 
satisfies P3. As a result, principle P3 cannot differentiate the fictional domain from 
the factual domain, whose scope is the thought of a delusional or hallucinating 
person.  
Deutsch may claim that there is no difference between fiction and the 
complex of delusions and hallucinations. If so, then he has to explain why people 
are commonly treated for hallucinations and delusions, but not for producing fic-
tion. This difference entails an intuition that these two types of events are very dif-
ferent.  
Therefore, I reject P1 and P2, by using each to form a set with a member-
ship condition of not being a member of the set itself, which is Russell’s paradox. 
This leaves P3, which is not sufficient as a definition of the fictional domain, as it 
cannot differentiate between the fictional domain and hallucinations, delusions, 
and lies. Thus, Deutsch’s principles of poetic license are not sufficient for defining 




The Third Shortcoming of Deutsch’s Account: Being Too Inclusive 
 
Besides the threat of circularity and the reduction to Russell’s paradox and 
insufficiency, the principles of poetic license have an additional problem: they are 
too inclusive, and allow meaningless complexes of utterances to be about the fic-
tional domain. 
I will demonstrate this beginning with P2. Suppose the condition C is satis-
fied by an object being a woman, there are many works that satisfy the condition 
of having a woman in them. Many of these works can be sets of meaningless utter-
ances. 
For instance, if I write “Mary is purple. The number 3 is a prime number”, I 
satisfy the condition with a concatenation of sentences that do not produce a work 
of fiction. In fact, many such concatenations can be created simply by combining a 
(1) description of an object possessing all the properties that satisfy certain condi-
tions (though not descriptions of what happens to the object) with (2) a phrase 
containing certain random doctrines of philosophy, social science, pure science, 
etc. Thus, there are many writings satisfy P2 without being works of fiction.   
P3 can be dealt with similarly. According to Deutsch (2000), P3 says “Let C’ 
be any condition on propositions. Then there is a story in which all of the proposi-
tions satisfying C’ are true” (p. 157). While P2 is on objects is stories, P3 is on prop-
ositions in stories. Therefore, to show that P3 is too inclusive, I keep (2) and substi-
tute (1) by (1’): “the writing in which all propositions satisfying certain condition 
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are true”. My previous example, “Mary is red. The number 3 is a prime number” 
also satisfies step (1’), because it is associated with a truth condition. Indeed, it is a 
conjunction of “there is a person such that she is Mary and she is red” and “there is 
a number such that it is 3 and is a prime number”. 
This leaves P1 as the only remaining component in the account. As there 
are no details in P1 that allow it to reject the type of writing produced by following 
steps (1), (1’), and (2), P1 cannot refuse to include these cases because it includes 
all the objects that one can think of. Thus, principles P1, P2, and P3 all include writ-
ings that are not works of fiction as works of fiction, making them much too inclu-
sive. 
 
A Potential Defence and a Final Rejection 
 
One can attempt to defend the principles of poetic license by appealing to a 
different definition of the word “story” in P2 and P3. One may claim that the type 
of cases I used to falsify P2 and P3 are not actually stories, so they should be ex-
cluded, and thus P2 and P3 could stand. However, Deutsch does not provide any 
definition of a story, and to attempt to create one here prompts an abandonment 
of the search for the definition of fiction until a definitive definition of the story can 
be created. 
Thus, I reject Deutsch’s official interpretation via the principles of the poetic 
license in three ways. I have shown that there is a threat of circularity in his defini-
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tion of fictional plenitude, as he uses the principles to define fictional plenitude, 
but the term “fictional plenitude” appears in the principles that define it. I then 
showed how P2 and P3 must be rejected because they can be reduced to Russell’s 
paradox, and how if this is the case, the remaining P1 is too inclusive for defining 
the fictional domain and works of fiction. Finally, I showed that even if the other 
issues with the principles are rejected, they are still too inclusive, as they together 
include some meaningless writings as works of fiction. 
 
An Alternative Interpretation of Deutsch’s Account 
 
 I have rejected Deutsch’s official definition of making something up, the 
principles of poetic license. But Deutsch also talks about his definition of making 
something up elsewhere with a philosophical elaboration of a definition of fiction 
from Virginia Woolf. As this can be taken as an alternative explanation of making 
something up, I will cover it here and then evaluate it. 
 Woolf [as cited in Deutsch (2013)] says that the difference between biog-
raphy and fiction is a matter of whether the author writes with or without any re-
strictions on the content: 
“[A] proof that they differ in the very stuff of which they are made. One [bi-
ography] is made with the help of friends, of facts; the other [fiction] is cre-
ated without any restrictions, save those that the artist, for reasons that 
seem good to him, chooses to obey” (p. 366). 
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 Although the lack of restriction on the author can be understood as imagi-
nation22, Deutsch (2013) focuses on the role of author. 
“For Woolf, it’s a matter of authorial authority—who or what is in charge? 
In the case of biography, the author is subordinate to facts and friends 
(knowledgeable sources); in the case of fiction, the author is fully in charge” 
(p. 366).  
 
Both Deutsch’s and Woolf’s accounts share the emphasis on the authority 
of the author when it comes to his own work of fiction. Deutsch’s account is a phil-
osophical development of Woolf’s original distinction between biography and fic-
tion. His account takes a core idea of Woolf’s — the emphasis on the authority of 
the author. This point is also implied in his official interpretation, the principles of 
poetic license. Although this alternative interpretation does not contain the detail 
found in the principles, this particular point is still there. Thus, this is the core idea 
of Deutsch’s definition of fiction, and he finds it in Woolf’s writing about her own 
view of fiction. 
Although this alternative interpretation does not contain enough detail to 
be an interpretation of a definition of fiction, it still provides significant inspiration 
for the search for a definition of fiction. First, in this interpretation, Deutsch recog-
nises that imagination often occurs in the process of creating a work of fiction (A 
point similar to one of Friend’s). However, he does not regard imagination as a 
                                                 
22
 The notion of restriction can also be understood in terms of imagination, which Deutsch (2013) 
further claims. He says the author of a fiction must to be able to use his imagination regardless of 
how facts actually are: “what is crucial is that the imagination is not a slave to (our epistemic access 
to) how things actually are” (p. 366). Of course, this emphasis on imagination in definition does not 
mean that the entire content of a work of fiction is made up, Deutsch (2013) only means that a 
work of fiction is a product of the author’s imagining. It can include works with parts that are factu-
al, or not imagined (pp. 368-9). 
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necessary condition for his definition of a work of fiction, so he does not become 
an imagination-based theorist. All he does is to emphasise the authority of the au-
thor of a work of fiction over his content. On one hand, he has the authority to in-
put imagination or imaginative events into the work; on the other hand, he also 
has the authority to input facts into his own work with or without modification. 
The necessary component in Deutsch’s view is the authority of the author. While 
the utterances produced by imagination are frequently used to demonstrate au-
thorial authority, they are neither necessary nor the only means of doing so. 
This account is certainly not perfect — it does not provide enough material 
to be a plausible definition of fiction. Its emphasis on authorial authority is simply 
not detailed enough to be a definition of fiction. Additionally, the emphasis on au-
thority alone is too inclusive, as it can include random concatenations of words or 
sentences, as well as hallucinations, delusions, and lies. Further, authorial authority 
does not fit all types of fiction. For example, the authority of the author in histori-
cal fiction is particularly limited, as the work must be largely historically accurate. 
Thus, this idea cannot be applied to all types of fiction, at least without further re-
finement. However, this alternative explanation is still useful in pointing out some 
of the merits of Deutsch’s account, which I will now expand on. 
 
The Plausible Points of Deutsch’s Account 
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 Deutsch’s account is often unfairly ignored. Despite its many drawbacks, it 
has at least one great contribution, which is to emphasise the role of the author in 
fiction without presuming that every work of fiction has an audience. (This is par-
ticularly clear in his alternative explanation of making something up.) This makes it 
immune from the problem of mental fiction raised in chapter 1.  
 
Deutsch’s Account as Related to Assertions in Fiction 
 
As I have shown in the previous chapters, assertions in fiction are a signifi-
cant issue for many definitions of fiction. While assertions are fatal for many defini-
tions of fiction, they are not so for Deutsch’s account, although they do highlight its 
oddity and inadequacy. 
Deutsch’s account could tackle the issue of assertions in fiction by claiming 
that assertions in fiction are about both the fictional and factual domains. Thus, 
they are different from assertions in the factual context, since those are about the 
factual domain only. However, this would work only if Deutsch has provided a 
plausible idea of what the fictional domain is. I have shown that this is not the 
case. 
Alternatively, Deutsch’s account could dismiss the issue of assertions in fic-
tion, because utterances in fiction are not about states of affairs in the factual do-
main, but those in the fictional domain. However, this strategy cannot explain why 
certain authors are blamed for incorrect descriptions. If discourse in a work of fic-
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tion cannot be a description of any actual event, it also cannot contain any asser-
tions about any actual events, and thus cannot be criticised as being inappropriate 
if it is false. Thus, the most plausible option for Deutsch is to claim that people tak-
ing certain inaccuracies in fiction as flaws are wrong, because they fail to respect 
the difference between the fictional domain and the nonfictional domain. Even if 
this explanation successfully dismisses the blameworthiness of factually inaccurate 
works of fiction, he still fails to explain the intuition that Tolstoy’s historical and 
biographical research for War and Peace is praiseworthy. He still needs a theory on 




To conclude, I am not convinced that Deutsch’s definition of fiction as mak-
ing something up is a plausible definition of fiction, because I found that his official 
interpretation of his definition, namely the principles of poetic license, is not suffi-
ciently well-argued for. I have shown them to be implausible because they contain 
a threat of circularity, resulting in certain undesirable yet unsubstantiated claims, 
and include meaningless writing as works of fiction. I also refuse to accept his al-
ternative interpretation, since it does not provide enough material to be a plausi-
ble definition of fiction. Its emphasis on authorial authority is simply not detailed 
enough to be a plausible definition of fiction. 
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Despite its shortcomings, Deutsch’s account does have several unique con-
tributions to the debate on defining fiction. It is a breakaway from imagination-
based theories. While imagination-based theories regard make-belief expressions 
as a necessary condition of fiction and often include an emphasis on what the au-
thor of a work of fiction wants from his work as well as an emphasis on what the 
author wants his audience to do to his work, Deutsch’s definition does not take 
imagination as a necessary condition, and it has only the emphasis on the author’s 
intention about his work, not the intention about his audience. 
Thus, there are at least two important contributions to the search for a 
plausible definition of fiction. First, Deutsch shows that the emphasis on authorial 
intention does not always have anything to do with the audience. Second, he uses 
logic to define fiction in terms of domains, rather than imagination. While his at-
tempt is unsuccessful, it shows that fiction can be defined in terms ideas other 
than imagination.  
This is particularly important in light of my rejection of imagination-based 
theories. If fiction can be defined without taking imagination as a necessary condi-





A Sceptic Shoots Himself in the Foot: Matravers, Social Science Results, and the 
Distinction between Fiction and Nonfiction 
 
In his book Fiction and Narrative, Matravers (2014) proposes that there 
should be no distinction between fiction and nonfiction. In this chapter, I will argue 
against the part of his scepticism that rejects the distinction between fiction and 
nonfiction universally, rather than simply rejecting imagination-based accounts. I 
will then show how Matravers misuses findings from social science experiments to 
make his point, and then show how those same findings, when understood cor-
rectly, support my own definition of fiction.  
Matravers (2014) makes two main points: first, that imagination-based ac-
counts fail to show that there is any meaningful distinction between the idea of 
fiction and the idea of nonfiction, and second, that the experience of reading a 
work of fiction is very similar to the experience of reading a work of nonfiction (p. 
47). I will focus only on the second point, because I have already rejected the imag-
ination-based theories in Chapters 1 and 2, and because only the second point can 
be used to cast doubt on the fiction/nonfiction distinction universally.  
Matravers states his second point thus: 
(1) A reader’s experience of reading fiction and nonfiction is similar;  
 
(2) Therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the idea of fiction 
 and nonfiction. 
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He then provides three sub-arguments for the first premise: 
(1) There is no good definition of make-believe or propositional imagination 
that can be used for defining fiction, (pp. 21-44);  
 
 
(2) Definitions of fiction cannot accommodate utterances that express the 
author’s belief particularly factual utterance (pp. 100-1). 
 
 
(3) The results of experiments in social sciences are incompatible with the 
existence of a fiction/nonfiction distinction (pp. 90-101); 
 
 
 Points 1 and 2 are used for rejecting imagination-based theories. I will not 
focus on them here, as they have no application beyond imagination-based theo-
ries, and because I have already rejected imagination-based theories in Chapters 1 
and 2. Instead, I will focus on rejecting point 3, the only one which can be worked 
out as a premise for a universal rejection of the fiction/nonfiction distinction. 
 Point 3 can be presented as: 
1. The findings from social science experiments are incompatible with the ex-
istence of a fiction/nonfiction distinction (pp. 90-101); 
 
2. Because of 1, readers’ experience of reading fiction and nonfiction is simi-
lar; 
 
3. Therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the ideas of fiction 
and nonfiction. 
 
I will begin by addressing the plausibility of proposition 1, particularly 





 Matravers (2014) tries to reject the distinction between fiction and nonfic-
tion (and thus, the need for a definition of fiction) by saying that according to social 
science findings, from the audience’s perspective, there is no significant difference 
in the experience of reading a work of fiction and a work of nonfiction (p. 47). Ac-
cording to his understanding of the findings, audience believes some utterances in 
fiction, including some that are not intended to state facts. Therefore, the experi-
ments show that the experience of reading a work of fiction is similar to that of 
reading a work of nonfiction — audiences believe at least part of its content no 
matter whether it is a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction. Consequently, he ar-
gues that there is no meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction.  
 Having reviewed the experiments that Matravers cites, I particularly disa-
gree with his interpretation of three of them. I will briefly present Matravers’s in-
terpretation of these experiments, and then present my own. 
 Matravers (2014) does not spend a lot of time talking about the experi-
ments; in fact, he does not reference any of the experiments explicitly. He simply 
says, 
“The question is the extent to which this compartmentalised content [my 
note: not regarded as the content of genuine belief] of fictional narrative 
gets integrated into pre-existing structures of belief. Far from discovering 
that there is no such integration, the psychology evidence goes far in other 
direction” (p. 97).  
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Thus, all Matravers (2014) makes out of these experiments is that audienc-
es’ beliefs are affected by the content of works of fiction. He calls this effect 
“integration”, and states that with it, “the reader can supplement the content of 
the narrative from their beliefs, and their beliefs from the content of the narrative” 
(p. 98). He fails to consider how and why such phenomenon happens in fiction, 
which is the weak point of his scepticism. 
 
Gerrig and Prentice’s Experiments 
 
 Among many other experiments, Matravers (2014) mentions a set of exper-
iments by Richard Gerrig and Deborah Prentice on how the content of works of fic-
tion affects the beliefs of an audience (p. 97). I will discuss this set of experiments 





In the first experiment, Gerrig and Prentice (1999) asked 29 participants in 
different universities to read a story about a professor from their home institute 
being kidnapped (p. 531). There were two versions of the story, both of which con-
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tained 32 specific pieces of information, some of which were correct in the story 
but false in the actual world (called context details), and some of which were cor-
rect in the story and true in the actual world (called context-free assertions). Some 
participants were assigned a control story, which contains none of the 32 pieces of 
information. 
Then the experiment team then asked the participants to verify utterances 
about the 32 topics mentioned in the story, as well as 32 topics that were not men-
tioned in the story. They compared the mean time participants used to answer 
each question, and compared that to the mean answer time of those in the control 
group.  
If the mean time used by the experiment participants for the verification of 
a particular utterance was longer than the mean time used by the control group, 
Gerrig and Prentice treated it as a case of interference, by which they mean that 
the belief of the participant was affected by the story. They found that the experi-
ment subjects took longer to verify context-free assertions than context details, 
and so concluded that there was evidence of interference in context-free verifica-
tion. While they did not believe that the context-free information replaced the par-
ticipants’ beliefs, they did find that the subjects certainly accepted information 
from the story as an alternative to their existing beliefs (pp. 536-7). 
 Nevertheless, Gerrig and Prentice (1999) emphasise that audiences do not 
accept all the information from works of fiction as alternative beliefs. They de-
signed a second experiment to show that the influence of fictional content on the 
audience depends on the audience’s background knowledge.  
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  In a modification of the first experiment, they changed the background of 
some of the stories to be the home institute of the participants. They found that 
students reading the story about an unfamiliar institute were seven times more 
likely to believe in the weak and unsupported assertions about events taking place 
at that institute than students reading a story about their home institute (p. 539). 
Thus, they found that audience does not necessarily accept weak and unsupported 
assertions even when processing a work that they believe to be fictional, particu-
larly if the content contradicts other beliefs that they hold with a high degree of 
certainty. 
 Finally, Gerrig and Prentice (1999) did another experiment to show how 
people react differently to works they believe to be fictional than they do to works 
they believe to be nonfictional. In this experiment, all participants were reading 
stories about an institute unfamiliar to them. Some of the participants were told 
that they were evaluating a nonfictional description, while others were told they 
were reading a work of fiction. Participants in a control group read no narrative. 
Gerrig and Prentice found that participants who believed they were reading a work 
of fiction were influenced by unsupported assertions in it, but the same phenome-
non did not occur in those who thought they were reading a work of nonfiction 
(pp. 539-40).  
 Gerrig and Prentice explain their findings of the three experiments thus: 
audiences process the content of a work non-systematically (i.e. with less of a fo-
cus on verification and logic) when they believe it to be fiction. This renders them 
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more likely to accept weak and unsupported information in that work as true (p. 
540). 
 
The Key for Understanding Gerrig and Prentice’s Experiments: Non-Systematic 
Processing 
 
There are two questions outstanding as to why non-systematic processing 
makes people more likely to accept weak assertions. First, what do the audiences 
focus on when apprehending a work? Second, why do audiences simply tend to 
accept the information, if they comprehend it non-systematically? Why can they 
not just refrain from judgement or ignore verification altogether?  
Gerrig and Prentice (1999) provide an answer to the first question. I shall 
quote it directly from them, since Matravers (2014) also uses it to support his claim 
that content of a work of fiction affects the audience’s beliefs (p. 98). According to 
Gerrig and Prentice (1999), 
“Belief in fiction is determined not by a critical analysis of the strength of its 
arguments [non-systematic process], but instead by the absence of motiva-
tion or ability to perform such an analysis. As a result, the persuasiveness of 
fiction depends less on its substance and more on rhetorical features of the 
narrative context and the expectations readers bring to it [a non-systematic 
process]” (p. 542).  
 
 This explains why people in all three experiments tend to believe in the un-
supported assertions in works they believe to be fiction. It also shows the respec-
tive significance of three aforementioned experiments. The first experiment shows 
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that utterances in a work believed to be fiction may become part of a reader’s be-
liefs, even if they are weak and unsupported. This is because of non-systematic 
processing — logic and evidence are not the focus. Thus, when readers compre-
hend and evaluate a work that they believe to be a fiction, they focus on the fea-
tures of the work, not whether the utterances in it are true or not. Given that 
comprehension leads to acceptance (which is a point that I shall discuss using an-
other experiment), the non-systematic processing will lead to acceptance of cer-
tain utterances that are not supported by logic and evidence. And if this is accept-
ed, then Gerrig and Prentice’s theory as stated in their quote is sufficient to answer 
the first question. 
 
Gilbert’s Experiments on Comprehension and Acceptance 
 
To address the second question of why people cannot or do not simply 
withhold judgement when verifying an utterance they are unsure about, I will use 
Daniel Gilbert’s (1991) findings on how people comprehend information. 
Gilbert argues for the comprehension and acceptance model of narrative 
comprehension. According to this model, comprehending an utterance necessarily 
includes accepting an utterance. In his account, rejecting an utterance is subse-
quent to the process of comprehension. In the case of rejecting an utterance, the 
subject chooses to reverse his acceptance. He (1991) states that this idea is found 
in Spinoza: “all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed 
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through the very fact of being conceived” (p. 108). To be clear, I am not stating 
whether his understanding of Spinoza is correct or not, I’m simply presenting what 
he’s saying (pp. 108-10). 
 
Gilbert First Case Study: The Case of Child Development 
 
 Gilbert (1991) cites several case studies for his comprehension and ac-
ceptance model. First, he states that the ability to deny an utterance is one of the 
last linguistic abilities that children master. If linguistic competence reflects cogni-
tive ability, then disbelieving an utterance is more cognitively demanding than be-
lieving an utterance. Gilbert affirms the antecedent. He further states his observa-
tion that children who are still mastering both cognitive and linguistic abilities are 
particularly gullible: they accept things effortlessly, but need to make effort to de-
ny those (pp. 109-10).  
 
My Comment on Gilbert’s First Case 
 
In my view, these observations certainly show that the cognitive skill of dis-
believing an utterance is harder to learn than that of believing one. Yet, it does not 
conclusively demonstrate that people always accept an utterance before disbeliev-
ing it. Neither does it show that acceptance is a necessary component in compre-
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hension. The difference in the difficulty of mastering these two skills (i.e. belief and 
disbelief) does not mean that one skill is automatically used before another one. 
Further, it does not show that adults will always accept utterances first, because 
the study is done only using children. Finally, this study does not show how people 
behave after they have mastered both belief and disbelief.  
 
Gilbert’s Second Case Study: The Case of Irrelevant Stimulus 
 
Gilbert (1991) mentions another experiment to substantiate his point. This 
one shows that it takes extra effort for a person to refrain from accepting an 
utterance as true, and that a person is much more likely to accept an utterance as 
true when there are irrelevant stimuli taking up cognitive resources during the 
comprehension process. Gilbert found that denying an utterance took more cogni-
tive resources than accepting one, because people who spent less of their cogni-
tive resources on verifying an utterance were much more likely to accept it as true 
(p. 111). 
 
Commenting on Gilbert’s Second Case 
 
The comprehension and acceptance model states that a subject accepts an 
utterance while comprehending it, but this does not follow from this experiment. 
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While this experiment shows that it is significantly easier for people to accept an 
utterance as true than to deny it, it does not substantiate the point that compre-
hension necessarily involves acceptance. Further, it does not show that the two 
processes happen simultaneously, or that they happen instantly. Thus, Gilbert 
modifies his comprehension and acceptance model to what I’ll call the three step 
model: comprehension occurs first, then acceptance, then denial, if needed. 
There is a subtle but important philosophical difference between these two 
models: in the three step model, comprehension is separated from acceptance. 
This can explain why people tend to accept an utterance when their cognitive re-
sources are deprived, because according to this experiment, acceptance is less 
cognitively demanding than denial. 
 
Gilbert’s Third Case Study: Reading Additional Utterances 
 
Gilbert produces additional experiments to settle this issue. In one experi-
ment, subjects only had enough cognitive resources to comprehend the content of 
a narrative, but not to evaluate it. (Gilbert accomplished this by only allowing the 
participants a short time to read the narrative, and instructing them not to assess 
its truth value.) When asked to evaluate the truth value of these utterances after-
wards, participants tended to accept them as true (p. 115).  
Gilbert uses this experiment to reject the three step model. If the three 
step model were right, the participants would have a tendency to refrain from 
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judgement, instead of tending to accept utterances as true. This did not happen, 
thus, the model was rejected.  
In contrast, these findings support the comprehension and acceptance 
model. The experiment’s set up makes it improbable for participants to carry out 
an evaluation in addition to comprehension. Thus, it appears that there is a ten-
dency for acceptance in the comprehension process, and partially confirms the 
comprehension and acceptance model. 
Finally, Gilbert (1999) uses these findings to reject another model of com-
prehension, the acceptance or rejection model. In this model, a person first com-
prehends content, and then decides whether to accept it as true or to reject it as 
false. This idea is associated with Descartes who said, “we have power … to give or 
withhold our assent at will, is so evident that it must be counted among the first 
and most common notions that are innate in us” (cited in Gilbert (1999) p. 108) 
(pp. 108-9, 114).  
Similarly to the three step model, if this is true, a cognitively depleted per-
son should refrain from evaluating an utterance, because he does not have the re-
sources to properly carry out any processes in addition to comprehension. As this 
is inconsistent with the findings of the experiment, the acceptance or rejection 
model is also rejected. 
 
What Does Gilbert Show? 
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Gilbert tries to use these experiments to show that the comprehension and 
acceptance model is true. To do so, he must be able to show that (1) comprehend-
ing an utterance necessarily involves accepting it, and (2.1) the process of rejecting 
an utterance is always subsequent to comprehension, in which (2.2) a person de-
liberates to reverse his acceptance. I argue that his third experiment shows that 
the comprehension and acceptance model is true for 2.1 and 2.2, although 1 needs 
modification. 
The comprehension and acceptance model states that comprehending an 
utterance entails accepting it. However, Gilbert’s third case study shows that com-
prehending an utterance only entails a tendency towards acceptance; it does not 
show that participants accept all of the additional utterances as true, which would 
be necessary for comprehension to entail acceptance. Thus, point (1) should be 
revised as (1’): comprehending an utterance necessarily includes a tendency to-
wards accepting it. 
 
Audiences Genuinely Accept the Content of Fiction: Non-Systematic Processing 
and the Comprehension Acceptance Model 
 
 These two sets of experiments by Prentice and Gerrig and Gilbert together 
explain the process of comprehending a work of fiction. Prentice and Gerrig’s ex-
periments show that readers of works that they believe to be fictional often genu-
inely accept what is said in the work as true. This is because they process works 
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that they believe to be fictional non-systematically (without focusing on evidence 
or logic), which leads them to accept unsupported utterances as true. 
 But these experiments on their own are not enough to definitively say that 
non-systematic processing makes people more receptive or gullible. Thus, I need to 
provide either an argument or evidence to show that it is plausible to connect non-
systematic processing with acceptance. I do so with Gilbert’s experiments. 
 Gilbert’s third experiment shows that comprehending a work entails a ten-
dency to accept it as true. By this reasoning, audiences tend to accept the content 
of a work they believe to be fictional as true when they apprehend it. But this is 
still not enough to explain the effect of non-systematic processing on the compre-
hension of works believed to be fictional. Indeed, Prentice and Gerrig show that 
audiences usually regard the content of a work they believe to be fiction as false 
when it contradicts beliefs they hold with a high degree of certainty. Thus, a ten-
dency to believe is clearly not enough to argue that audiences tend to accept the 
content of a work believed to be fictional as true, and it certainly cannot explain 
the reasoning for such a tendency. 
 However, there are additional details of Gilbert’s experiments that can be 
used to shed some light. First, the third experiment shows that comprehension en-
tails a tendency towards acceptance; second, the first and second experiments 
show that this tendency towards acceptance often demonstrates itself when a per-
son cannot or does not assign enough cognitive resources to properly evaluate the 
truth of the content.  
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 Recalling the point by Gerrig and Prentice (1999), readers process the con-
tent of work non-systematically when their reading is labelled as fiction. In other 
words, they pay little attention to verify whether the content is true (p. 540). This 
gives the readers little motivation or ability (i.e. cognitive resources) to perform 
such an analysis (p. 542). So the non-systematic processing that occurs when ap-
prehending a work believed to be fiction is a demonstration of the tendency to ac-
cept an utterance as true when cognitive resources are depleted. 
To sum up, readers of works believed to be fiction often genuinely accept 
weak and unsupported utterances because of their non-systematic processing of 
the work. Non-systematic processing causes the deprivation of cognitive resources 
by shifting the focus of the readers during the process of apprehension. This 
demonstrates the feasibility of the modified comprehension and acceptance mod-
el, which states that comprehending a work of representation entails the tendency 
to accept its content as true.  
 
Rejecting Matravers’s Scepticism by Clarifying Social Science Findings 
 
 Using Gilbert’s experiments, I have shown the plausibility of non-systematic 
processing as an explanation of why audiences tend to accept weakly supported 
utterances in a work of they believe to be fiction. Thus, it is plausible for Gerrig and 
Prentice to claim that the process of apprehending fiction is non-systematic. Using 
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this point, I can not only reject Matravers’s reading of Gerrig and Prentice’s 
findings, but also undermine his scepticism as a whole. 
 The structure of Matravers’s scepticism towards the fiction/nonfiction dis-
tinction is as follows: (1) a reader’s experience of reading works of fiction and 
works of nonfiction is similar; so (2) there is no meaningful distinction between fic-
tion and nonfiction. He argues for the proposition (1) using an interpretation of 
Gerrig and Prentice’s findings. 
 However, I reject both points. In terms of proposition (1), setting aside the 
issue of whether he correctly interprets the findings (which I will later argue he 
does not); I argue that Matravers’s understanding of the experiments is philosoph-
ically implausible. 
 According to Matravers (2014), Gerrig and Prentice’s experiments show 
that people believe in some of the content of fiction (p. 98). I argue that Gerrig and 
Prentice’s findings only show that people accept the content of fiction as being 
true; they do not believe it. In fact, Gerrig and Prentice do not declare a definition 
of belief; they seem to conflate belief with acceptance. Although the definition of 
belief is an ongoing debate, there is a clear distinction between belief and ac-
ceptance in philosophy. 
 As pointed out by Velleman and Shah (2005), regarding an utterance as true 
means only acceptance. Belief is a sub-category of acceptance; it is not identical to 
acceptance (pp. 498-9). Since Gerrig and Prentice and Gilbert did not specify a 
philosophical definition of belief in their experiments and findings, their findings 
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are insufficient for any philosopher to claim that belief, as opposed to acceptance, 
is involved. Matravers fails to recognise this, or ignores it, and accepts the standard 
of belief that is not even associated with philosophical belief. 
 Having rejected Matravers’s reason for asserting proposition (1), I will now 
go on to show that (1) must be rejected because of his misinterpretation of the 
findings. 
Matravers himself cites the quote from Gerrig and Prentice (1999) that fal-
sifies this point: 
“Belief in fiction is determined not by a critical analysis of the strength of its 
arguments [non-systematic process], but instead by the absence of motiva-
tion or ability to perform such an analysis. As a result, the persuasiveness of 
fiction depends less on its substance and more on rhetorical features of the 
narrative context and the expectations readers bring to it [a non-systematic 
process]” (p. 542) 
 
 Right after citing this passage, Matravers (2014) writes “this discussion of 
the integration of some of the content of representations with pre-existing struc-
tures of belief should not draw our attention away from the main point” (p. 98). 
What is the main point? He attempts to dismiss the meaningfulness of the fic-
tion/nonfiction distinction altogether, in other words, the argument from point (1) 
to point (2).  
 What he fails to realise or ignores is that this passage falsifies point (1) by 
pointing out the difference between the experience of reading fiction and nonfic-
tion: readers of fiction focus on the rhetorical features, the context of the work’s 
creation, and how the features and content of a work live up to their expectations, 
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while readers of nonfiction focus on verification and the strength of the arguments 
in its content. Further, according to this passage, readers of fiction do not motivate 
themselves to evaluate the evidence and the strength of arguments, while readers 
of nonfiction do motivate themselves to do these things, meaning that readers of 
fiction and nonfiction differ in their both focus and motivation. These two differ-
ences are enough to reject Matravers’s (2014) claim that “it is independently im-
plausible to think that what goes on when we read fiction is very different from 
what goes on when we read nonfiction” (p. 47). 
 I go on to show that point (2) is false using a positive argument providing an 
account of the meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction in the next 
chapter; however, before I do that I will settle some methodological issues. 
 
Some Methodological Issues 
 
 Although I have rejected Matravers’s reading of the experiments men-
tioned in this project, as well as his scepticism, I admit that his use of social science 
findings is an unusual move in the debate on the definition of fiction. Since I will be 
using a similar unusual methodology in constructing my own definition of fiction, I 
want to clarify some of the issues surrounding it before I begin. I will begin by ad-
dressing Peter Lamarque’s criticism of Matravers’s methodology, and then argue 
why it is implausible. Afterwards, I will delineate the merits of the use of social sci-
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ence experiments to complement philosophical research, and provide the details 
of my own methodology.  
Imagination-based theorist Peter Lamarque disagrees with Matravers’s use 
of social science experiments to substantiate his scepticism on the fic-
tion/nonfiction distinction. Lamarque (2016) says,  
In general Matravers should have been more sceptical of the philosophical 
significance of this work and more cautious in the support he draws from it. 
If he had attended less to the work of empirical psychologists more to that 
of experienced literary critics writing about novels and if he had compared 
this to experienced historians appraising the work of fellow historians, he 
would have got a quite different picture of the terrain (p. 618). 
 
 Lamarque undermines Matravers’s use of social science findings by arguing 
that fiction should be defined in terms of what experts do with works of fiction, 
and that the actions of the audiences in the experiment findings cannot be taken 
as the actions of experts. But this disagreement with Matravers’s methodology 
does not show that his argument is invalid. Matravers could simply say that a ques-
tionable methodology does not necessarily mean an invalid argument. 
 I reject Lamarque’s criticism because (1) it is not as destructive to Matrav-
ers’s scepticism as mine is, and (2) I see substantial merits in using social science 
findings in the definition of fiction. 
 Regarding (1), I have shown in this chapter that Matravers’s interpretation 
of the findings, according to his own methodology, cannot be used to reasonably 
support his scepticism, which is certainly a stronger criticism than Lamarque’s. 
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Regarding point (2), I find it more plausible to take the rigorously produced 
findings from social science more seriously than intuition tests about how fiction 
ought to be. While philosophers often do intuition tests, they are typically isolated 
and unregulated. Social scientists have provided us with a regulated intuition test 
on a group of intellectual laymen. Thus, I take the findings provided by Gerrig and 
Prentice and Gilbert to be useful for defining fiction. 
 Consequently, despite my criticism of Matravers’s methodology, and my 
demonstration that his interpretation of the findings was mistaken, I believe his 
use of experimental results as a methodology is valuable. Thus, I will also use social 





 Matravers argues that there is no meaningful distinction between fiction 
and nonfiction because he says that there is no significant difference between the 
experience of apprehending a work of fiction and a work of nonfiction. He argues 
for this reason with his interpretation of social science findings. 
 I disagree with his interpretation of these findings, and argue that they, in 
fact, support the opposite point — that there is a significant difference in the expe-
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rience of apprehending fiction and nonfiction. Thus, I have undermined not only 
his reading of the findings, but also his reason for scepticism. 
 I finished by discussing Matravers’s methodology, the criticisms against it, 





A New Definition of Fiction and a New Explanation of the Unique Role of Asser-
tions in Fiction 
 Thus far I have shown that none of the existing definitions of fiction are 
plausible, but that a distinction between fiction and nonfiction is still necessary. I 
will now present my new definition of fiction, which is immune to the criticisms of 
previous definitions and can explain many difficult issues regarding the process of 
defining fiction. This chapter will be divided into two parts: in part 1, I will con-
struct my own definition of fiction and demonstrate its plausibility, and in part 2, I 
will address a particularly difficult issue for definitions of fiction, namely, assertions 
in fiction, and show how my definition solves this problem. 
 I will begin the construction of my own definition of fiction by recalling 
which ideas can still plausibly be used for defining fiction: authorial intention and 
non-systematic processing. I will then modify the idea of non-systematic pro-
cessing to make it more philosophically sound, using the concepts of interior prop-
erties, phenomenal concept, and end value. Having done this, I will state my defini-
tion of fiction, and then demonstrate its plausibility by using it to address several 
persistent problems for previous definitions of fiction, including the nonfictional 
status of In Cold Blood, the concept of faction, and the fictional status of Schindler’s 
Ark. I will then discuss why so many previous theorists thought that imagination 
was a necessary component of a definition of fiction and demonstrate that it is not, 
before addressing further issues for previous definitions of fiction, including factu-
ally correct fiction and mental fiction. 
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 I will then shift my focus to one final, intractable problem for definitions of 
fiction: the role of assertions in fiction. I will use Stalnaker’s theory of secondary 
effects to argue that assertions in fiction are different from assertions in nonfiction 
because they have both an essential and a secondary effect. I will discuss why as-
sertions cause so many problems for other theories of fiction, and then show how 
my theory works with a wide range of assertions in fiction. 
 
Part 1 
A New Definition of Fiction 
The First Pillar of My Theory: Authorial Intention 
 
 Despite having rejected both imagination-based theories and non-
imagination-based theories generally, there is one element of them that I retain, 
albeit with modifications: the focus on the author’s intention. 
 With the case of mental fiction in chapter 1, I have shown that it is implau-
sible to presuppose that all authors of all works of fiction intend for those works of 
fiction to have an audience, and that those authors intend those audiences to do 
something specific with those works. This is because the case of mental fiction 
shows that an author can create a work of fiction and intend it to be read by no 
one, and that it is implausible to use the audience’s actions as a necessary condi-
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tion when defining fiction, because it is possible for a work of fiction to have no 
audience. 
 
The Second Pillar of My Theory: Non-Systematic Processing 
 
In chapter 5, I demonstrated that despite the implausibility of all the exist-
ing definitions of fiction, a distinction between fiction and nonfiction remains, as 
shown by the existence of non-systematic processing.23 
By shifting the audience’s focus from verification and logical processing, the 
non-systematic processing makes them much more likely to genuinely accept weak 
and unsupported utterances in works they believe to be works of fiction. When 
paired with Gilbert’s comprehension and acceptance model, it becomes apparent 
that people who believe they are reading a work of fiction dedicate fewer cognitive 
resources to evaluating the truth of the utterances they read in it than those who 
believe they are reading a work of nonfiction. 
 
The Foundation of My Definition of Fiction 
 
                                                 
23
 I would like to stress that although extremely valuable, the work of social scientists cannot be 
taken as a definition of fiction. Rather, as philosophers, we can use their findings to create a philo-
sophically sound definition. 
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 So far, I have argued that a plausible definition of fiction has two necessary 
components: authorial intention and non-systematic processing. Thus, I can create 
a preliminary definition of fiction as the following: 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be processed non-systematically. 
 
I call this definition preliminary because non-systematic processing is not 
yet substantial enough to be a philosophical idea. Thus far, the concept of non-
systematic processing only states that the concept of fiction tends to drive readers’ 
attention away from verification. There is no explicit mention of what the readers 
focus on instead, although Gerrig and Prentice (1999) do drop some hints: 
“The persuasiveness of fiction depends less on its substance and more on 
rhetorical features of the narrative context and the expectations readers 
bring to it” (p. 542).  
 
This quote details two foci of non-systematic processing: the rhetorical fea-
tures and the readers’ expectations. The rhetorical features are the content and 
parts of the work that do not depend on events in the actual world. These features 
do not depend on other objects, states of affairs, or relationships to any set of ob-
jects in the actual world.  
Gerrig and Prentice provide less information about the second focus, but I 
can use philosophical theories to interpret their findings and connect them to the 
readers’ expectations. 
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Gerrig and Prentice’s second point is clearly about audiences; however, this 
should not be taken to support theories of fiction that have an audience as a nec-
essary component. I will now set this idea aside for four reasons.  
First, if the author’s intentions for the audience determines whether a work 
is a work of fiction or not, then neither Kafka’s Metamorphosis nor The Castle can 
be fiction24. My case of mental fiction in chapter 1 shows the same point. 
Second, despite it causing no harm to my theory, this point on the audi-
ence’s expectations may produce an issue of circularity if included into a definition. 
If audience’s expectations are affected by their belief about whether they are read-
ing a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction, the idea of fiction affects their expec-
tations of apprehending a work of representation. If works of fiction are defined in 
terms of the audience’s expectation, then the change in the audience’s expectation 
of what they are reading, which is caused by their belief about whether they are 
reading a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction, is explained in terms of the audi-
ence’s expectation itself. This is an instance of circular reasoning. Third, this idea of 
expectation is vague, and is not explained by Gerrig and Prentice in detail, so it is 
too unclear to be useful. Fourth, I can set this idea aside because it is consistent 
with a definition, in which audience plays no role. As a result, only the focus on 
rhetorical features is useful here. 
 
Categorising Rhetorical Features: Intrinsic Properties or Interior Properties 
                                                 
24
 Franz Kafka wrote Metamorphosis and The Castle with the intention that they not be read by 
anyone, not even himself, according to an article by T Peterson (2010) in The Guardian. 
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 Having set aside the issue of the audience’s expectations, I will now catego-
rise the social science idea of rhetorical features in philosophical terms. One might 
think that they are the intrinsic properties of a work of representation, as they are 
those properties of an object that are often independent of any other distinct ob-
jects or states of affairs. 
 Unfortunately, there are so many definitions of intrinsic properties, none of 
which are widely accepted, that is it impossible to reasonably use intrinsic proper-
ties in a definition of fiction. However, there is one theory of intrinsic properties 
that, while debatable when it comes to defining intrinsic properties, can plausibly 
be used to explain what type of features in a work of fiction are the focus of ap-
prehension: that of interior properties. 
 Interior properties are a categorisation of properties that are used for de-
fining intrinsic properties. As presented by Dan Marshall (2012): “[those] proper-
ties that are classified as intrinsic by (3) [are] interior properties” (§2.3).  
“(3) Being F is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, anything that is F is F in 
virtue of the way it itself, and nothing wholly distinct from it, is” (§2.3).” 
 
I will borrow the interior properties method of defining intrinsic properties 
to define rhetorical features. According to this method, the rhetorical features of a 
work — its plot structure, characterisation, style of writing, etc. — are interior 
properties. 
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Despite the fact that the concept of interior properties is normally used to 
define intrinsic properties, I shall not call the rhetorical features intrinsic proper-
ties, because what intrinsic properties are does not concern my current project. I 
have merely borrowed the method of definition, and do not commit to its conclu-
sions in the original usage. Additionally, the usefulness of the concept interior 
properties does not depend on whether all intrinsic properties are interior proper-
ties.  
One could say that rhetorical features could be changed by the context of 
production, and therefore claim that rhetorical features are not really interior 
properties. However, I say that the context of production is part of the idea of the 
work, and so is not distinct from the work itself [see Lamarque (2010)], meaning 
that even if rhetorical features are affected in the context of production, they are 
affected by other interior properties of the work. Interior properties of a work of 
representation are the properties possessed by the work independent of any ob-
ject distinct from it. Following this, because the context of production is part of the 
work, and so is also an interior property, being affected by the context of produc-
tion does not disqualify rhetorical features from being interior properties.  
Further, the relation between the rhetorical features and the context of 
production further strengthens the idea that a work of representation has certain 
rhetorical features independent of other distinct objects or events. If the context of 
production changes, such as in the case of the author deciding to cancel out a 
character, then the rhetorical features of the work change because of the cancella-
tion of all the parts about the cancelled character. If the author of a work of repre-
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sentation does not change anything about the work (and thus there is no change in 
the production context), then there is no change in the rhetorical features of that 
work no matter what happens in the actual world. Thus, rhetorical features are un-
like some other non-interior properties of a work, such as being a true description 
or being about certain actual events. Thus, a work of representation has certain 
rhetorical features because of its context of production, and thus the work itself. 
Therefore, I categorise the rhetorical properties that audiences focus on in com-
prehending a work (whether in terms of the context of its production or its actual 
elements) non-systematically as interior properties. 
 
Interior Properties and Definition of Fiction 
 
 My next step is to incorporate the idea of interior properties into my defini-
tion of fiction. We can see from the above section that audiences in Gerrig and 
Prentice’s findings focus on the interior properties of a fiction. (I do not claim that 
they focus on the interior properties exclusively, just that this is at least one of 
their foci.) When I explain non-systematic processing in terms of interior proper-
ties, my definition becomes, 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process, which focuses on 
the interior properties of the work. 
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For this preliminary idea, I will argue that the interior properties of a work 
of fiction form an important focus for understanding a work of fiction, even when 
the author or audience is trying to understand the components of a work of fiction 
that may not be amongst the interior properties of a work of fiction and address 
potential objections to my argument. For example, characterisation is often not an 
interior property of a work of fiction, because the personality of a fictional charac-
ter often depends on the content in other works of fiction, such as what a vampire 
usually does or looks like. Further, the writing style of an author is not confined to 
the interior properties of a single work of fiction, because it has to do with how he 
writes when producing other works of the narrative. 
My first step of response is to clarify my idea. Although I make interior 
properties as a focus of comprehending works of fiction, I have not made it the on-
ly focus. While I may not have a foolproof response to the potential criticism, I ar-
gue that the interior properties of a work of fiction are an important focus for un-
derstanding a work of fiction, even when the author or audience is trying to under-
stand the components of a work of fiction that may not be amongst the interior 
properties of a work of fiction.  
I will show my point by discussing the issues of characterisation and writing 
style separately. Thus, my second response is to show that the issue of a fictional 
character does not threaten my proposed emphasis on the interior properties. Alt-
hough the characterisation  of fictional characters depend on other works of fiction, 
like zombie having no conscious sensation, or such as the characterisation of Her-
cule Poirot depends on multiple works of fiction, it does not mean that the interior 
properties is not an important focus when the authors of these works were creat-
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ing these works of fiction. For example, It is still reasonable to accept that Agatha 
Christie still wanted her audience to focus on how she writes about Poirot in Mur-
der in Mesopotamia, which are the interior properties of this work of fiction, even 
though she expected her audience to bring in some of their beliefs about Poirot, 
like him being a famous Belgian detective who likes drinking Tisane, when the au-
dience read this work of fiction. Further, even if authors of works of fiction that 
include zombies expects their audience to have certain belief about zombie before 
reading their books, it is also reasonable to accept that these authors still want the 
audience to focus on what they write about the zombies in their works, which are 
the interior properties of  their works of fiction. 
Third, as for writing style, although writing style can often be seen in the 
perspective of a collection of works of fiction, like the writing style in the plays by 
William Shakespeare, how the writing style developed amongst the martial art 
novels by Louis Cha (Jin Yong), it is still legitimate to talk about the writing style of 
a particular work of fiction, such as how it changed, developed, or revolutionised 
the writing style of a particular type or genre  of works of fiction (in the 
categorisation sense, not in the sense proposed by Friend). When this happens, the 
focus is on how particular works of fiction is written, which is an instance of interi-
or properties of a work of fiction. 
Although both cases of characterisation and writing style require the audi-
ence to utilise their beliefs that are not induced by the interior properties of what 
they are reading. Nevertheless, what knowledge audience need to comprehend 
certain aspect of a work of fiction does not affect whether they always focus are 
always expected by the authors to focus on the interior properties of a work of fic-
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tion. Indeed, it may confirm my point regarding interior properties being the focus. 
This is because, the audience are using their knowledge or beliefs to comprehend 
certain features of a work of fiction, which are the interior properties. As long as 
the characterisation or writing style of a particular work of fiction is concerned, the 
interior properties of a work of fiction form a necessary focus for discussing these 
issues.  
Thus, as a clarification, I insert an explanatory clause into my idea, 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process, which focuses on 
the interior properties of the work (as a focus, not the only focus, amongst 
some other properties of the work). 
 
 I will not include the bracketed clause in the later part of this project, but I 
always mean to include this clause when I mention interior properties in my ideas 
of fiction. 
Using Phenomenal Concept to Reframe Fiction 
 
 We now know that interior properties are the focus in non-systematic pro-
cessing, but why is this case? And why are they not the focus in systematic pro-
cessing? Both fiction and nonfiction have interior properties, so why do they only 
become the focus in fiction? 
 To answer these questions, I argue that the purpose of a fiction is to pro-
duce an experience that is valued by the audience without regarding any object 
distinct from the work, and that this experience is produced by the interior proper-
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ties of the work of fiction. Furthermore, the initial, first-hand experience of appre-
hension itself is particularly important when apprehending a work of fiction. Know-
ing the plot points of a work of fiction is different from having apprehended it in 
person. Apprehending the work in person produces a phenomenal concept of the 
work in question that simply knowing things about it or knowing about parts of the 
content does not.  
 I shall now demonstrate how phenomenal concept applies to the experi-
ence of reading a work of fiction. Afterwards, I will argue that the application of 
phenomenal concept means that we can look at the idea of fiction in a completely 
new way, one that has not been done in any previous definition of fiction.25 
According to Papineau (2002), phenomenal concepts necessarily require the 
subject’s initial experience. If Mary has the phenomenal concept of seeing the 
colour red, she must have had the initial experience of perceiving red. Papineau 
allows two exceptions: either (i) a phenomenal concept can be derived from 
combining two other phenomenal concepts that the subject has already mastered; 
or (ii) a phenomenal concept is the intermediate of the two previously-mastered 
phenomenal concepts (pp. 67-9, pp. 96-7).  
An example of the type (i) is the phenomenal concept of seeing a yellow 
cube. If one has the phenomenal concept of seeing the colour yellow and the 
phenomenal concept of seeing a cube, he may not need to have the initial 
                                                 
25
 Although Paisley Livingston (2005) has produced an account on version, it is on literary works in general rather 
than works of fiction specifically.  
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experience of seeing a yellow cube to have the phenomenal concept of seeing a 
yellow cube.  
An example of type 2 (ii) is the phenomenal concept of seeing the colour 
pink. If one knows theoretically that the colour pink is composed of the colours 
white and red, and he has the initial experience of seeing the colours red and 
white, he may not need the initial experience of seeing the colour pink to have the 
phenomenal concept of the colour pink, because the colour pink is the 
intermediate of the colour white and the colour red. 
Papineau (2002) emphasises that his version of phenomenal concept refers 
to the experience without any description. To show this point semantically, his 
phenomenal concepts take the form of an “experience operator”, which is “the 
experience: —”. The gap after the experience operator, denoted here by a dash, is 
called “perceptual filling”. The phenomenal concepts refer to a set of resembling 
experiences, rather than any instance of the type of experience quoted in the 
perceptual filling. A type of experience is a set of many similar experiences (pp. 
102-3; 116-21).  
  
The Phenomenal Concept of Apprehending a Fiction 
 
Although the experience of apprehending a work of fiction is different from 
the experience of seeing colours, the phenomenal concept can still be applied 
when defining fiction. The experience of apprehending a work of fiction is the 
initial experience that is necessary for one to have the phenomenal concepts of 
apprehending the work in question. The phenomenal concept of apprehending a 
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work of fiction is a complex of many phenomenal concepts. Formally, while the 
phenomenal concept of seeing the colour red is “the experience: seeing red”, the 
phenomenal concept of apprehending a work of fiction F is “the experience: 
reading/watching/listening to a work of fiction F”. 
Because of the complexity of the initial experience of the phenomenal 
concept of fiction, it is very difficult, and likely impossible, for anyone to have a 
phenomenal concept of a particular fiction without any initial experience of it at all. 
Even Papineau’s exceptions do not apply: in terms of the first exception, the 
experience of reading a work of fiction is not a combination of the experience of 
any two other works of fiction. The second exception is not applicable because the 
experience of apprehending a work of fiction is irrelevant to any spectrum of 
experience.  
One may ask whether the phenomenal concept of a new version of a work 
requires the readers to have a new initial experience apart from their initial 
experience of the old version. In my view, unless the new version is very different 
from the old one or there are changes in the non-descriptive properties like its 
rhetoric, it does not. This is because if a person has an initial experience of an old 
version of a work of fiction, and then apprehends a new version that is not 
significantly different from the old one, the experience qualifies for Papineau’s first 
exception: producing the initial experience from combining other phenomenal 
concepts.  
This is because the phenomenal concept of a work of representation is a 
complex of different phenomenal concepts of experiences. A revision normally 
changes a minor part of the plot that can be experienced with an initial experience 
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from an old edition. Unless the new parts are very hard to visualise or the changes 
are in the non-narrative properties of the work, apprehending the changes 
together with the initial experience of an old edition can produce the experience of 
the new version in the mind of the readers of the old version. 
 
Phenomenal Concept’s Role in My Definition Thus Far 
 
I have been focusing on interior properties and phenomenal concept to 
explain the role of non-systematic processing as a component of my definition. I 
will further refine it here. 
The interior properties of a work of fiction do not only include what 
happens in the work of fiction but also the interior features, such as rhetorical 
features, how different words sound together, iconography, or even the author’s 
way of describing events. The phenomenal concept of reading a fiction is a complex 
of phenomenal concepts of all these different properties. This is because many 
parts of a work are those properties that can be apprehended only via initial 
experience.  
One may say that this is true of both fiction and nonfiction, and thus that 
phenomenal concept is not useful in defining fiction specifically.  However, 
although the experience of apprehending both fiction and nonfiction produce 
phenomenal concepts, the acquisition of these concepts only affects the focus of 
the audience in cases of fiction. 
 
End Value and Fiction  
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The significance of phenomenal concepts differs hugely between the 
apprehension of a work of fiction and a work of nonfiction. A history book that 
contains falsehoods about history is a bad history book, no matter how exciting it is 
to read it. In contrast, a work of fiction can be as factually inaccurate as the author 
wants it to be and can still be a great work of fiction because of its interior 
properties, such as the plot or the writing style. My own exposition of non-
systematic processing of works of fiction must also explain the difference in the 
role of the phenomenal concept of a work of fiction in the evaluation, so that I can 
plausibly include it into my definition. 
I argue that the non-systematic processing of works of fiction means that 
the subject values his experience of apprehending a work of fiction as an end. This 
understanding can produce a clear overall picture of non-systematic processing and 
set the apprehension of works of fiction apart from the apprehension of works of 
nonfiction. 
When a person believes that he is reading or watching a work of fiction, he 
focuses on the interior properties of the work. This is because he determines the 
value of the work by valuing the initial experience that is required for acquiring the 
phenomenal concept of the work as an end. In contrast, a person apprehending 
nonfictional work values the work by its correctness in a way that he does not do 
with a work of fiction. 
I am not claiming that audiences of works of fiction do not consider 
accuracy at all. My point is that a work of fiction is valued as a good work of fiction 
because the experience of evaluating it is valued as an end in itself. Valuing a work 
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of fiction as an end does not mean that all works of fiction are valuable or good as 
an end. Rather, I am arguing that a work of fiction is evaluated as good or bad 
because of how good or bad the experience of apprehending it is. In other words, 
the evaluation of the experience is grounded in the experience of apprehension 
alone. I use “grounding” and “in virtue of” interchangeably. For the logical rules 
regulating this notion, see Gideon Rosen (2010). 
Valuing something as an end in itself is an important concept in philosophy. 
Shelly Kagan (1998) uses value as an end to define intrinsic value saying,  
“I suggest that we reserve the term ‘intrinsic value’ for value as an end, and 
leave it to others to come up with a short label for the value that an object 
has simply by virtue of its intrinsic properties” (p. 293).26 
 
 In response to my use of end value in fiction, make-believe theorists may 
claim that works of fiction can serve a variety of purposes — for instance, they can 
shed light on social problems or provide accounts of history — and therefore, the 
experiences of works of fiction are often not valued as an end because they are 
made for some other instrumental purposes, i.e. they are valued as a means. 
 This idea presumes that if an object is instrumentally valuable, it cannot be 
valued as an end in itself. Kagan (1998) rebuts this point. He says,  
“No doubt most of us do value the ability to cook a gourmet mean at least 
in part for merely instrumental reasons. (Presumably, for example, we might 
value the ability as a means to fine food, and the food as a means to 
pleasure). But I think it is not an uncommon view to hold that such abilities 
are intrinsically valuable as well—that they are valuable as an end, and not 
merely as a means” (p. 284). 
                                                 
26
 The definition of intrinsic value is still hotly debated. There are other theories that disa-
gree with the Kagan’s definition of intrinsic value, notably Christine M. Korsgaard (1983). 
Nevertheless, my current project makes no attempt to define intrinsic value; therefore, there 
is no need to address the plausibility of Kagan’s argument. I mention Korsgaard’s account 
merely to show that there is debate around the term “intrinsic value”, though Kagan uses 
“intrinsic value” and “value as an end” interchangeably. 
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 Kagan’s point is that an object can be valuable both as an end and as a 
means. In his example, the skill of gastronomy is valuable both in virtue of 
producing fine food and as a skill in and of itself. 
Further, he argues that end value is not only consistent with instrumental 
value, but is sometimes founded on instrumental value. He argues that the value as 
an end of certain skills or useful objects depends on their instrumental values, i.e. 
how good they are at achieving the purpose, 
“That is to say, it is the usefulness—the instrumental value—of culinary skill 
that provides part of the basis of the intrinsic value of that skill. Were 
culinary expertise to somehow lose its instrumental value (if we no longer 
needed food, and if it no longer game us pleasure), it would lose at least 
some (and perhaps all) of its intrinsic value as well”(p. 285). 
 
 While Kagan argues that instrumental value sometimes leads to value as an 
end in the first quote, he argues that the loss of instrumental value deteriorates the 
value as an end. I agree with him that instrumental value sometimes leads to end 
value, but I am hesitant as to whether the loss of instrumental value deteriorates 
the end value of an object27.  
 Consider, before the invention of photography, painting was a common way 
to show and reproduce an object’s appearance in terms of a two-dimensional 
image. The invention of photography rendered this skill instrumentally useless. Yet, 
the skill of painting is still valued as an end, so there are at least some cases where 
the loss of instrumental value does not deteriorate the end value.  
 Similarly, the ability to produce a work of fiction is a skill, if not a set of 
skills. The skill of producing a work of fiction can serve many purposes, including 
                                                 
27
 I am only commenting on the relationship between value as an end and instrumental value. I 
make no comment on the definition of intrinsic value. 
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shedding light on social problems or providing an account of history, as mentioned 
above. Nevertheless, there are many other skills that serve the same purpose; a 
textbook can shed light on social problems or provide an account of history. While 
the skills of creating a work of fiction still retain their instrumental value, creating a 
work of fiction may not be the best or most common method for telling history, 
uncovering social problems, or fulfilling other instrumental purposes. As these skills 
are still being used for these purposes, it seems that these still-useful skills are 
valued as an end. 
 
End Value, Phenomenal Concept, and Interior Properties 
 
I have delineated why end value is a very suitable component for a 
definition of fiction. The next step is to incorporate it into my definition of fiction as 
a concept for explaining non-systematic processing related to fiction. My idea is the 
following: although both works of nonfiction and works of fiction contain interior 
properties and produce phenomenal concepts, only works of fiction are evaluated 
by valuing the experience of apprehension that is necessary for acquiring the 
phenomenal concept of their interior properties as an end. Thus, a revised version 
of my definition is the following:  
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process, which focuses on 
the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehend-
ing the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the 
work in question28. 
                                                 
28
 It is possible to simplify my definition of fiction to the following, “A work of representation is a 




Addressing Persistent Problems for Theories of Fiction: In Cold Blood 
 
I will now use my theory to address some cases that have shown persistent-
ly problematic for many previous theories of fiction, before providing a final ver-
sion of my definition. 
In Cold Blood and Schindler’s Ark are both problematic for many theories of 
fiction. While a plausible theory of fiction has to provide at least one reason for 
categorising works as works of fiction or works of nonfiction, these two works are 
impossible to properly categorise using the previous theories of fiction. 
I will first show how my definition of fiction properly categorises In Cold 
Blood as a work of nonfiction. This book produces two issues: (1) it is a work of 
nonfiction with many untrue utterances and (2) it is a work of intentionally well-
made nonfiction. 
Regarding the first issue, if Capote produced factual errors in his book unin-
tentionally, then he was neither intending his work to cause his readers to process 
it non-systematically nor to cause his readers to focus on any of its interior proper-
ties. Accidentally untrue utterances are not the same as the imaginative utterances 
                                                                                                                                         
gagement with the work affords”. While I take this version as a simplified version of my definition of 
fiction, I do not take it as my official definition of fiction, because I want my official definition of 
fiction to highlight all the important ideas, such as end value and interior properties, so that I can 
later defend the use of these ideas in Chapter 7, and present a more straightforward application of 
my definition of fiction to address different issues. Further, this alternative definition does not place 
an emphasis on end value, which is an important focus of my official definition. 
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in a work of fiction. The latter is the focus, and are meant to be comprehended re-
gardless of truth or falsity.  
In contrast, accidentally untrue utterances are supposed to be telling facts, 
though they fail to do so. The utterances themselves are not the focus of compre-
hension. The focus is on the facts they describe. The author of such utterances still 
wants his work to cause the readers to process it systematically, not non-
systematically. Thus, Capote does not intend his work to cause the readers to focus 
on the interior properties of the work, nor does he intend it to cause the readers to 
comprehend it non-systematically, and In Cold Blood must be excluded from being 
a work of fiction.  
Regarding the second point, Capote may intend his work to cause the audi-
ence to focus on its interior properties to fulfil his further purpose of the audience 
appreciating how well written the work is and not whether it is true or not. How-
ever, an important feature of non-systematic processing is that audiences do not 
focus on whether what they are reading is true, as they regard verification as less 
important in this process. I do not think this is what Capote wants, as the title of his 
book is “In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences”. 
He himself puts the focus on the verification of his work, and is thus asking the au-
dience to process it systematically — to evaluate the work for truth. Therefore, he 
intends his work to cause systematic processing, though he arranges it in a way 





The label “faction” is interesting, though it is not used academically by phi-
losophers. In Cold Blood is regarded as a work of faction first because it is not a 
work of fiction. My account agrees with this, as this work fails to satisfy the criteria 
for being a work of fiction. Nevertheless, the significant amount of intentionally 
factual errors and the writing style render it to be an unusual type of nonfiction. 
The writing style resembles the aesthetic aspects of fiction by making it an attrac-
tive read for audiences. Therefore, I think that the status of faction, in this case, is 
the resemblance to a work of fiction without being one; and the author’s intention 
to create a factual work, though it contains many factual errors.  
Thus, my take on the idea of faction is that it is not the same as fiction, but 
it resembles a work of fiction by using some of the means that normally appear in 
works of fiction. There is a fundamental difference though: a work of fiction is in-
tended to be apprehended non-systematically, but a work of faction is still intend-
ed to be apprehended systematically.  
In light of this, Keneally’s Schindler’s Ark is an interesting case. It may be ei-
ther a work of fiction or a work of faction. If it is a work of faction, this is the case 
for similar reasons as In Cold Blood. Keneally (2007) attests that he is reporting 
facts in the book (pp. 2-4). Thus, he aims to cause the audience to focus on verifi-




Schindler’s Ark as a Work of Fiction 
 
If this is the only interpretation that my account can provide, my account is 
still not plausible enough. After all, the book won the Booker Prize for fiction. My 
account can only be plausible if it can explain this categorisation, which I can do 
with an alternative explication of Keneally’s intentions. 
Although Keneally intends his book to be a record of history, a memorial to 
the victims of Nazism, and a work of moral education, he does so in a way that can 
be achieved only by valuing the reading experience as an end in itself and by focus-
ing on the interior features of the work. In this way, he intends the work to pro-
duce non-systematic processing, even if his ultimate goals are instrumental. This 
interpretation provides a prime example of a work of fiction created for instrumen-
tal purposes. Schindler’s Ark is written for both historical and moral purposes. Yet, 
because of the author’s intention to have the audience process it non-
systematically, it should still qualify as a work of fiction. 
Schindler’s Ark is a case of intentionally factually accurate fiction, similarly 
to Vidal’s The Narratives of Empire series. If a work is a work of nonfiction, its au-
thor wants his work to induce systematic processing on the part of the audience, 
which includes verification. If a work is a work of fiction, the author wants his work 
to induce non-systematic processing in the audience, which is to value the experi-
ence of reading as an end.  
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Imagination and Fiction 
 
Unlike Schindler’s Ark, most works of fiction are clearly fictional, because 
the authors intentionally include a lot of utterances with the fictive intention or the 
intention to be imagined as true. I have previously addressed utterances of these 
types in my exploration of many other theories discussing the idea of fictive inten-
tion in Chapter 1 (although I do not include the idea of fictive intention in my ac-
count.) The use of these utterances indicates that they want their work to be pro-
cessed non-systematically — if they want the work to cause systematic processing; 
they would be writing something that too inaccurate to be of any use.  
This point leads to a question: why do so many theorists regard imagination 
as an important idea for defining fiction? Even Friend, who does not insist on re-
garding imagination as a necessary condition of a definition of fiction, still catego-
rises it as a standard feature of fiction. Although my theory makes no mention of 
imagination, it can explain why imagination is commonly associated with fiction.  
The reason is this: utterances made with the manifest intention for the au-
dience to imagine them as true propositions is a common means by which an au-
thor indicates his intention of writing a work that is meant to be apprehended in 
the way that involves valuing the experience of apprehension as an end in itself, 
regardless of other goals served by the work in question. Further, my theory pro-
vides a reason for specifically excluding the idea of imagination when defining fic-
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tion: it is not helpful in distinguishing works of fiction from works of nonfiction; and 
leads to many problems, as shown in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
Is There a Perfectly Factually Correct Fiction? 
 
 There is still a potential issue for my definition of fiction. Namely, one may 
produce a work with perfect factual accuracy but want his audience to take it as a 
work of fiction by having the intention specified in my definition. Normally, this 
case can be dealt with by the idea of systematic processing, as seen in my analysis 
of In Cold Blood. However, if the author wants his perfectly factually accurate work 
to be evaluated in the way specified in my account, then it must still be regarded 
as a work of fiction according to my account. Even if this case is not certainly a 
work of nonfiction, my account still must be refined to show that it is difficult to 
find a clear answer to this case. Thus, I refine it to: 
 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or 
any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior 
properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work 




 Though my definition of fiction can theoretically take a perfectly factually 
accurate work of representation as a work of fiction given the author’s intention 
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for it to be taken non-systematically, I do not know whether it is empirically possi-
ble for an author to do all the research involved in creating such a work and not 
want verification to be the focus of how he and his audience value the work. 
 
How Does My Account Include Mental Fiction? 
 
 This modification also fixes an issue with mental fiction. My account in-
cludes an intention to produce a work to be valued in a certain way. This concept 
of valuation presupposes that there is someone doing the valuing, meaning that it 
still requires an audience. However, I put “or any other” in the wording about the 
audience. Therefore, I can say that if there is any audience, the author would in-
tend them to value his work in a certain way. If there is no audience, then how he 
values his work matters. This point can be found in my definition above, but I re-
state it here for the sake of clarity. Thus, another advantage of the above revision 
is its ability to address the mental fictions or works of fiction created to have no 
audience.  
 
Conclusion to Part 1 
 
 In this chapter thus far, I have constructed my definition of fiction. Sche-
matically, the author of a work of fiction intends to create a work that causes any 
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audience besides himself that the work might have to focus on the interior proper-
ties of the work and value it as an end in itself. 
 I have shown the plausibility of my account by explaining why In Cold Blood 
is a work of nonfiction and why Schindler’s Ark is a work of fiction, something 
which imagination-based accounts always get wrong, as I have shown in Chapters 1 
and 2.  
 I end this section of the chapter by restating my definition of fiction:  
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or 
any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior 
properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work 





Part 2  
The Unique Role of Assertions in Fiction 
 
I have so far shown how my definition of fiction provides a plausible answer 
for several persistent problems, including why Schindler’s Ark is considered to be a 
work of fiction but In Cold Blood is not, and the issue of works of fiction created 
with the intention of having no audience. I will now address the one remaining im-
portant issue: that of the role of assertions in fiction, and why they do not change a 
work to be a work of nonfiction. This will further demonstrate the plausibility of my 
account, as the issue of assertions falsifies many imagination-based theories.  
I argue that assertions in fiction are different from assertions in nonfiction. 
While the essential effect of assertions in both works of fiction and works of non-
fiction is to change a presupposition of the audience, assertions in fiction have a 
secondary effect: to contribute to the evaluation of the interior properties, which is 
to evaluate the experience of apprehending the work of fiction as an end in itself. I 
will show this point by establishing an analogy between assertions in negotiations 
and assertions in works of fiction. I will further argue that assertions in fiction do 
not change a work of fiction into a work of nonfiction, because the issue of wheth-
er a work is a work of fiction determines whether these assertions have the afore-
mentioned contribution. To say otherwise risks circularity. Finally, I will explain why 
the issue of assertions in fiction is an insurmountable difficulty for imagination-
based theories.  
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Stalnaker’s Secondary Effects of Assertions 
 
 Assertions in fiction are a special type of utterance. They express the au-
thor’s actual beliefs, but are included in a work of fiction. For this reason, they re-
late to both the actual world and the content of a work of fiction. A plausible theo-
ry of fiction must produce an explanation of this issue. My explanation is the fol-
lowing: both assertions made in a daily nonfictional (i.e. actual) context and asser-
tions in fiction have the role of expressing the utterer’s belief, but assertions in fic-
tion have another role as well: they contribute to the value of the experience of 
apprehending the work of fiction.  
To support this, I will now address Robert Stalnaker’s arguments about as-
sertions. Stalnaker (1999) argues that assertions have an essential effect, which is 
to convince people to accept their content as true, after which the assertion be-
comes a presupposition. In some cases though, a speaker or author can intend his 
assertions to have a secondary effect in addition to this essential effect (p. 86).  
Stalnaker describes “secondary effects” thus: 
“My suggestion about the essential effect of assertion does not imply that 
speakers intend to succeed in getting the addressee to accept the content 
of the assertion, or that they believe they will, or even might succeed.  A 
person may make an assertion knowing it will be rejected just as Congress 
may pass a law knowing it will be vetoed, a labour negotiator may make a 
proposal knowing it will be met by a counterproposal, or a poker player 
may place a bet knowing it will cause all the other players to fold. Such ac-
tions need not be pointless, since they all have secondary effects, and there 
is no reason why achieving the secondary effects cannot be the primary in-
tention of the agent performing the action. The essential effects will still be 
relevant even when it is a foregone conclusion that assertion, legislative 
act, proposal, or bet will be rejected, since one generally explains why the 
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action has the secondary effects it has partly in terms of the fact that it 
would have had certain essential effects had it not been rejected.” (pp. 87) 
 
 There are several important points in this quote. First, assertions do need 
to be made for the essential effect. Second, this secondary effect is separate from 
the essential effect and is made intentionally. Third, the secondary effect can vary 
in different cases of assertions. Finally, if a primary effect is non-existent or unrec-
ognised, there is no secondary effect. However, the secondary effect can succeed 
even if the primary effect fails. 
 It is clear from Stalnaker’s quote that there is a huge variety of secondary 
effects, from provoking someone to veto a law to getting a counterproposal from 
an opponent in a negotiation. Nevertheless, each particular set of assertions made 
for a particular secondary effect can form a type of assertion, as is the case for 
each type of assertion mentioned by Stalnaker. For example, assertions in negotia-
tions are not normal assertions, because they have the particular secondary effect 
of leading to a counterproposal.  
 Though it is easy to form the impression that the essential effect must fail 
for the secondary effect to succeed, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, essen-
tial assertions are sometimes accepted and still produce a secondary effect. For 
instance, in the case of assertions in a negotiation, while it is often that case that 
one may want his opponent to reject his assertions and create a counter-offer, this 
is not always the case. A negotiator may want his opponent to accept his asser-
tions, and to add further conditions to them. For instance, a person offering to sell 
a batch of goods for $1,000 may want his negotiation partner to accept the offer, 
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and also want to see what other conditions the other person puts in the agree-
ment, such as a deadline for delivery of the goods. 
 Having shown that Stalnaker’s quote is consistent with my interpretation 
via an example case, I will now show the same point by dissecting Stalnaker’s 
quote. 
 Stalnaker (1999) says, “My suggestion about the essential effect of the 
assertion does not imply that speakers intend to succeed in getting the addressee 
to accept the content of the assertion, or that they believe they will, or even might 
succeed” (p. 87). This only shows that the primary effect is not always the intention 
of making an assertion; it does not say that the success of secondary effects re-
quires the failure of essential effects. 
 Consequently, the idea of secondary effects may be used to explain asser-
tions in fiction, since they are compatible with Stalnaker’s motivation for creating 
this idea. In light of that, it is now crucial to determine whether assertions in fiction 
fit the aforementioned criteria of having secondary effects.  
 
Assertions in Fiction and Stalnaker’s Criteria of Secondary Effects 
 
Having delineated Stalnaker’s idea of secondary effects and his example of 
the secondary effect of assertions in negotiation, I will now argue that assertions in 
176 
fiction fit the criteria of secondary effects, and thus are a type of assertions made 
to have secondary effects.  
Stalnaker’s criteria for secondary effects are as follows: 
1. Assertions need not be made for their essential effect29.  
2. Secondary effects are those effects that are separate from the essential 
effects and are made intentionally.  
3. Secondary effects can vary in different cases of assertions.  
4. If a primary effect is non-existent or unrecognised, there is no secondary 
effect. However, the secondary effect can succeed even if the essential 
effect fails. 
I have previously shown that assertions in fiction are also sentences about 
the content of a particular work of fiction, and do not need to be made for their 
essential effect (which is changing the context of a communication). Thus, they sat-
isfy the first criterion. 
Assertions in fiction also meet the second criterion, because they are in-
tended to contribute to the content of a work, which is a secondary effect. (The 
essential effect of assertions is to change people’s presuppositions.)  
The third criterion does not exclude any particular use of assertions, and so 
assertions in fiction can be included. 
                                                 
29
 I will explain Stalnaker’s idea of the essential effects of assertion later in this chapter.  
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Finally, the fourth criterion requires the secondary effect to be explained 
partly in terms of the essential effect. In the case of assertions in fiction, there is 
always an essential effect, and so there can always be a secondary effect, and an 
essential effect to help explain it. If assertions in works of fiction do not possess 
their essential effect as assertions, (in this case, to be accepted as the true belief by 
the audience), it is impossible for them to achieve the secondary effect. For exam-
ple, assertions in fiction achieve a secondary effect of making the background of a 
work of fiction to be about a particular place, like an assertion about the environ-
ment around the city of Manchester for example, partially by its essential effects of 
telling the readers how Manchester is like. As another example, assertions in fic-
tion carry out their secondary effects of rendering some works of fiction containing 
them to be a work of fiction about certain historical events, by asserting what his-
torical events actually happened, which is the essential effect. I will now address 
this point in more detail to explain the relationship between the essential and sec-
ondary effects of assertions in fiction and so demonstrate how assertions in fiction 
fit Stalnaker’s fourth criterion. 
 
The Essential Effect of Assertions 
 
The fourth criterion regards the relationship between essential and sec-
ondary effects of assertions. Stalnaker (1999) does not commit to one definition of 
assertions, but does state his idea of the essential effect of assertions: 
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“To make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way, pro-
vided that there are no objections from the other participants in the con-
versation. The particular way in which the context set is reduced is that all 
of the possible situations incompatible with what is said are eliminated. To 
put it a slightly different way, the essential effect of an assertion is to 
change the presuppositions of the participants in the conversation by add-
ing the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed. This effect is 
avoided only if the assertion is rejected.” (p. 86)  
 
According to Stalnaker, the essential effect of assertions is to become a 
framework for a particular communication by reducing the possible situations that 
the communication can be about and become accepted into the set of presupposi-
tions for that communication. 
Stalnaker (1999) says the following about presuppositions,  
“A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given con-
text just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or be-
lieves that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or be-
lieves that his addressee recognises that he is making these assumptions, or 
has these beliefs” (p. 49). 
 
 Presupposition includes both beliefs and assumptions, which he describes 
as those propositions that the participants in a communication accept as true for 
the purpose of communication, though they do not always genuinely believe them 
(p. 84). According to Stalnaker (1999), the presupposition is not a mental attitude 
like belief, so it is not a propositional belief. Rather, it is a disposition of behaving in 
a certain way if another party in a communication has certain beliefs or assump-
tions (p. 52).  
This is particularly important when it comes to the issue of proper names 
and descriptions in assertions in fiction. Stalnaker thinks that proper names and 
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descriptions are often uttered with a presupposition: participants are disposed to 
assume that a person is not uttering empty names when making an assertion. He 
(1999) says, “one of the facts could be stated like this: it is inappropriate to say 
‘The Queen of England is bald’ (or to say ‘the Queen of England is not bald’) except 
in a context in which it is part of the resumed background information that England 
has a queen” (p. 53). 
 
The Essential and Secondary Effects of Assertions in Fiction  
 
If assertions in fiction are assertions made for their secondary effects, there 
must be a relationship between the essential effect and the secondary effect, as 
stated in Stalnaker’s fourth criterion. I will use Elizabeth Gaskell’s example of Mary 
Barton to delineate this relationship. Mary Barton opens with this sentence: 
“There are some fields near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as ‘Green 
Heys Fields’, through which runs a public footpath to a little village about two miles 
distant” (1987, p. 1). (p. 184). I simplify this example of assertion into “Green Heys 
Fields is a field and is near Manchester”. I call this utterance GH1. 
Assertions in fiction like GH1 are essential effects, as they change the pre-
supposition of the reader. Readers assume that GH1 is true whether they know it 
to be true in the actual world or not so that they can continue to understand and 
read the novel.  
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Some readers do know GH1 to be true in the actual world, in which case 
GH1 does not change their presuppositions. Nevertheless, this assertion still mat-
ters to them because of its secondary effect. I have already shown that assertions 
containing names are often made with the presupposition that those names are 
not empty names, so it is reasonable to say that in the case of GH1, the author pre-
supposes that there are both Green Heys Field and Manchester in the actual world, 
and that audiences will share this presupposition by either believing it or assuming 
it.  Together with another presupposition that GH1 is in the content of a work of 
fiction, the audience recognises that the author of this work of fiction is writing 
about actual things rather than imaginary objects.  
I will now show the relationship between the essential and secondary ef-
fects of an assertion, and thus show that assertions in fiction satisfy Stalnaker’s 
fourth criterion. The secondary effect in the case of GH1 is to include real world 
objects into the content of a work of fiction. This can be so because of the presup-
positions associated with proper names in assertions. It is difficult for GH1 to in-
clude real world objects in fiction if it is not an assertion. Further, GH1 is changing 
the presuppositions of those who know nothing about the geography of Manches-
ter, which is the essential effect. Consequently, the secondary effect is explained in 
terms of the essential effect. Thus, assertions in fiction fit Stalnaker's fourth criteri-
on. 
 





I will explain the assertions in Schindler’s Ark to further substantiate my ex-
planation of assertions in fiction as assertions made with a secondary effect. I do 
this for two reasons. First, the assertions in Schindler’s Ark have a different purpose 
and effect than those in Mary Barton. Instead of being used for setting the scene, 
they are used for telling a true story. The success of my explanation, in this case, 
will show that it can work in a variety of cases, and that it can address the 
longstanding problems that the assertions in fiction cause for previous theories of 
fiction. 
Assertions in Schindler’s Ark meet Stalnaker’s criteria for assertions made 
with a secondary effect. Many assertions in this book retain their essential effect of 
expressing the author’s beliefs and changing the presuppositions of the audience 
by informing them about the states of affairs in both Germany and Poland during 
the Second World War. 
However, these assertions also have a secondary effect: contributing to the 
content of a work of fiction. The essential effect of changing the presupposition 
shared by the author and audience is necessary to achieve the secondary effect of 
including real world objects and events in the plot of a work of fiction. These real 
world objects are embedded in the presuppositions of the assertion; it would be 
impossible to have the secondary effect without the essential one.  
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War and Peace 
 
 The assertions in Tolstoy’s (2005) War and Peace are equally, yet differently 
problematic for previous theories of fiction. They have a different contribution to 
the content of a work of fiction — rather than setting the scene or being part of 
the plot, they express Tolstoy’s own argument about history. For example, in part 
two of the epilogue, Tolstoy (2005) says, “History seems to assume that such pow-
er is universally acknowledged and can be taken for granted” (p. 1321). 
 The quote demonstrates both the essential and secondary effect of an as-
sertion. The essential effect is Tolstoy expressing his view on the ideology behind 
many works of history. The secondary effect is to indicate that he wants to use the 
epic story in his book War and Peace as part of his argument for his view of history. 
The essential effect demonstrates that he wants to argue for his view of history. 
The secondary effect could not exist without the essential effect. 
 However, both works of fiction and works of nonfiction can include a made 
up story to argue for a particular point, so it initially appears that this type of sec-
ondary effect is not unique to fiction. I disagree with this assessment — Tolstoy’s 
assertions in the quote are not only about how well his story supports his point or 
whether his point is right. Rather, they are also about how his story shows his point 
and provides material for him to argue for it. Thus, even if the content of the asser-
tion is implausible, one can value how the author relates his point to other parts of 
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his work. Even if one disagrees with Tolstoy’s point in the aforementioned quote, 
he can still appreciate whether Tolstoy has created a good story as to argue for or 
make the audience feel this point.  
 
Assertions in Fiction as a Type of Assertion 
 
To differentiate assertions in fiction from assertions in nonfiction beyond 
these three examples, I propose a theory regarding the role of assertions in fiction. 
This theory needs to be inclusive, because, as seen in the assertions in three differ-
ent works of fiction, assertions in fiction contribute to the content of a work of fic-
tion in many different ways. I propose to explain assertions in fiction in light of my 
theory of fiction, because it allows me to plausibly explain the role of assertions in 
fiction. 
My theory of fiction states: 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or 
any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior 
properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work 
in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in ques-
tion. 
 
If fiction is defined in terms of how it is comprehended, it is reasonable to 
explain assertions in fiction, which are parts of fiction, in terms of how they con-
tribute to the comprehension of a work of fiction.  My explanation of assertions in 
fiction is the following: 
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Assertions in fiction are made for a secondary effect. They are never only 
made for their essential effects, and their secondary effects are what set 
them apart from assertions in nonfiction. The secondary effect of assertions 
in fiction is to contribute to how the author or any other audience values 
the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end by its rela-
tion to other parts of the work of fiction.  
 
 I do not specify how assertions in fiction contribute to how a work of fiction 
is valued in the explanation, because they impact evaluation in many different 
ways, as I have previously demonstrated with GH1, Schindler’s Ark, and War and 
Peace. Therefore, the exact manner of contribution should be left vague to allow 
for the variety of contributions assertions can make. Finally, I include the specifica-
tion “by its relation to other parts of the fiction” in light of GH1 and Tolstoy’s 
quote, which show that assertions in fiction normally contribute to the evaluation 
of a work of fiction by how they relate to the other parts of that work of fiction.  
 
Assertions in Fiction and the Categorisation of Fiction 
 
 My explanation of the role of assertions in fiction is helpful for explaining 
why assertions in fiction cannot affect the fictive status of the work that contains 
them, because it includes Stalnaker’s (1999) idea of the secondary effect. His ex-
amples of assertions made for a secondary effect show that the secondary effect of 
an assertion is determined by its context. Assertions in negotiations are made for a 
secondary effect of leading to a counterproposal, but assertions made in Congress 
have different secondary effects (p. 87). Therefore, the context of making an asser-
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tion determines whether the assertion in question has any secondary effects and if 
so, what they are. 
Following this, assertions in fiction cannot affect the fictive status of the 
work that contains them, because to do otherwise leads to circularity. Suppose 
that an assertion in fiction affects whether the work that contains it is a work of 
fiction, and recall the point that the effect of an assertion in fiction is determined 
by the context in which it is found in that work of fiction. Consequently, the effect 
of an assertion is determined by its context, and if the status of a work of fiction is 
determined by whether it contains assertions, then the assertions in that work of 
fiction will also determine whether they themselves are found in a work of fiction, 
which is circular. 
 Additionally, I argue that assertions in fiction do not change a work of fic-
tion to be a work of nonfiction using an analogy between assertions in fiction and 
assertions in communication. There are many similarities between assertions in 
fiction and assertions in negotiation. Both cases consist of complexes of utteranc-
es. Both cases involve many different types of speech-acts, such as questions and 
requests. As I have demonstrated in my point on the secondary effects of asser-
tions in fiction, both of these contexts determine whether or not the assertions 
have a secondary effect. Also, both of their secondary effects are not affected if 
their essential effects are rejected; and both of their secondary effects are ex-
plained in terms of their essential effects, as I have previously explained. Thus, if 
assertions in a negotiation do not change its category of communication from ne-
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gotiation to something else, then assertions in fiction also do not change the cate-
gory of communication of the work that contains them, from fiction to nonfiction.  
 
Why Are Assertions in Fiction a Problem for Other Theories? 
 
 I have shown that assertions in fiction contribute to the evaluation of a 
work of fiction in many different ways. I have also shown that they cannot change 
the status of a work from being a work of fiction to being a work of nonfiction. 
Then why has this issue become so problematic for so many imagination-based 
theories? This is because they do not allow the expression of belief (i.e. assertions) 
to be a purpose of utterances in a work of fiction. Imagination-based theories take 
imagination to be a necessary condition; and if one imagines that p, he does not 
believe that p. Therefore, imagination-based theories do not allow a work of fiction 
to serve the purpose of expressing the author’s belief. Therefore, though they can 
dismiss the cases like GH1 as scene setting for further imagination, they cannot ex-
plain cases like Schindler’s Ark and War and Peace. This is because the expression 
of the author’s belief is a main (though not only) goal for these two works of fic-
tion; and as I specified before, the roles of assertions in these works of fiction high-
light the importance of the expression of the author’s belief as the main goal of 
these two works. Thus, assertions in fiction are not an independent issue for imag-
ination-based accounts. Rather, assertions’ various contributions to works of fic-
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tion highlight a fundamental failure of imagination-based theories in terms of their 
understanding of the variety of the purposes of works of fiction. 
 
Conclusion to Part 2 
 
In this section, I have argued that an assertion in a work of fiction is an as-
sertion with a secondary effect. While it retains the essential effect possessed by 
other assertions, including being an expression of belief and being an attempt to 
change the beliefs of an audience, it also has a secondary effect of contributing to 
the end value of the experience of apprehending a work of fiction. This secondary 
effect is determined by the context of being in a work of fiction, so it cannot 





In this chapter, I have constructed my own theory of fiction and then 
demonstrated its plausibility by using it to address many major problems that oth-
er definitions of fiction cannot. 
I began by delineating the two pillars of my theory: authorial intention and 
non-systematic processing. As non-systematic processing was originally a social 
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science idea and not a philosophical one, I modified it to make it philosophically 
sound using the well-known concepts of interior properties, phenomenal concept, 
and end value. I then stated my definition of fiction thus: 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or 
any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior 
properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work 
in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in ques-
tion. 
 
I then went on to use my definition to address all the major, persistent 
problems that previous definitions of fiction fail to plausibly solve, including the 
status of In Cold Blood, faction, and Schindler’s Ark. I discussed why so many previ-
ous theorists thought that imagination was a necessary component of a definition 
of fiction and demonstrated that it is not and why this is the case, before going to 
address further issues for previous definitions of fiction, including factually correct 
fiction and mental fiction. 
I ended by using my definition to solve the one remaining major problems 
for definitions of fiction: the role of assertions in fiction. Using Stalnaker’s theory of 
secondary effects, I showed that assertions in fiction are different from assertions 
in nonfiction because they have a secondary effect that other assertions do not. I 
created my own explanation of assertions, and stated it thus: 
Assertions in fiction are made for a secondary effect. They are never only 
made for their essential effects, and their secondary effects are what set 
them apart from assertions in nonfiction. The secondary effect of assertions 
in fiction is to contribute to how the author or any other audience values 
the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end by its rela-
tion to other parts of the work of fiction. 
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 I then discussed why assertions cause so many problems for other theories 
of fiction, and showed how my theory works with a wide range of assertions in fic-
tion. In doing all of this, I have shown that my theory is not only plausible; it also 











Addressing Some Final Issues about Fiction and My Definition 
 
In this chapter, I will clarify some subtleties of my account, and use my ac-
count to address some difficult issues that have not yet been properly addressed 
by other accounts of fiction. Addressing these issues will further delineate the 
plausibility of my definition of fiction. I will separate this chapter into two parts.  
In the first part, I will address possible criticisms and clarify some important 
ideas in my definition of fiction, including what the experience of apprehending a 
work of fiction includes, the idea of a work, the difference between end value and 
aesthetic value, and the philosophical plausibility of my way of using phenomenal 
concept for constructing my definition. 
In the second part, I will showcase the advantages of my definition. I will 
address several difficult cases of the categorisation of works of fiction, including 
myths, Roman historiographies, and Sergei Prokofiev’s composition Peter and the 
Wolf. Afterwards, I also argue how my account justifies an important point from 
Carroll about how works of narrative art serve a moral purpose. My definition pro-
vides ideas to justify his theory in the cases of works of fiction, without committing 
to his point. Therefore, my definition contributes to at least one debate related to 
fiction without being affected by the result of this debate. In this way, I also show 
that it is plausible for my theory to claim that works of fiction can serve a moral 
purpose, because it complements an important theory on the way in which a work 
of fiction can do so.  
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Part 1  
Defending my Definition of Fiction from Possible Criticisms: Four Supplements of 
My Definition 
 
 Although I do not see any need to add any further conditions to my account 
of fiction, I do see the need to respond to some cases that appear to challenge my 
account. In responding to these cases, I will not only provide defences for my 
definition, but also clarify the subtleties of my account.  
 
 
Supplement 1: The Case of Changing the Experience of Apprehending a Work 
 
 My definition focuses on the experience of apprehending a work of fiction 
(i.e. reading a novel, listening to a radio broadcast, and watching a film). One may 
ask whether one can produce a work of representation about certain fabricated 
events and intend his audience to initially believe the events to be factual, but later 
find out that he was intentionally fabricating the content in a way that imitates 
genuine works of nonfiction30. It is important to note the author has to want the 
audience to find out about the deception shortly after being deceived, or this case 
will be too similar to lies or discredited works of journalism. 
Although there is no exact example of fiction for this point, there are similar 
cases in which the author creates a work of fiction that imitates the style of a work 
                                                 
30
 I faced this issue when I presented a preliminary edition of my definition of fiction at the Ad-
vanced Research Seminar at King’s College London. I found this issue challenging and not very well 
explored, so I saw the need to answer it in my project.  
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of nonfiction. For example, Orson Welles’s radio broadcast The War of the Worlds 
(1938) imitated the style of an actual radio news broadcast of the time, although 
he and his team were actually reading a work of fiction: H. G. Wells’s novel of the 
same name [see Campbell (2011) and Lovgen (2005)].  However, there is no evi-
dence that Welles and his team wanted anyone to be fooled by the broadcast, 
though many initially were. Moreover, there is a genre of film called mockumen-
taries, which focuses on imitating the style of documentary films without actually 
creating them. For a historical introduction to this genre of film, see Thomas 
Doherty (2003). 
This case is not difficult for my theory. The author may want the audience 
to experience the compelling, odd, and unsettling experience of listening to a 
broadcast of a work of science fiction in the style of a news broadcast. They may 
intend the audience to value this strange experience of listening as an end.  
Nevertheless, what if Welles did want his audience to initially believe his 
broadcast to be genuine and then recognise it as a hoax? My theory still categoris-
es Welles’s The War of the Worlds in this possible case as a work of fiction. I ex-
plain this categorisation with my first supplement: the experience of apprehending 
a work also includes a secondary experience. A secondary experience here means 
the experience of other experiences, including the change of experience in particu-
lar. In this case, the experience in my definition of fiction means the experience of 
changing from one experience to another experience, for example, changing from 
an experience in which one initially takes the content of a work as factual to an ex-
perience in which one recognises that the content is fabricated. 
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 One may further argue that the inclusion of a secondary experience may be 
ad hoc. First, there is no reason to do so apart from including the possible case of 
Welles’s The War of the Worlds. Second, this approach will lead to nth level experi-
ence, which is strange.  
To respond to the first argument, the reasoning for including a secondary 
experience of apprehending a work of fiction lies in the idea of a work of fiction. 
The debate on the definition of fiction focuses on defining what a work of fiction is, 
not what a text of fiction is. Lamarque (2010) noted that there is no clear definition 
of work apart from two necessities; the role of author and what is produced by the 
author (pp. 165-6). Therefore, the idea of work31 does not need to be confined to 
the text, audio, or audiovisual elements, it can include the participation of the au-
dience.  
 Given this background knowledge, there are two distinct and independent 
ways to justify my inclusion of a secondary experience. First, the counterfactual 
case of Welles’s broadcast is like those works of theatre that include audience par-
ticipation, though the author retains control over the plot line or at least the possi-
ble plot lines of the play. In these two cases, the author wants audiences to experi-
ence a change of their experience of what is produced by the author. Therefore, 
their change of experience is carefully planned by the author as a part of the work, 
though this part is carried out by the audience themselves, albeit under strict guid-
                                                 
31
 I stress that my project is committed to only very minimal understanding of work, namely the 
role of the author and what he produces. I even leave the room of interpreting these two necessi-
ties. I also am open to the inclusion of other criteria for defining work. This is unrelated to my pro-
ject.  
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ance from the author. Thus, the experience of apprehension for cases like this is to 
experience a change of experience.  
 The second way to justify my inclusion of a secondary experience is to un-
derstand the works like the possible case of The War of the Worlds is to regard the 
experience of the change of experience as simply a more complex experience of 
apprehending the work of fiction. This experience consists of three parts: the in-
tended experience of taking the work as stating facts, the experience of recognis-
ing that the content of his work is fabricated, and valuing the experience of this 
change of experience as an end. The prerequisite is that the experience of this 
change is intended by the author and is intended to be valued as an end.  
Will This Lead to Nth Level Experience? 
 
 While I have argued for including a secondary experience into the reading 
of my idea of the experience of apprehending a work of fiction, I shall respond to 
the claim that this may lead to a case of nth level experience. I admit that it may be 
metaphysically possible. However, this does not threaten my definition of fiction. 
In both of my lines of reasoning, an important reason for including a secondary ex-
perience is that the secondary experience in question is intended by the author of 
fiction when he produces the work. Thus, the problem of a case of nth level of ex-
perience happens only if an author of a work of fiction plans an nth level experi-
ence for the audiences or himself when he produces the work of fiction. Such a 
work of fiction does not yet exist. I have not even seen a work of fiction made for 
eliciting a third level experience yet. I cannot imagine how any author of a work of 
fiction could plan to elicit a case of nth level of experience for the audience or him-
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self meticulously. Furthermore, a question about some remote possibility, like the 
problem of nth level experience does not concern my current project because the 
debate about the definition of fiction is mainly about the actual world.  
 
Supplement 2: The Idea of Work 
 
 I have made use of the idea of work in the last supplement. Although I claim 
that I make a minimal commitment to the idea of works of fiction in this project, I 
see the need to clarify how I understand the idea of work in the context of the cur-
rent project, to clarify and strengthen my definition of fiction, as well as the last 
supplement.   
The baseline for my understanding of work is that it includes authorial in-
tention and the product of this intention, such as text, moving images, recorded 
sound etc. Lamarque (2010) emphasises that a written work is more than just a 
text (semantics and syntax). It also includes the conventions that govern its appre-
ciation and production. More importantly, two identical texts are not necessarily 
the same work (p. 166). Thus, as part of the convention of apprehending a work of 
representation, audiences should sometimes also pay attention to background in-
formation about the production of the text, such as a background of the author 
and his intentions. 
Nevertheless, Lamarque (2010) maintains that the idea of what a work is 
precisely is unclear, as it is not clear what background information should be in-
cluded and what should not be included:  
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“The text/work distinction is an instance of a broader distinction running 
across all the arts and indeed other cultural objects, between that which 
possesses only physical (or ‘natural’) properties and that which is ‘practice 
dependent’, cultural, and intentional” (p. 165). 
 
 
By “intentional”, Lamarque (2010) means something that represents an ob-
ject other than itself or expresses a certain meaning (p. 165). He does not state 
clearly what the practice dependent, cultural, and intentional properties of an ob-
ject are. This is indeed extremely difficult to specify, because there are many media 
of arts. There are different cultures and practices that are specific to each medium, 
and different cultures and practices for different traditions within each medium. 
Therefore, it is not realistic to specify all the properties involved in a work. Follow-
ing this, it is plausible to leave the idea of work vague.  
Nevertheless, Lamarque’s exposition states clearly that the idea of work in-
cludes the context of production, which certainly includes the role of the author 
regarding his intention about his work of fiction. Thus, the idea of work in my cur-
rent project justifies the emphasis on the role of the author of a work of fiction 
when defining fiction; even though this point hardly needs any further justification 
since all definitions of fiction addressed in the current project, including mine, 
share this emphasis. 
 
Supplement 3: End Value Does Not Mean Aesthetic or Artistic Value 
 
 Another possible criticism for my definition of fiction is that my account ex-
cludes many novels that are of very low aesthetic value, e.g. many romantic novels 
with cheesy plots and bad writing. In response, this criticism assumes that end val-
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ue in my definition is identical to aesthetic value; and I make no such assumption 
when I include the idea of end value.  
I get this idea from Kagan; he also does not make this assumption when 
speaking of end value. Kagan (1998) gives an example of end value that has noth-
ing to do with aesthetic or artistic value:  
 
“Consider the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proc-
lamation, freeing the slaves. Clearly, this pen had considerable instrumental 
value—it was the actual means by which a great deal of intrinsic good was 
brought into the world. But it seems to me that we might want to say 
something more than this. It seems to me that we might want to suggest 
that this pen has intrinsic value, that the continued existence of this pen 
has value as an end. Of course, the pen’s defining instrumental moment is 
now long since over. But by virtue of that history, we might way, it now 
possesses intrinsic value: it is something we could reasonable value for its 
own sake” (p. 285). 
 
 In the last sentence of this quote, Kagan (1998) spells out his identification 
between end value and intrinsic value, but this does not concern me. What matters 
is that he puts end value in another way: valuing it for its own sake. This is the idea 
of end value that I use for categorising the experience of apprehending a work of 
fiction. This is also the idea that some people might mistake as identifying fiction 
with aesthetic value, artistic value, or literary value32.  
  Fortunately, Kagan’s example also rebuts this point. He writes clearly that 
the pen Lincoln used for signing the Emancipation Proclamation is valued for its 
own sake because of its history of being the pen (1) that was used by Lincoln; and 
(2) that was used for signing the Emancipation Proclamation. It has nothing to do 
                                                 
32
 I faced this misunderstanding when I presented a preliminary edition of my definition of fiction at 
the Advanced Research Seminar at King’s College London.  
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with any aesthetic or artistic value the pen might have. The pen could be the most 
common and ugliest pen from that period of time, and can still have this intrinsic 
value because of its history.  
 This idea can be applied to my use of the experience of apprehension. Alt-
hough both aesthetic value and artistic value can be end value, they are not the 
only types of end value. When I claim that the experience of apprehending a work 
of fiction ought to have end value, I do not mean it that this end value is always 
aesthetic or artistic value. I only mean that the work ought to be valued for its own 
sake: the experience of apprehension should be valued regardless of anything dis-
tinct from the experience itself.  
I will now provide a more practical elaboration of my point on end value. A 
work of fiction is commonly evaluated by its plot. In cases like this, the end value of 
the experience can be how funny that plot is, how sad that plot is, or how intricate 
that plot is. The end value of the plot could even be how cheesy it is. 
The emphasis is on how a person values the plot of a particular work of fic-
tion. There are many funny or sad or intricate plots. Thus, how a person values the 
plot of a particular work of fiction matters because the author of a work of fiction 
intends his audience to evaluate the experience of apprehension of the features of 
a work of fiction, not the generalised concept of funny, sad, or intricate plots. This 
experience of apprehension (reading, watching, or listening etc.) is unique for each 
work of fiction, as there is no work of fiction that is identical as long as I count the 
context of production related to its author.  
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Supplement Four: Defending My Use of Phenomenal Concept in Constructing My 
Definition 
 
 My definition of fiction is founded on the experience of apprehension. I de-
velop this idea from Papineau’s account of phenomenal concept. He argues that 
the initial experience of apprehension plays an irreplaceable role in acquiring a 
phenomenal concept. I take his idea of the phenomenal concept as one of the the-
oretical foundations of my definition. If Papineau is wrong, it does not mean that 
my definition of fiction is to be rejected. It only means that the emphasis on the 
experience of apprehension in my definition is produced by interpreting social sci-
ence findings alone, rather than social science findings and philosophy of mind.   
 To defend the philosophical foundation of my emphasis on the experience 
of apprehension in my definition of fiction, I will rebut an argument by Derek Ball 
(2009). He does not think that the initial experience of apprehension is necessary 
for any phenomenal concept, so phenomenal concept is not a philosophical con-
cept about subjective experience.   
 
Derek Ball’s Attacks on the Idea of Phenomenal Concept 
 
 Ball (2009) tries to undermine a range of accounts of phenomenal concepts, 
including Papineau’s. He argues that a scientist, Mary, can possess the concept of 
what it is like to see red in the room to which she is confined that does not afford 
her the possibility of ever seeing any red objects. Therefore, a phenomenal concept 
that Mary possesses only after her release, such as that proposed by Papineau, 
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does not exist (p. 948) [For the background of Mary the scientist33, see Jackson 
(1986)]. 
Ball’s (2009) first premise is that concepts (including phenomenal concepts) 
in general are deferential. By deferential, Ball means that a language user acquires 
the concept of a word if he interacts with a linguistic community that uses the 
word. Whether or not the person has accurate beliefs about the concept, he still 
grasps the concept (p. 944-7). 
Ball (2009) substantiates his first premise with Tyler Burge’s arthritis 
thought experiment (p.944-7). Burge’s (1979) thought experiment is about a given 
person (whom I call John) who claims to have arthritis. John shares a lot of correct 
attitudes about arthritis with many competent users. Yet, he mistakenly thinks that 
                                                 
33 Mary is a figure mentioned in an argument by Frank Jackson, in which he argues that there are 
non-physical properties. Jackson shows his understanding of physical properties in premise 2. I 
summarise Jackson’s (1986) knowledge argument as the following: 
 
1. “Mary is kept in a black room, so she only experiences the colours black and white. 
2. She knows every physical fact about seeing the colour red, including the knowledge of 
physics, chemistry, neurophysiology, and an understanding of causal relationships 
3. Mary learned what it is like to see red after she was released from the black and white 
environment. 
4. From 3, Mary learned at least one new fact that is not included in premise 2. 
5. If physicalism is true, premise 4 is false. This is because if physicalism is true, Mary would 
have known all the facts about the world, such that premise 4 will be false.   
6. Following from premises 4 and 5, physicalism is false” (p. 291). 
 
Papineau (2002) denies Jackson’s inference of 4 from 3. According to Papineau, Jackson 
assumes that the subject has the new experience of seeing the colour red if and only if she 
acquaints herself with at least one fact that she does not know before her release.  
 
Papineau denies this assumption, and thus denies the inference of 4 from 3 (p. 68). Unlike Jackson, 
Papineau (2002) regards the change in Mary’s knowledge after her release only as Mary acquiring a 
new concept of seeing red. The new concept is acquired by her new experience of the colour.  Yet 
the new concept refers to the same physical property that Mary identifies with the colour red, such 
as the property of red as a particular wavelength of light hitting a person’s retina. Therefore, both 
pre-release Mary and post-release Mary think of the same physical property identified with seeing 
the colour red. The before-after difference in premise 3 of the knowledge argument should be 
interpreted as Mary having a new way of thinking about seeing the colour red. Thus, Mary’s new 
experience does not acquaint her with any non-material fact. Following this reading, the knowledge 
argument fails to show that there are non-physical properties (p. 51).   
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his thigh is arthritic. Once a doctor corrects this belief, John then asks what actually 
is wrong with his thigh (pp. 77-9).  
According to Ball’s (2009) deferential approach, John grasps the concept of 
arthritis by interacting with a linguistic community that uses the word. Thus, he 
denies that there are concepts that cannot be grasped unless the subject has an 
initial experience of them (pp. 946). Similarly, Mary’s phenomenal concept of 
seeing red can be acquired by her relation to her linguistic community, so it is not 
necessary for her to any initial experience to possess her concept of seeing red. As 
a result, the case of the acquisition of a phenomenal concept necessarily requiring 
an initial experience, like the one proposed by Papineau, does not exist. 
Ball’s argument can be summarised into four propositions (his first premise 
becomes proposition 1): 
1. All phenomenal concepts can be acquired deferentially. 
2. If phenomenal concepts can be acquired via a subject’s connection to a 
linguistic community, these concepts can be acquired without the sub-
ject’s initial experience.  
3. The phenomenal concept of seeing red is a phenomenal concept. 
4. Therefore, following from 1&2&3, phenomenal concepts, in general, can 
be acquired without the subject’s initial experience. 
 
Rebutting Ball’s Argument 
 
I defend Papineau’s phenomenal concept against Ball’s argument by show-
ing that either proposition 1 or 2 is false. If Mary acquires her phenomenal concept 
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of seeing red deferentially, then she must possess the initial experience to acquire 
this concept. Following this, either proposition 1 or 2 is false. As a result, Ball’s ar-
gument is unsound.  
The foundation of Ball’s proposition 1 is his application of Burge’s arthritis 
thought experiment. Burge (1979, pp. 78-9) mentions a counterfactual case in 
which there is an exact replica of John (I call him C John). They are the same in 
every respect, including their phenomenal experiences, personal history, biology, 
and even their many correct beliefs about arthritis. Yet C John does not grasp the 
concept of arthritis, because all the speakers in his community have a different 
convention. They apply the concept of arthritis to areas outside the joints, 
including the thigh. In the case of John and C John, the physical environment is the 
same, while the social environment is different.  
Mary’s case is the opposite. Her physical environment is different, but her 
social environment is the same in terms of the linguistic convention, so Burge’s 
thought experiment cannot be used to explain Mary acquiring the phenomenal 
concept of seeing red. Putnam’s (1975) famous twin Earth thought experiment is 
far more similar to Mary’s case. This thought experiment, very briefly summarised, 
is that H2O is the necessary and sufficient condition for anything to be regarded as 
water in the Earth. In contrast, water in twin Earth, where everything is identical to 
our world, is composed of something entirely different that is abbreviated as XYZ. 
Because of the difference in their environments, a person called Oscar in our Earth 
and his identical twin Oscar in twin Earth have very different concepts of “water” 
(p. 222-7). 
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The similarity between Mary’s and the twin Oscar’s cases is that they both 
use the word differently from the agreed usage in the normal earth community 
because of the abnormality in their empirical environments. In the case of Mary, 
no red object is available to her. Similarly to the twin Oscar, Mary is not in the lin-
guistic community that has acquired the phenomenal concept of seeing red before 
her release because of the difference in her physical environment. I call the similar-
ity between twin Oscar and pre-release Mary the Oscar-Mary analogy. 
Following from the Oscar-Mary analogy, if Mary does not have the experi-
ence of seeing red, she is not connected to the linguistic community that uses the 
phenomenal concept of seeing red correctly. Therefore, if Mary is connected to the 
linguistic community that uses the phenomenal concept of seeing red correctly, it 
is necessary for her to have the initial experience of seeing red.  
Following this, either the initial experience of seeing red is necessary for 
Mary to acquire the phenomenal concept of seeing red, or her phenomenal con-
cept of seeing red cannot be acquired deferentially. With either result, Ball’s argu-
ment is shown to be unsound, so it must be rejected. As a result, I have defended 
Papineau’s phenomenal concept, and have thus defended one of my philosophical 
foundations for using the experience of apprehension to define fiction. 
 
Part 2 
The Advantages of My Definition As Shown by Its Ability to Resolve Difficult Cas-
es for Definitions of Fiction in General 
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 After defending and clarifying my definition of fiction against some poten-
tial problems, I will now further demonstrate the plausibility of my definition by 
using it to solve some difficult issues for definitions of fiction in general, and 
demonstrate how it provides a theoretical foundation for other debates related to 
fiction, including the moral value of works of fiction. 
 
Myths as Fictions 
 
For my first case, I will show how my account can explain how to categorise 
whether myths are works of fiction or not, while imagination-based accounts can-
not. R. M. Sainsbury (2010) believes that imagination-based theories cannot ex-
plain why myths are taken as works of fiction: 
 
“There is one category which we need to include [as fiction], but which our 
Currie-style account [i.e. imagination-based theories] excludes: myth. 
Myths are typically not propounded as myths, but start life propounded 
and accepted as truths. Should we regard them as fiction at that early 
stage? Presumably not. They are taken too seriously. Recountings of them 
are intended to secure or reinforce belief rather make-believe. They start to 
count as myths when they cease to be believed, even though they are still 
in some sense accepted. They are counterexamples to the claim that fic-
tionality depends upon being produced with fictive intentions”(p. 21). 
 
 
 In this quote, Sainsbury is so sure that myths are works of fiction. Yet, he 
does not provide a lot of reasons for being so sure apart from how these works are 
received. Sainsbury regards myths as works of fiction solely because of the way 
that they are valued in the 21st century. This is not a good reason for labelling a 
work of representation as a work of fiction. I have rejected the role of the audience 
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in defining whether a work of representation is a work of fiction in Chapter 1 with 
the case of mental fiction. Therefore, Sainsbury’s reason is insufficient. Even 
though I agree with Sainsbury that myths are not history, I think that whether 
myths are works of fiction or works of nonfiction is a very complicated issue.   
First, the content and writing style of many myths is similar to many works 
of fiction. From their writing styles, which include some unbelievable content, such 
as that about gods or wizards, it is tempting to believe that the authors of the 
myths intended to produce a work of fiction.  
Nevertheless, similarity to other works of fiction is not an important point 
in my definition. In my definition, the intention of the authors is a decisive factor. 
This is the second important point. Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence 
regarding the intention of authors of many myths. It is far from clear whether 
these authors intended these works to be comprehended non-systematically, as 
specified in my definition, or to be comprehended as works mainly made for telling 
facts. There is insufficient evidence to take myths as a case of works like Schindler’s 
Ark, in which the author induces non-systematic processing for the audience to 
learn and reflect on historical facts by the experience of apprehending the work 
and focusing on the interior properties of the writing, like plots or characterisation.   
Even so, it may be plausible to take myths as another case of Schindler’s Ark 
and regard them as works of fiction for this reason. It is not clear whether myths 
are intended by their authors to be taken literally as history. For the sake of argu-
ment, I shall first suppose that they were not intended to be taken literally, then 
suppose that they were to demonstrate the results that occur with each supposi-
tion.   
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First, I suppose that the authors of myths do not want their works to be 
evaluated literally. This interpretation allows them to ensure that the facts and 
plots in their works are mostly correct, just like Schindler’s Ark, but also to fabricate 
the details, such as how different events happen, descriptions, and dialogue with-
out any intention to be correct, but rather to enhance the experience of reading, 
though they want their readers to learn something by valuing their reading experi-
ence as an end and by focussing on the interior properties of the writing. If so, 
myths are works of fiction in my definition. I have delineated my rationale for this 
in Chapter 6 to explain how Keneally uses Schindler’s Ark to achieve his instrumen-
tal goals of telling facts without preventing his work from being a work of fiction. 
With this rationale and my definition, these myths are works of fiction, and they 
may be the earliest works of fiction. 
The second interpretation supposes that the authors wanted their works to 
be considered to be literally true. In this interpretation, the authors of myths wrote 
something that is very unlikely to be telling facts from a 21st-century perspective, 
but they wholeheartedly believed that they were writing about the facts and 
wanted their audiences to take their works as telling facts. They wanted their audi-
ences to focus on taking their writings as true and to learn from it. They might have 
made efforts to make it easier or more entertaining to read, but their focus was on 
facts and truth rather than the interior properties of the myth or apprehension ex-
perience. If this is the case, then these works are just bad histories, they are not 
works of fictions.  
Following from this result, if the authors do want the audience to take the 
work literally, then Sainsbury’s intuition of regarding myths as works of fiction 
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needs to be explained away. In my view, audiences, especially literature experts 
after the Industrial Revolution, value and experience myths in such a way as if they 
are works of fiction, though they are not. They do so for two reasons. The first is 
the remarkable similarity between myths and works of fiction. Like works of fiction, 
myths are well-written and are often pleasurable to read. Also, many myths ex-
press moral messages, as do many works of fiction. The second is that these liter-
ary scholars are trying to maximise the value of these works in post-Industrial Rev-
olution societies. This is because, as I have mentioned, these works are just very 
bad works of history (at least with my second supposition on the authors’ inten-
tion). Without re-categorisation, they are worthless. However, literary scholars find 
that they deserve a lot of attention because of the experience of apprehending 
them as well as many of their interior properties, such as excellent rhetorical fea-
tures. Thus, they find that these works would be invaluable if they were works of 
fiction, and thus take them as works of fiction to highlight their value in this regard. 
Thus, Sainsbury’s categorisation of myths is too hasty. When applying my 
definition of fiction, I do not see a definite answer on whether myths are works of 
fiction or works of nonfiction because of the lack of knowledge about the authors’ 
intentions. If the authors of myths did not intend their mythical works to be taken 
as literally true, then myths are fictions produced with an instrumental purpose, 
like Schindler’s Ark. If the authors of myths did intend their works to be taken as 
literally true, then their works are not fiction. Yet, they are still valued as if they 
were works of fiction, because doing so allows literary experts to find out and high-




Roman Historiography as Nonfiction 
 
Roman historiographies are similar to myths, because they contain many 
untrue utterances and fabricated events. Yet, despite the similarities, Roman histo-
riographies are not regarded as being works of fiction. Indeed, they are works of 
nonfiction. While I do not intend to provide a definite answer for every work in 
such as the massive category of writings, I will still explain why Roman histori-
ographies are not works of fiction.  
Roman historiography becomes important in the debate about the defini-
tion of fiction when Friend (2012) uses it as a counterexample to those imagina-
tion-based accounts of fiction: 
 
“According to the ancient Roman conception of history that had a defining 
influence on European historiography in the fifteenth to seventeenth cen-
turies, the point of history was to provide moral and especially political in-
struction through examples (Nadel 1964). The choice of examples and the 
way they were treated constituted aesthetic and didactic decisions, not mo-
tivated primarily by fidelity to the facts” (p. 185). 
 
 
This passage once again shows the difficulty of defining fiction in terms of 
intentionally untrue or imaginative utterances. Carroll (2016) proposes that Roman 
historiographies were made with the focus on telling facts, though he thinks that 
the fabricated details are there to make the work more vivid:  
 
“The practice of ancient historians to invent speeches and battle details was 
an acknowledged convention meant to vividly put the events before the lis-
tener’s or reader’s eyes (a standard expression). It was an invitation to 
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mentally visualize the events, rather like the more prosaic pictorial illustra-
tions in some of our history textbooks. It was not an invitation to entertain 
the occurrence of the events as unassisted” (p. 370). 
 
 
 I agree with Carroll that ancient history books were made for asserting cer-
tain points. Carroll’s point is that this criticism from Friend is not problematic for 
imagination-based accounts, as the fabricated details are only aids for the visuali-
sation of events.  
However, Carroll’s explanation can be applied to works like Schindler’s Ark 
and thus produce a disastrous result to imagination-based accounts. It is uncontro-
versial to claim that Schindler’s Ark asserts the events as they actually happened. 
Further, it is also uncontroversial to claim that the dialogues and descriptions in 
Schindler’s Ark are invitations for audiences to mentally visualise these events. Car-
roll regards Roman historiographies as works of nonfiction for these two reasons, 
so he also must regard Schindler’s Ark as a work of nonfiction for these two rea-
sons. Further, another work of fiction, War and Peace, also satisfies these two rea-
sons. Thus, while his explanation may save imagination-based accounts from being 
too inclusive, and wrongly including Roman history books as works of fiction, his 
explanation also commits imagination-based accounts to be too exclusive, and ex-
clude some iconic works of fiction that are made for telling facts like Schindler’s 
Ark, War and Peace, and Romance of the Three Kingdoms.  
The problem produced by Carroll’s defence once again shows that my ac-
count is a more preferable option compared to imagination-based theories. My 
definition of fiction excludes Roman historiographies from being works of fiction 
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without excluding works of fiction that are made for telling facts from being works 
of fiction.  
Although my account also excludes this problematic case of Roman histori-
ographies by focusing on author’s intention like Carroll, the focus on my account is 
on different aspects of the authors’ intentions. As far as I see in Friend’s (2012) 
elaboration, quoted before, the writers in question are not too concerned about 
whether the audiences focus on the interior properties of the writing like its style, 
neither are they concerned about how readers value their experience of reading as 
an end; instead, they intend readers to focus on learning in their apprehension.  
Thus, their intentions fail to satisfy my definition of fiction. Unlike the case of 
Schindler’s Ark, these writers wanted their audiences to focus on finding out and 
accepting certain didactic points. This difference in the intended focus prevents 
these works from being works of fiction in my account.  
Although Friend claims that the authors are concerned about the aesthetic 
value of their writing, a well-written didactic work is very different from a work of 
fiction. A main advantage of my account, the ability to differentiate works of fiction 
made for telling facts from works of nonfiction made with intentional fabrications, 
is significant again in problematic or borderline cases like this. Making a didactic 
work easy to read does not mean wanting to the audience to take the interior 
properties and the end value of their reading experience as the foci of apprehen-
sion. I have explained the reason for this when I explain how my definition ex-
cludes In Cold Blood from being a work of fiction. Therefore, the authors’ possible 




The Limit of Fiction 
I have gone through several complicated and commonly mentioned issues 
in the debate about the definition of fiction. There is also a scarcely mentioned but 
also complicated issue: whether there is any work of fiction in the medium of non-
narrative art. By narrative, I only mean a description of a sequence of events. In-
deed, one may claim that Sergei Prokofiev’s music Peter and the Wolf (Op. 67)34 is 
a work of fiction because it is used for telling a story, Peter and the Wolf, using mu-
sic. Because of that lack of images and words in its medium of delivery, it is hard to 
claim that this work describes any sequence of events.  
The central issue of whether this work is a work of fiction is whether this 
piece of music is a work of representation. While my account does not specify 
whether a work of fiction is a work of narrative, it does specify that it needs to be a 
work of representation. I do not know how music represents any event. This issue 
needs to be settled by a debate on representation. If this work alone represents at 
least one event, then my account allows it to be a work of fiction. This is because 
being a work of fine music as such, its experience of apprehension, is certainly in-
tended for end value, and is taken in that way. Also, Prokofiev certainly intended 
the audience to focus on the interior properties of his music, like its composition.  
Even if the debate on whether a work of music represents any event is nev-
er settled, I still have an opinion to contribute to this case. First, this is a very spe-
cial case. Most works of music, like Bach’s Sonatas and Partitas for solo violin (BWV 
                                                 
34
 Thanks to Mark Textor for bringing this point up. 
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1001-1006), are not intended by the composer or author to represent any event, 
nor do the audiences normally take them in this way. Secondly, my most straight-
forward answer to this piece by Prokofiev is that it does not matter whether it is a 
work of fiction. It can be taken as if it is a work of a fiction because audiences usu-
ally associate a narrative to it; and because such an association is intended by the 
author, Prokofiev. If representation can be stretched to include this sort of preva-
lent and authorial intended association, then this is a work of representation and 
thus a work of fiction according to my account. If the notion of representation does 
not stretch this far, then audience takes it as if it is a work of representation be-
cause of its prevalent and intended association with a story. For this reason, audi-
ences and critics may value this work as if it is a work of fiction without confirming 
it to be one.  
 
My Definition of Fiction and Its Contribution to the Debate about Fiction and Mo-
rality 
 
 The advantage of my account goes beyond answering difficult cases; it also 
provides a foundation for other debates related to fiction, though without taking 
any side in these debates. While my account does not support any particular theo-
ry about how narrative art serves the purpose of moral education35, my theory of 
fiction justifies an important claim made in a theory by Carroll (1996) about cases 
                                                 
35
 I shall mention a plausible view on how fiction serves a moral purpose; and I will show how my 
account of fiction is compatible with, and even complementary to, this idea. This idea is by no 
means an exhaustive account of fiction serving a moral purpose. However, it is one of the more 
plausible and widely accepted views.  
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of fiction and morality. It is an advantage of my theory, because even if Carroll’s 
idea is rejected, it does not affect the plausibility of my definition of fiction. My 
definition only provides some ideas that justify an important point made by Carroll.  
There are several reasons for discussing Carroll’s theory here. First, many 
works of fiction are works of narrative art, so complementing theories of art and 
moral education is an advantage of my theory. Second, my definition allows works 
of fiction to serve a moral purpose and tell facts simultaneously (as shown before, 
my definition allows instrumental goals of fiction), so I want to show that my defi-
nition does not have any tension with some iconic theories on how works of fiction 
achieve their moral purpose. Carroll’s theory is one of the most iconic ones and 
one of the most relevant to the ideas in my definition. Therefore, I choose this one 
and show that my theory is not only consistent with it, but also complements it. 
In his theory on how art serves the purpose of moral education, Carroll 
(1996) argues that fiction strengthens the moral understanding of its audiences by 
providing examples of certain morally praiseworthy or blameworthy situations. 
Works of fiction do not only describe or mention series of events; they can also 
lead their audiences to deepen their moral understanding by their experience of 
apprehending the descriptions of those situations and then assign relevant senti-
ments to these situations (p. 230).  
I now apply Carroll’s point to understand how Schindler’s Ark serves a moral 
purpose. Many people know how morally bad Nazism is solely by reading about 
the number of people killed by the Axis powers or reading some documents about 
how people were tortured by Nazi organisations. Nevertheless, a work of fiction 
provides its readers’ with the experience of how some officers felt towards their 
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Jewish slaves. For instance, one character might feel indifferent towards his slaves, 
while another might think he was totally justified in his abusive actions towards 
that slave. Through some fabricated dialogues, Keneally mentions that some army 
officers were not pleased with how the Jews were treated. This experience of ap-
prehension allows readers to not only experience and feel the moral defects of cer-
tain officers but also the helplessness felt by some officers. Some German officers 
in the book were not bystanders to human rights abuses, but they could do rela-
tively little when compared to what some higher up officials could do.  
My theory of fiction justifies Carroll’s point on how works of narrative art 
that are also works of fiction serve a moral purpose. On one hand, a work of fiction 
strengthens the moral knowledge of its readers because they experience the por-
trayal of certain events in the work of fiction; on the other hand, this process is jus-
tified by my theory because readers ought to focus on the plots and events in a 
work of fiction and value the reading experience as an end. Together with the ef-
fect of non-systematic processing of fiction delineated in my comments on Gerrig 
and Prentice’s experiments in Chapter 5, readers of works of fiction are more sus-
ceptible to accept the content of a work that they believe to be a work of fiction as 
true descriptions. If this point also applies to the moral judgement of certain 
events embedded in the content of a work of fiction, then readers will also be 
more likely to adopt the moral standpoint portrayed in a work of fiction, unless 
they strongly disagree with it36. Thus, my theory of fiction justifies Carroll’s idea of 
how art serves the purpose of moral education, though the plausibility of my theo-
                                                 
36
 In Chapter 5, I have addressed the issue of how the strong belief of a reader cancels out the ef-
fect of non-systematic processing of fiction, when elaborating my understanding of Gerrig and 
Prentice’s experiments.  
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ry is not affected by the plausibility of Carroll’s theory. As a result, I have also 
shown that it is plausible for my theory to claim that works of fiction may serve a 
moral purpose, because it complements an important theory from Carroll on how 




In this chapter, I have addressed different issues related to my definition 
and to definitions of fiction in general. In part 1, I used four supplements to clarify 
and defend some important ideas in my definition of fiction. In part 2, I use four 
cases to showcase the plausibility of my definition by addressing some difficult is-
sues and by showing how my definition of fiction complements Carroll’s theory on 
how works of art that are also works of fiction can serve a moral purpose. 
In the first supplement in part 1, I addressed how my account handles a 
problematic case like works of fiction pretending to be works of nonfiction, such as 
Orson Welles’s broadcast of The War of the Worlds. Works like this are not normal-
ly mentioned in the debate about the definition of fiction. My account includes 
works like this by focusing on the experience of initially thinking that the work is 
telling facts, and then recognising that the work is not actually made for telling 
facts but is only pretending to do so. The end value of apprehension lies in the ex-
perience of recognition: the work is like a work of nonfiction, though it is not made 
for lying or telling facts. I argue that the audience take this experience as end val-
ue.  
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I then constructed a possible case out of Welles’s broadcast. I changed his 
intention of wanting the audience to believe and then recognise that the broadcast 
as a work of fiction shortly afterwards. I explained this case by including the expe-
rience of the change in audience’s experience of the work into the idea of the ex-
perience of apprehension in my definition of fiction. I did so in two distinct ways. 
First, I included this experience of change as the experience of apprehension, be-
cause it is what the author of the work intends to achieve by creating his work, and 
then include the change of audience’s experience as part of a work of fiction. 
Therefore, the experience of change is an experience of apprehending a work of 
fiction. Second, I simply took the experience of apprehension in this case to be a 
more complex experience, one which includes two initial experiences of the con-
tent of a work of fiction and an experience of the change from one experience of 
apprehension to another. 
 In the second supplement, I clarified what I mean when I use the idea of 
work. Although I am not committed to any particular definition of work, I agree 
with Lamarque that work includes the context of production. I clarified the idea of 
work because I mention this idea very often throughout the entire project, and 
have just used it to explain the difficult possible case about Welles’s broadcast The 
War of the Worlds in supplement 1. 
In the third supplement in part 1, I clarified that end value does not mean 
aesthetic value. End value may not be aesthetic value. An audience or even an au-
thor may value a work of fiction in virtue of how funny and sad it is. He takes the 
funniness and sadness in the plot of the work as an end in itself, which may not 
mean that he thinks that the work has any aesthetic value. 
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In the fourth supplement of part 1, I argued that the possible weakness of 
phenomenal concept as a philosophical idea does not affect the overall plausibility 
of my definition, though the idea of phenomenal concept plays a role in construct-
ing my definition. Nevertheless, I defended my use of the idea of phenomenal con-
cept against a criticism by Ball, to defend the philosophical foundation of the em-
phasis on the experience of apprehension in my definition. I have argued that Ball’s 
argument is unsound, at least for the idea of phenomenal concept used in the cur-
rent project, by arguing that one of his premises must be false.  
Having completed my clarifications in part 1, I proceeded to part 2 to show-
case the plausibility of my definition.  
In the first case of part 2, I addressed whether myths are works of fiction or 
works of nonfiction. I argued that myths are a complicated case. The central issue 
is whether their authors wanted their content to be taken as literally true. If not, 
then myths will be works of fiction for reasons similar to my rationale for categoris-
ing Schindler’s Ark as a work of fiction. Namely, the authors want their audiences 
to learn some facts or ideas while focusing on the interior properties of their works 
and the end value of the experience of apprehension. If the authors wanted the 
content of their myths to be taken as literally true, I accept that myths are works of 
nonfiction, though they are usually appreciated and valued as if they were works of 
fiction. By doing so, the experience of appending them is of end value including 
aesthetic and artistic value. The intentions of the authors of many myths are un-
known, not to mention they may vary, so I left this issue of whether myths are 
works of fiction with these two plausible interpretations. I believe that these two 
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interpretations cover a huge amount of different scenarios about myths, even if 
they do not cover all of them.  
In my second case in part 2, my account explains why Roman histori-
ographies should be categorised as nonfiction because they were made with the 
intention to convince the audience to accept their content as facts and believe in 
their didactic points, despite containing many fabricated details. Their authors did 
not intend their audience to focus on the interior properties and value the experi-
ence of apprehension as an end, so my definition rejects them from being works of 
fiction. I explained their status as works of nonfiction in the way that I explained 
why In Cold Blood is a work of nonfiction.  
In my third case in part 2, I provided my view about whether my definition 
of fiction can decide whether there are any works of fiction amongst works of mu-
sic. My example is Prokofiev’s work of music Peter and the Wolf (Op. 67). My ac-
count does not provide a definite answer to this question, but I argued that the 
most important issue is whether this piece of music represents any events. If not, it 
cannot be a work of fiction; if it does, then it is very likely to be one.    
For the last case in part 2, I have shown that my theory of fiction provides a 
theoretical foundation for Carroll’s important point that fiction serves certain 
moral purpose by inviting the audience to experience certain fictional events from 
a certain moral perspective. My theory provides a theoretical foundation for this 
account, because the audience is intended by the author to focus on the fictional 
events when reading works of fiction. Therefore, my account supports Carroll’s 
point by claiming that the audience is doing so because they are doing what the 
author intends them to do. Following this, it is plausible for me to claim that my 
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definition of fiction allows works of fiction to serve a moral purpose because my 
definition complements an iconic theory by Carroll on how works of narrative art 
serve a moral purpose. It is an advantage particularly because the plausibility of my 
account is not affected even if Carroll’s theory is rejected. 
 In this chapter, I have defended the theoretical foundation of my account. 
Further, I have also used my definition to explain some complicated cases of fiction 
categorisation that have either been ignored or poorly explained. This has allowed 



















 The overall goal of this work has been to demonstrate that there is no plau-
sible existing definition of fiction, and then to argue for my own, non-imagination-
based definition of fiction that is free from the fundamental flaws of imagination-
based approaches. 
 Throughout this work, I have addressed the dominant, imagination-based 
approaches, and then moved progressively away from them before arriving at my 
own definition. I began by addressing dominant theories of fiction and demonstrat-
ing their weaknesses in Chapters 1 and 2. I demonstrated three fundamental flaws 
in these theories: 
 1.  No imagination-based theory in its current form can plausibly explain the 
role of assertions in fiction. 
2. No imagination-based theory can differentiate between works of fiction 
created for telling facts and works of nonfiction made with intentionally 
fabricated details. 
3. A plausible definition of imagination or make-believe that can be used to 
save imagination-based theories from points 1 and 2, but as seen in Chap-
ter 2, imagination-based theorists appear to have no clue regarding the 
functional role of imagination in fiction, which is the important point that 
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differentiates imagination in fiction from belief. Therefore, I refuse to ac-
cept imagination-based theories as plausible theories of fiction. 
 With imagination-based theories off the table, I then turned to Friend’s 
non-imagination-based approach, which nonetheless incorporates the concept of 
imagination, albeit not as a necessary component. I showed how her definition is 
at best incomplete for the following reasons: 
1. Unlike imagination-based accounts, Friend’s genre approach does not 
identify any features of a work that make it fictional. Instead, she only pro-
duces a list of the standard features of works of fiction, and then uses them 
to categorise works of representation as works of fiction. However, her set 
of standard features may well be stereotypes that are sometimes used to 
identify fiction, rather than fundamental features of fictional works, as I 
showed using Putnam’s distinction between definitions and stereotypes. 
Thus, this method of categorisation only demonstrates how fiction is con-
ventionally classified in certain communities, rather than answering the 
question of what makes a work of representation a work of fiction. Though 
it is possible that there are no such properties, Friend does not make this 
argument. 
2. One of the strongest reasons given by Friend for any philosopher to 
adopt her genre approach to define fiction is the failure of imagination-
based theories that she argued for. Nevertheless, as seen in chapter 2, 
there are convincing alternative reading to the imagination-based theories 
that does not falsify them. Therefore, I have yet to find a reason to abandon 
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the clear-cut imagination-based approach and adopt the vague genre ap-
proach proposed by her.  
After setting Friend aside, I address Deutsch’s definition, which is a total 
breakaway from the imagination-based approach, as it does not involve imagina-
tion at all. I reject a fundamental part of this definition, namely how he defines 
making something up via the principles of poetic license, and thus rejected his the-
ory, showing that it contains a threat of circularity, results in problems related to 
Russell’s paradox, and includes meaningless writings as fiction. I also reject his al-
ternative interpretation of making something up with its emphasis on authorial 
authority, since it does not provide enough material to be a plausible definition of 
fiction. Its emphasis on authorial authority is simply not detailed enough to be a 
definition of fiction, even though it confirms that authorial intention is a necessary 
condition for defining fiction.   
Having now rejected all the imagination-based theories as well as those of 
Friend and Deutsch, I attacked the problem from the opposite perspective: scepti-
cism about whether there is a meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfic-
tion. I covered and undermined Matravers’s scepticism by showing that he misin-
terprets the data from the social science experiments on which his argument is 
founded. While he incorrectly states that the findings from these studies show that 
there is no meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction, I show how they, 
in fact, support the existence of a meaningful distinction between fiction and non-
fiction, though not an imagination-based one. 
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This left the field clear for me to construct my own definition of fiction, 
which I did in Chapter 6. In doing so, I included the component of authorial inten-
tion, as it is uncontroversial and I agree with it. Second, I use findings from social 
science that show that works of fiction are processed non-systematically, while 
works of nonfiction are processed systematically. 
Since the concept of non-systematic processing was not developed enough 
to be philosophically useful for defining fiction, I refined it for use in this debate 
using other philosophical ideas, including interior properties, phenomenal concept, 
and end value. I then stated my definition thus: 
A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends 
it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or 
any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior 
properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work 
in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in ques-
tion. 
 
I then went on to demonstrate the plausibility of my definition by using it to 
solve most of the major problems that other definitions of fiction have been una-
ble to solve, including why In Cold Blood is a work of nonfiction and why Schindler’s 
Ark is a work of fiction. According to my account, the answer lies in the difference 
of what the author intends himself or the audience to focus on: only in the appre-
hension of fiction is the focus intended to be on the end value of the experience. 
I have also addressed the persistent problem of the role of assertions in fic-
tion, for which no theory has provided a satisfactory explanation. I argue that an 
assertion in fiction is an assertion with a secondary effect. While it retains the es-
sential effect possessed by other assertions, including being an expression of belief 
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and an attempt to change the presuppositions of the audience, it also has a sec-
ondary effect of contributing to the end value of the experience of apprehending a 
work of fiction. My explanation is inclusive of the many different types of contribu-
tions to end value that assertions in fiction can make. Consequently, I created my 
own explanation of assertions, and stated it thus: 
Assertions in fiction are made for a secondary effect. They are never only 
made for their essential effects, and their secondary effects are what set 
them apart from assertions in nonfiction. The secondary effect of assertions 
in fiction is to contribute to how the author or any other audience values 
the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end by its rela-
tion to other parts of the work of fiction. 
 
Besides demonstrating the plausibility of my definition, my arguments on 
assertions also showed that it is implausible to claim that there are no assertions in 
fiction. Additionally, they explained why assertions in a work of fiction do not 
change it to be a work of nonfiction: the secondary effect of assertions in fiction is 
determined by the context of being in a work of fiction, so they cannot change a 
work of fiction to a work of nonfiction just by being part of it. 
In the last chapter before this overall conclusion, I addressed how my defi-
nition of fiction handles different miscellaneous issues related to fiction. I divided 
this chapter into two sections: in the first one, I clarified some subtleties about my 
account using four supplements. In the second one, I showcased the plausibility of 
my account by addressing three difficult cases and then showing how my account 
complements an iconic theory in a related debate. 
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In my first supplement, I argued that my account works for those works of 
fiction that are created to imitate works of nonfiction, since the author still intends 
these works to be valued by the experience of apprehending them — in this case, 
the end value is found in the discovery of the works’ fictional status. In the second 
supplement, I clarified my use of the idea of work in my project. In the third sup-
plement, I clarified that end value is not always an aesthetic value, because experi-
ences such as enjoying a plot can be an end value, but are not always an aesthetic 
one. In the fourth supplement, I defended the theoretical foundation of my em-
phasis on the experience of apprehending a work by defending my use of the 
phenomenal concept.  
Then, in the first case of part 2, I argued that although my account does not 
have a definitive answer for the question of whether myths are works of fiction or 
nonfiction, it provides two plausible interpretations to cover many cases of myths: 
if the authors intended the myths to be taken non-literally, then myths should be 
categorised as fiction, for reasons similar to the categorisation of Schindler’s Ark. 
Alternatively, if the authors did intend the content of myth to be taken literally, 
then myths should be categorised as works of nonfiction, although they are still 
often considered as though they were works of fiction because of the end value of 
apprehending them. Then, in case 2 of part 2, I showed how my definition catego-
rises Roman historiographies as works of nonfiction with fabricated parts, similarly 
to In Cold Blood. In case 3 of part 2, I addressed the issue of whether Prokofiev’s 
musical work Peter and the Wolf (Op. 67) is a work of fiction. While I did not pro-
vide a definitive answer, I showed how the central issue of this question is whether 
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the musical work represents an event. If so, it is a work of fiction, and if not, it can-
not be one. Finally, in case 4 of part 2, I showed how my definition of fiction can 
serve as the theoretical foundation for one of the most iconic theories in a related 
debate: Carroll’s theory of how a work of narrative art can serve a moral purpose. 
 
The Contributions of My Project 
 
 My project makes many significant contributions to the debate about the 
definition of fiction. First, I have provided a definition that differentiates works of 
fiction made for telling facts from works of nonfiction made with intentionally fab-
ricated parts. No other definition of fiction seen in this project manages to do so. 
Second, I have explained a related issue: why a work of fiction can contain asser-
tions without becoming a work of nonfiction. There is very little previous research 
on this question. Third, my definition of fiction explains the case of mental fiction 
in a plausible way, because the role of the audience is not necessary for my defini-
tion. Fourth, my definition of fiction is one of the very few that not affected by 
Matravers’s scepticism about whether there is a meaningful difference between 
fiction and nonfiction. It indeed is built on the failure of his scepticism. Therefore, 
the fifth advantage of my project is to show that there is indeed a meaningful dis-
tinction between fiction and nonfiction. Sixth, my definition plausibly categorises 
difficult cases like myths and Roman historiographies. Although Friend attempted 
to do the same thing, I have shown that her account has no cross-media applicabil-
ity and is at best incomplete. Seventh, my definition can answer whether certain 
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works of non-narrative art are works of fiction, like Prokofiev’s symphony Peter 
and the Wolf.  
Because I have settled many issues surrounding the difficult cases related 
to definitions of fiction with my definition, research about fiction can enter a new 
stage. First, it is now more possible to answer whether there are works of fiction in 
the medium of non-narrative art. My project has not provided a definite answer to 
this issue when addressing Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf, though it has identified 
the central issue in this question. This provides a potential for the further devel-
opment of philosophical debates about fiction. Further, as a new understanding of 
the idea of fiction, my definition of fiction can provide theoretical foundations for 
philosophers to discuss whether and how works of fiction can serve a moral pur-
pose. Although I have shown that my theory complements Carroll’s iconic theory in 
this debate, my theory may serve this related debate in a different way, which is 
another possible development from my project.  
To conclude, by rejecting all the major theories of fiction, from those of im-
agination-based theorists to Friend and Deutsch, as well as demonstrating that 
there is a meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction and then using an 
unusually interdisciplinary methodology to create my own definition of fiction that 
is free from the flaws of previous definitions, can do many things that they cannot, 
and opens up several new avenues of research, I have made a significant and origi-
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